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 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
LIONS AND ROSES: 
 
AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF ISRAELI-IRANIAN RELATIONS 
 
by  
 
Marsha B. Cohen 
 
Florida International University, 2007 
 
Miami, Florida 
 
Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor 
 
This multi-disciplinary research project explores the religious and cultural 
foundations within the “master commemorative narratives” that frame Israeli and Iranian 
political discourse. In articulating their grievances against one another, Israeli and Iranian 
leaders express the tensions between religion, nationalism, and modernity in their own 
societies.  
The theoretical and methodological approach of this dissertation is constructivist-
interpretivist. The concept of “master commemorative narratives” is adapted from Yael 
Zerubavel’s study of ritualized remembrance in Israeli political culture, and applied to 
both Israeli and Iranian foreign policy.  Israel’s master commemorative narrative draws 
heavily upon the language of the Hebrew Bible, situating foreign policy discourse within 
a paradigm of covenantal patrimony, exile, and return, despite the unrelenting hostility of 
eternal enemies and “the nations.”   Iran’s master commemorative narrative expresses 
Iranian suspicion of foreign encroachment and interference, and of the internal corruption 
that they engender, sacralizing resistance to the forces of evil in the figurative language 
and myths of pre-Islamic tradition and of Shi‘a Islam. Using a constructivist-interpretive 
 vi
 methodological approach, this research offers a unique interpretive analysis of the 
parallels between these narratives, where they intersect, and where they come into 
conflict.  It highlights both the broad appeal and the diverse challenges to the components 
of these “master” narratives within Israeli and Iranian politics and society. 
The conclusion of this study explains the ways in which the recognition of 
religious and cultural conflicts through the optic of master commemorative narratives can 
complement the perspectives of other theoretical approaches and challenge the 
conventions of Security Studies.  It also suggests some of the potential practical 
applications of this research in devising more effective international diplomacy.  
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 CHAPTER   I 
  COMPARING THE INCOMPARABLE 
Introduction 
Iran and Israel share no common border and have no irredentist claims on one 
another’s territory.  Both have long been regarded by their neighbors as perpetual 
outsiders in the largely Sunni Arab Middle East, yet each considers itself to be at the 
center of the universe.1  Both have highly factionalized political systems in which the 
right and the power to impute value to the actions of the state, to enunciate the state’s 
transcendent political vision, and to articulate the grievances of the state in the 
international political arena are all strongly contested.2  
Each asserts the conviction of its own cultural uniqueness and superiority, based 
upon its continuity with an ancient culture that first formulated and nurtured the highest 
ideals of civilization.  Each views its history through an optic of victimization en route to 
redemption that mandates exemption from—even defiance of—cosmopolitan ideals and 
universal norms.3   Fueled and justified by narratives of grievance and betrayal in the past  
                                                 
1. According to Jewish legend, the foundation stone (even ha-shatiya) of the universe is 
located within the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, over which.  Solomon’s Temple was built.  It  is 
presently beneath the Dome of the Rock.  See Howard Schwartz, Tree of Souls:  The Mythology 
of Judaism (Oxford and New York:  Oxford, 2004), 96-98. Cf. Graham E. Fuller, The “Center of 
the Universe”:  The Geopolitics of Iran (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), 1.   
     
2. Myron J. Aronoff, “Myths, Symbols and Rituals of the Emerging State,” in Laurence J. 
Silberstein, ed. New Perspectives on Israeli History:  The Early Years of the State (New York and 
London:  New York University Press), 177ff.  Cf. Daniel Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini:  The 
Struggle for Reform in Iran (Chicago and London:  University of Chicago Press, 2001), 
particularly chapters 6-7.    
 
3. See, for example, Esther Azolai, “Conquest of the Land: The Moral Dimension,” 
Nekuda 77, August 31, 1984, pp. 18; 31:  “There is a qualitative difference between the Torah 
 
 1
 and messianic salvation in the future, both the Jewish state and the Islamic Republic 
selectively draw upon cultural symbols and myths,4 nationalist historiography, and 
religious texts in constructing a usable past for a state and society unlike any that has ever 
existed in Jewish or Islamic history.5   
           In few countries is civil society so permeated by religion, even among avowed 
secularists, with religious and national symbols intertwined.6   Paradoxically, however, 
the heuristic content of shared texts, rituals, symbols, and “the lessons of history” and 
how they ought to be applied to contemporary domestic politics and international affairs, 
are also vociferously contested in similar ways.   Expressed in Hebrew and Persian, both 
                                                 
 
morality of the people of Israel and the moral laws of other peoples spread over the earth which 
are derived from anthrocentric worldviews in which man stands at the center of law and is the 
highest value.  In contrast, the Jewish worldview is theocentric.  For the believer the source of 
both action and belief is the command of God.” Quoted  by Ian S. Lustick, For the Land and the 
Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), 121.   
 
4. Use of the term “myth” here and subsequently follows Bascom:  “Myths are prose 
narratives which, in the society in which they are told, are considered to be truthful accounts of 
what happened in the remote past.”  William Bascom, “Prose Narratives,” in Sacred Narrative:  
Readings in the Theory of  Myth, ed. Alan Dundes (Berkeley et al:  University of California 
Press, 1984.),  9. 
 
5. As Sami Zubaida points out, “There is a dualism in the Iranian state of nation-state 
concepts intermingled with Islamic forms.  These forms are not revivals or continuities with 
historical instances but quite novel creations.  Khomeini’s doctrine of velayat –e faqih, for 
instance, as applied to government, is a major departure from historical Islamic political thought 
and practice, including Shi‘ism.  The duality is indicated in the very designation  Islamic 
“republic” (jomhuri).  “Republic” represents a link with the French revolution and all the 
revolutions of this century, in the region and outside, which have toppled a monarchy.”   Sami 
Zubaida, “An Islamic State?  The Case of Iran,” Middle East Report, no. 153, Islam and the State 
(July-August 1988), 4. 
 
6. Myron J. Aronoff, “Civic  Religion in Israel.” RAIN 44 (June 1981), 4-6.  In his 
conclusion, Aronoff observes that his concept of civic religion might also be applicable 
elsewhere.  He offers Iran as a conspicuous example of another case besides Israel of a society 
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 ancient languages that have evolved into their present forms while retaining deep layers 
of historic connotation and nuance, political discourse in both Israel and Iran draws upon 
vocabulary and imagery from sacred texts that, at one and the same time, resonate as if 
they were divine fiat, but whose ambiguity allows for considerable interpretive flexibility 
and ideological disputes.   
This research seeks to explore and explain the religious and cultural foundations 
of the foreign policies of Israel and Iran by examining messages from the past that are 
conveyed through, inferred from, and justified by sacred text and tradition.  It focuses on 
the various ways that images of the past, expressed in religious symbols and metaphors, 
are invoked and interpreted as relevant paradigms for the present and the future in the 
Israeli and Iranian “master commemorative narratives” that contextualize Israeli and 
Iranian foreign policy discourse.  Master commemorative narratives fuse diverse stories 
about the past into a coherent saga of the formation of a nation—a unified group with a 
unique character—as it moves through time.7  “Nationalist movements typically attempt 
to create a master commemorative narrative that highlights their members’ common past 
and legitimizes their aspiration for a shared future,” one of the most significant 
mechanisms for constructing a nation’s identity.  
                                                 
 
which has, or is developing, a religiously based or oriented cultural framework that is becoming 
ideologically prominent or dominant. 
 
7. Yael Zerubavel, Recovered Roots:  Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli 
National Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 7. 
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  In the process of recovering the past, a highly selective attitude toward available 
historical knowledge comes into play.8 The dynamic process of recovering memory of 
the past also requires omission and/or conflation of historic facts—in other words, 
“forgetting.”  Drawing upon religious, historiographic, and literary texts, as well as 
political documents and discourse, this study approaches foreign policy through the optic 
of  ritualized collective memory—“selective memory,”9 “collective amnesia,”10 and 
“neglected memory,”11—reflected in these narratives.  It identifies and elaborates some 
of the deep-seated religious and cultural affinities, ambivalences, suspicions, and 
grievances that have shaped Israeli and Iranian political discourse.  
Problem 
This interdisciplinary research explores the framework, as well as the tensions and 
contradictions, within the “master commemorative narratives” that are the foundations of 
Israeli and Iranian political discourse.  To what extent are cultural conceptualizations 
expressed in religious imagery, and the historiographic frameworks within which they are 
depicted, significant factors in the construction, articulation and legitimation of Israeli 
and Iranian foreign policy?  How do parallel tensions within Israeli and Iranian 
cultures—between “tradition” and “modernity,” “collective memory” and “cultural 
                                                 
8.  Zerubavel, 214. 
9. Driss Maghraoui, “Moroccan Colonial Soldiers: Between Selective Memory and 
Collective Memory-Beyond Colonialism and Nationalism in North Africa,”  Arab Studies 
Quarterly 20,  no. 1 (Spring 1998), 21-22.   
 
10.  Zerubavel, 8.   
 
11. Yaacov Shavit, “Cyrus King of Persia and the Return to Zion:  A Case of Neglected 
Memory.”  History and Memory 2, no. 1 (1990), 51-83.   
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 amnesia,” and “utopianism’ and “pragmatism”—influence perceptions of the strategic 
environment, and shape the threats that Israelis and Iranians perceive from one another?  
In what ways are the narratives, counter-narratives, myths, and ritualized remembrances 
that articulate these threats reflected and reified in Israeli and Iranian foreign policy 
discourse? 
This study begins from the premise that, for all of their expressed enmity and 
animosity, Israel and Iran have much in common—historically, politically, culturally, and 
religiously—particularly in the ways in which religious texts and tenets are used to 
articulate and legitimate foreign policy goals.   This is reflected not only in numerous 
parallel conceptualizations of religious tradition, modernity, and nationalism, and the 
tensions between them, but also in the  in which seemingly opposing tendencies are 
mirror images of one another, revealing commonalities in some surprising ways. 12 For a 
variety of reasons identified, elaborated and explained within the scope of this project, 
these commonalities have been forgotten or are deliberately ignored or repressed.  The 
interdisciplinary and multi-disciplinary research presented here supports its thesis that it 
is the clash of commonalities, rather than a “clash of civilizations,” that best explains the 
hostility between Israel and Iran during recent decades.  Paradoxically, however, the 
recognition of these cultural commonalities might someday have the potential to 
                                                 
 
 
12 See Abdolkarim Soroush, “The Three Cultures,” in Reason, Freedom and Democracy in 
Islam:  Essential Writings of Abdolkarim Soroush, transl. and ed. Mahmoud Sadri and 
Ahmad Sadri (Oxford and New York:  Oxford , 2000), 156. 
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 overwrite this hostility, were the geopolitical environment to ever make it strategically 
advantageous for Israeli and Iranian political leaders to reestablish ties.   
Purpose  
This research project has several objectives.  The first is to challenge the 
widespread presumption of the singularity, and thus the incomparability, of Israel and 
Iran with any other states, let alone with one another.   Conceptions of the uniqueness of 
Israel’s state and society have long justified the exclusion of Israel from comparisons 
with other polities and its exemption from numerous categories of conventional 
classification, and that exclusion is then invoked as further evidence of Israeli 
exceptionalism: “Neither East nor West, developed nor underdeveloped, capitalist nor 
socialist, Third World or First World, there is little about Israel that automatically 
reminds us of other countries and their historical experiences.”13  
 Iran shares this resistance to these conventional classification, also resisting 
designation as “east” or “west,” 14  “developed or undeveloped,” “capitalist or socialist,” 
and “First World or Third World” on a multiplicity of levels that are similar or parallel to 
Israel’s singularity in a number of ways.  Walter Posch points to Iran’s unbroken 3,000 
                                                 
13.   Michael  N. Barnett, “The Politics of Uniqueness:  the Status of the Israeli Case,” in 
Israel in Comparative Perspective, Challenging the Conventional Wisdom, ed. Michael N. 
Barnett (Albany, SUNY, 1996), 3. 
 
14. Ramazani explains that  Khomeini’s doctrine of “Neither East nor West, only the 
Islamic Republic” (nah sharq, nah gharb, faqat jumhuri- islami) referred not simply to non-
alignment or equidistance from the superpowers, but to ideological opposition to and conflict 
with the superpowers that have “arrogated all the worldly power (qudrat) to themselves at the 
expense of the exploited, dispossessed masses of the people everywhere. R.K. Ramazani, 
Revolutionary Iran:  Challenge and Response in the Middle East (Baltimore and London:  Johns 
Hopkins , 1988), 21.  
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 year national history, to the geographic boundaries that contributed to the sense of Iranian 
isolation, and the role of the Persian language in culturally unifying much of the vast 
region between the Ottoman Empire and India, as factors contributing to “Iran’s strong, 
albeit rather schizophrenic, national identity, which is marked by overt self confidence on 
the one hand and by a deep sense of victimization on the other.”15 Historic victimization 
amalgamated with exaggerated self-confidence also characterizes Israel’s civil religion, 
which takes “exaggerated pride in military prowess.”16  The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) 
embodies “the myth of the fighting Jew,” and is the centerpiece of Israel’s “avenging cult 
of reprisal” and the “ceremonies and rituals by which the state legitimizes its institutions, 
cements the loyalty of its citizens, and commemorates its history.”17  
 One manifestation of Israeli and Iranian cultural nationalism is their respective 
protectiveness of moledet (Hebrew) and vatan (Persian)—the eroticized, adored feminine 
geobody of the beloved homeland.18  “Constituted as a maternal familial space, vatan 
became the site for redefining and nationalizing masculinity and its attributes.”19 
                                                 
15. Walter Posch, Introduction, Iranian Challenges, Chaillot Paper 89 (Paris: European 
Union Institute for Security Studies, May 2006), 10. 
 
16. Raymond Cohen, “Israel’s Starry- Eyed Foreign Policy,” Middle East Quarterly,  
June 1994.  
 
17. R. Cohen, “Israel’s Starry- Eyed Foreign Policy.” 
 
18. Meron Benvenisti, Conflicts and Contradictions  (New York:  Vintage Books, 1986),  
19-20; David Biale, Eros and the Jews (New York: Basic Books, 1992),  183; Cf. Afsaneh 
Najmabadi, “The Erotic Vatan [Homeland] as Beloved and Mother: To Love, to Possess, and To 
Protect,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 39, No. 3. (July, 1997),  444-445;  
Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi, Refashioning Iran:  Orientalism, Occidentalism and Historiography 
(Houndsmill and New York: Palgrave, 2001), 127-133.    
 
19. Tavakoli-Targhi, Refashioning Iran,132. 
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 Similarly, the eroticization of labor  by the young chalutzim (“pioneers”) who came to 
Palestine from Eastern Europe —building and being built up by agricultural work and 
physically demanding toil—“was closely bound up with images of the land of Israel as 
lover, a kind of materialistic transformation of the old allegory of love between God and 
Israel.”20  In the biblical Book of Lamentations, an ancient dirge composed about the 
destruction of Jerusalem by the Babylonians that is recited each year on the 9th of the 
Hebrew month of Av (Tisha b’Av),  the disgraced city of Jerusalem, the “daughter of 
Zion,” is depicted as a  despoiled woman  whose “uncleanness clings to her skirts” (Lam. 
1:9).  In the ghayrat literature of the constitutional revolutionary years of the early 
twentieth century, foreign intervention has dishonored the chastity of the vatan: “the 
enemies of the motherland were depicted as rapists” and adulterers [zinakaran].21 
Iran is a challenging test case for theories of identity and foreign policy, observes 
Suzanne Maloney, because it is one of the world’s only modern theocracies.  Maloney 
suggests that this raises some interesting questions about the impact of spiritual aspects of 
identity on a state’s security dilemmas, both in general and in the particular case of 
Islamist ideology:  “The literature on Iran typically adopts divergent explanations of this 
dynamic, either dismissing religion as merely a cynical tool for legitimating state 
                                                 
 
 
20 Biale, Eros and the Jews, 183. 
 
21. Tavakoli-Targhi, Refashioning Iran, 128.  Saskia Gieling,  who translates vatan as 
“fatherland,” states that it has a religious connotation while mihan, another word for fatherland, 
has a more patriotic connotation.  Saskia Gieling, Religion and War in Revolutionary Iran 
(London and New York: I.B. Taurus, 1999), 152-153. 
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 interests or, alternatively, interpreting Islamic evangelism and doctrine as the primary 
determinants of Iran’s international agenda.”22  Yet, with the exception of Israeli political  
analysis emanating from what are often disparaged as “liberal,” “left wing” or “post-
Zionist” Israeli academics and journalists,  scholarly literature tends to overlook the 
adaptation or manipulation of religious concepts to serve political interests, and often 
ignores, when it does not embrace, the role of religiously-rooted concepts and national 
myths in the formation and articulation of Israel’s foreign policy.    
Israel is, in some respects, a theocracy, with the Hebrew Bible loosely serving as 
the basis of the secularized civil religion of the Israeli nation, as well as the textual 
foundation of a broad spectrum of religious interpretations of Judaism (and of 
Christianity), which  shapes (or, as many Israelis and Israel-supporters abroad believe, 
ought to shape) Israel’s foreign policy. Sixty years after its founding, the State of Israel 
(in contrast to “theocratic” Iran) still has no constitution.  Ever since the first 
constitutional draft was presented to Israel’s founders prior to the convening of Israel’s 
first parliamentary session, competing claims about the role of religion in state and 
society that have framed the debates over “who is a Jew?”, and what a “Jewish state” is 
and ought to be, have proven impossible to reconcile.23      
Israel’s religious parties want to leave open the possibility of imposing of 
orthodox law (halakha) as the law of the state, while Israel’s secular parties of both the 
                                                 
22. Suzanne Maloney, “Identity and Change in Iran’s Foreign Policy,” in Identity and  
Foreign Policy in the Middle East, eds. Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2002), 89. 
 
23. Baruch Kimmerling, “Danger that lurks in a constitution.”  Haaretz, March 31, 2005. 
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 left and right generally favor some separation of religion and state.24 Within the areas of 
governance over which orthodox and ultra-orthodox rabbis have been permitted to 
exercise maximum and almost exclusive control over issues of personal status of Jewish 
Israelis, including marriage, divorce, conversion, as well as defining of “who is a Jew” 
for any purpose other than immigration under the “law of return,” debates over the 
relationship of religion and state in Israel have no parallel in secular western 
democracies, although they share some points in common with those taking place in Iran.  
Theopolitics and geopolitics reinforce one another, fomenting and mobilizing 
unconditional opposition to Israel’s relinquishing any territory conquered in past or future 
wars.  Many Israelis consider Yesha-- the Hebrew acronym for Judea, (Yehuda), Samaria 
(Shomron) and Gaza (Aza)—to be part of biblical Israel and the Jewish patrimony 
promised by God to the Jewish people, and are theologically as well as politically 
opposed to Israeli withdrawal from any of its presently-held territories and to the 
“uprooting” of any of the Jewish settlements beyond Israel’s pre-war boundaries.  
According to Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, one of the leading ideologues of Israel’s religious-
nationalism, “there is an absolute Torah prohibition against the transfer of any portion of 
our holy land to foreign rule.”  Even the Land of Israel not yet ruled by Jews must be 
acquired at any cost. 25   
The Israeli “new Jew” and the Islamic Republic’s “new Islamic man” are both 
envisioned as the product of a new utopian, religio-nationalist political order. The 
                                                 
24. Bernard Avishai, The Tragedy of Zionism:  Revolution and Democracy in the Land 
of Israel. (New York:  Farrar Straus Giroux, 1985), 185-187. 
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 idealized muscular Jew envisioned by Israel’s secular nationalist founders was conceived 
of as the antithesis of the stereotypical weak, passive, and “feminine” European Jew of 
the diaspora who had submitted passively to persecution, pogroms, and extermination.  
Iran’s Islamic revolution set out to create an ideal Muslim man whose daily life—
politically, economically, legally, and socially—would be structured and oriented around 
the teachings and values of Islam:   
Ridding the Muslim world of its foreign imitations is but a small part of the goal.  
The top priorities are writing new constitutions, distributing national resources 
more equitably, and restructuring tax systems so they will be less exploitive or 
burdensome. These goals have great appeal...The appeal has been reinforced by 
regular contacts and reinforcements from the clergy, messages of support for the 
oppressed minorities at Friday prayers and in the media, solutions in the Koran to 
the questions, big and little, of life.26  
 
 According to Barry Rubin, “Khomeini and his aides and their allies produced an 
opposition ideology that that fit their country’s historical/cultural predispositions and also 
supplied a complete set of explanations for Iran’s problems.”27 Competing 
conceptualizations  of the proper relationship between religious law and the laws of the 
state continue to shape debates in Israel and Iran over the possibility and desirability of 
                                                 
 
25. Quoted in Lustick,  95. 
 
26. Robin Wright, Sacred Rage: the Wrath of Militant Islam (New York: Touchstone 
Books, 1985), 44.                                                                                                                                                           
 
27. Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions:  The American Experience and Iran (New 
York:  Penguin, 1981), 272. 
 
 11
 reconciling Judaism or Islam with democracy, and how to balance the imperatives 
derived from national, religious and modern values.28  
   In both Judaism and Islam,  political discourse, when a passage from a sacred 
text or tradition can be useful in making a point, supporting a position in a controversy, or 
providing a basis for decision-making, law, or public policy, it is invoked.   Sacred texts 
at variance with policy are ignored or reinterpreted.  In traditional Judaism and Islam, 
reinterpretations take place through textual commentary (midrash in Judaism, tafsir in 
Islam,) and by deferring to oral tradition (minhag in Judaism, hadith in Islam).  The 
question of who is authorized to invoke or reinterpret a sacred text or tradition for a 
specific purpose is at the heart of most debates about the nature of religious authority, 
with rabbis and ayatollahs vying for control of the process of interpretation within a 
particular context or specific community.  
  “Religious fundamentalism” is therefore much less about textual literalism than it 
is about univocality—the insistence that a text or tradition has only one correct meaning, 
and that only certain arbiters of the law are qualified to ascertain that meaning and how it 
is to be applied to a given issue or problem.   This becomes particularly evident, and 
problematic, when univocal and multivocal conceptions of religious law battle with one 
another for acceptance by the state, and in the diasporas beyond its boundaries. 
Religion can, and does, inspire extremism and violent action, in defense of deeply 
held beliefs.29 The death sentence imposed Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini upon British-
                                                 
28. Abdolkarim Soroush, “The Three Cultures,” in Reason, Freedom and Democracy in 
Islam:  Essential Writings of Abdolkarim Soroush, transl. and ed. ahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri 
( Oxford and New York:  Oxford University Press, 2000), 156.   
 12
 Indian novelist Salman Rushdie in February, 1989, attracted worldwide attention, as did 
its subsequent reiterations after Khomeini’s death by his successor, Ali Khamenei, and 
other members of the Iran’s religious and political leadership.30  Reverberating for nearly 
a decade in the relations between Iran and Europe, and the non-relations between Iran 
and the U.S., the “Rushdie fatwa” became equated with, and emblematic of, the religious 
predilections of the clerical rulers of the Islamic Republic of Iran that did not bode well 
for Iranian foreign relations.   
The political impact of religious violence was immeasurably greater when it 
resulted in the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on November 4, 
1995. In the wake of his signing the Oslo Accords, Rabin was denounced by numerous 
Israeli rabbis, most of whom were paid employees of the Jewish state, as a rodef (a 
would-be murderer in hot pursuit) and a moser (a Jew who betrays a fellow Jew to 
gentiles), categories which, according to halakha (Jewish religious law), are designated 
as deserving of death.  The religious logic followed the same principle as that upon which 
Khomeini had issued his call for pious Muslims to kill Rushdie:  in agreeing to turn over 
the West Bank and Gaza to Arabs, Rabin was endangering the lives of Jews, and had to 
be stopped by any means necessary.31 
                                                 
 
29. See Ehud Sprinzak, Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli 
Politics from the Altalena to the Rabin Assassination (New York: The Free Press, 1999).  
 
30. Richard Bernstein, “Passages in Defense of a Colleague:  Writers Read and Speak for 
Rushdie,”  New York Times, Feb. 23, 2989. 
31. Haim Cohen, “Dangerous Halakha.” In Free Judaism & Religion in Israel, ed. 
Yaakov Malkin (Farmington Hills, MI: Free Judaism, 1998), 41-43;   Sprinzak, 244-285. 
 
 13
   The man arrested for Rabin’s assassination, Yigal Amir, used as his defense in 
court the argument that “According to Jewish law, the minute a Jew betrays his people and 
country to the enemy, he must be killed.”32  No specific rabbi could be identified as 
having given Amir explicit permission to assassinate Israel’s Prime Minister.  Indeed, 
several rabbis who had signed the decision declaring Rabin a moser deserving of death 
professed shock that their religious rulings might be taken literally as a license to kill.  
Nevertheless, when thirty of the most highly regarded rabbinic authorities (most, if not 
all, of whom were employees of the Jewish state), were asked whether or not Yitzchak 
Rabin was a moser according to Jewish law (halakha), not a single one offered a negative 
response.33 Many Israelis felt that the very act of issuing such rulings created the climate 
for extremist violence. 
 A year and a half earlier, on February 25, 1994, Baruch Goldstein, an Orthodox 
Jewish settler, had opened fired on five hundred Muslims as they knelt in prayer for 
Ramadan at the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron.  Goldstein killed twenty nine Muslims 
and wounded one hundred others, before he was overcome by worshippers when his rifle 
jammed and beaten to death.  Goldstein’s action was widely perceived by his closest 
associates and the religious-nationalist community in Israel as an act of martyrdom.34 
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 Long believed to be “an island of democracy, secularism, pragmatism, and 
nonviolence,” Israel was widely regarded as an exception to the violence associated with 
religious radicalism elsewhere in the Middle East.35.  Since the 1980s, the emergence of 
the radical Kahanist “culture of violence,” and its overlap with elements of the 
messianically-driven Gush Emunim (“Bloc of the Faithful) movement, challenges this 
assumption.  Furthermore, it raises questions about some deeply cherished verities about 
Israel’s “opaque” and undeclared nuclear program.    
It is only relatively recently that empirical and quantitative academic researchers 
have begun to analyze either Israel or Iran in comparison with any other societies and 
polities, let alone with each other.  The 1990-93 World Values Survey, which gathered 
and cross-culturally examined survey samples from 40 countries representing 70% of the 
world’s population, included neither Israel nor Iran.  However, more recent surveys 
conducted between 1999-2002 now provide at least some empirical data on numerous 
questions that can be usefully applied in quantitative trans-national and cross-cultural 
comparisons between Israel and Iran (although the number of issues for which Israeli 
data is available through the World Values Survey remains quite limited). 36       
Within, and beyond, demonstrating the possibility of constructing a broad but 
nuanced and detailed constructivist-interpretive framework to demonstrate that the 
“unique” cases of Israel and Iran may indeed be productively compared as well as 
contrasted with one another, the research objectives of this project are: 
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 1.  To compare the ways in which Israelis and Iranians utilize sacred text, myths, 
tradition, national-religious historiography, and “selective memory” to construct and 
promote their identification with ancient cultures, traditions, and historic grievances.  
These myths play a foundational role in the construction of their present-day political 
narratives and foreign policy.   Manochehr Dorraj observes, “Political events do not 
occur in a vacuum; they take place in a cultural context by which they are sanctioned, and 
in turn those political events modify cultural norms and sacred symbols.”37  It is in the 
ways in which religious historiography and vocabulary are employed in constructing 
these cultural contexts, and present-day political events interpolated into their respective 
mythic, religious, and historiographic teleologies that, this study argues, Israelis and 
Iranians exhibit the most similarities in their foreign policy discourse.  Although the 
institutional structures that shape and reflect these contexts are quite different, identifying 
and understanding the “hermeneutic trajectory” animating each of these narratives makes 
it possible to better understand the religious and cultural underpinnings of current Israeli-
Iranian enmity.38   
2.  To demonstrate the application of the theoretical and conceptual framework of 
“master commemorative narrative” that illustrates the pervasiveness and salience of 
competing interpretations of religious concepts, myths and symbols in Israeli and Iranian 
political consciousness and discourse.  Acts of commemoration, whether they reinterpret 
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 ancient and medieval practices (e.g. Purim and Ashura),  or create new  commemorations 
under religious auspices, with or without state sponsorship, such as Yom HaShoa 
(Holocaust Remembrance Day) and Quds (Jerusalem) Day in Iran, regenerate and 
revivify the commemorative aspects of the master narrative.  Such events are marked by 
the development of new religious and political rituals and “invented traditions.”  
Furthermore, when recognized and commemorated as typological events and turning 
points, these events may move to the forefront of what Yaacov Shavit calls “active 
historical memory,” emblematic of a period in history, with an analogical status, that is 
being reenacted in the present.   
3.  To highlight the ways in which Israeli and Iranian leaders responded to the 
U.S. “War on Terror” rhetoric and its neo-Manichaean overtones as a challenge as to one 
another, as well as to domestic opponents.  In this study of the period between September 
11, 2001 and U.S. President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” State of the Union address on January 
29, 2002, I provide a content analysis of published statements by politicians and other 
politically influential individuals to highlight specific examples of the tacit presence of 
the “master commemorative narratives” in this discourse. 
  This research also points out the interconnection of the two most contested 
issues in the Israeli-Iranian relationship: the Palestinians and nuclear technology.  From 
the Israeli perspective, the threat posed by Iran gaining nuclear capability gains shrillness 
and becomes front page news whenever Israel is under pressure to make any concrete 
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 territorial concessions to the Palestinians.  On the Iranian side, political support for the 
Palestinian cause and charges of western hypocrisy regarding the Iranian right to nuclear 
technology move to the forefront during domestic power struggles.   
4.  To highlight the ways in which Israelis and Iranians use the negative 
stereotypes of one another to brand and demonize domestic, as well as foreign, political 
opponents.    Iranian opponents of rapprochement with “the west”, and particularly with 
the U.S., accuse proponents of being Zionist counter-revolutionaries.  Secular Israelis, 
resentful of the growing power of orthodox and ultra-orthodox parties and factions, point 
out the resemblance of Israel’s politically powerful rabbis to their counterparts in Iran’s 
clerical establishment.    Religious factors also shape U.S. responses toward, and as an 
audience for, Israeli and Iranian foreign policy rhetoric, which elicit diametrically 
opposite responses from the U.S.  This research explores the extent to which Israel’s 
competitive advantage in eliciting positive responses to its foreign policy from the U.S., 
as well as U.S. negativity toward Iran, derives from elements of the U.S.’s own “master 
commemorative narrative.”  
5.  To suggest some of the ways in which a deeper and broader understanding of 
the religious, historical, and cultural components of the constructions of the past and 
“commemorative narratives” can expand and enrich the field of International Relations.   
Theory and Method 
 The theoretical and methodological approach to this research is constructivist 
and interpretive.  Epistemologically, it is predicated on the assumption that what is, 
and what can be, known by social actors about the past, recent as well as ancient, is 
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 always mediated through interactive historiographic processes that give form and 
meaning to events in the ongoing process of transmitting and commemorating them. 
Michael Kammen observes, “Critics adhering to diverse ideological persuasions 
have suggested that societies in fact reconstruct their pasts rather than record them, and 
that they do so with the needs of contemporary culture clearly in mind...”39 By 
participating in the recollection and commemoration of events in the past that they, as 
individuals, may not personally have experienced, members of a society or polity acquire 
identity and assert solidarity.  In their contributions to the structuring and observance of 
collective commemorative events, and to national historiography through their policy 
statements, speeches, memoirs, and other public commentary, political leaders vie with 
one another for adherence to their own particular constructions of the past and visions of 
the present and future.   This study draws upon a vast and diverse body of academic 
literature that deals with the social construction of collective memory in nationalist 
movements that continues in post-modern cultural analysis, while focusing specifically 
on the practical application of these conceptualizations to analyzing foreign policy in 
Israel and Iran.   
My research extends and applies the analytical framework of Yael Zerubavel’s 
study of ritualized remembrance within the Israeli domestic political sphere40  to Iran, and 
to the role of “master commemorative narratives” in both Israeli and Iranian foreign 
policy.  A synthetic, constructivist-interpretive methodology is employed in the analysis 
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 of the “master commemorative narratives” underlying political speeches, interviews and 
documents, and literature. Dvora Yanow, among the foremost proponents of 
interpretative policy analysis, emphasizes that analysts, policymakers and other actors in 
policy, organizational, and community situations are telling stories, whether for purposes 
of argument or claims making.  These require new modes of narrative analysis beyond 
the conventions of what is generally as qualitative research.41   By integrating the 
analytical tools provided by discourse analysis42 and hermeneutics, and applying them to 
foreign policy, my study seeks to identify and contextualize the use of historiographic 
and religious references whether explicit, implicit, or embedded.43    
 Both the State of Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran are living laboratories 
where ethno-religious myths and symbols gleaned from sacred texts and tradition have 
been drafted, armed, and placed in the frontlines of political change, social 
mobilization and national security during the course of the past half century.   It is 
precisely these national myths that define the boundaries between self and other that 
are the focus of the research presented here.  In both Israel and Iran, perceived 
contemporary threats to the survival of the state from its enemies are depicted as 
reenactments and recapitulations of flashpoints in sacred history.   I compare and 
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 contrast the ways in which political leaders of Israel and Iran utilize carefully chosen 
images from sacred texts and cultural myths in their “master commemorative 
narratives” in shaping their constructions of self and other in political discourse.   
These constructions, reinforced through religious ritual and state-sponsored “invented” 
traditions, in turn influence the ways in traditional texts are read and understood in a 
contemporary context.  Furthermore, I examine the ways in which political and 
religious leaders appropriate and synthesize events and personalities into an 
explanatory discursive paradigm that shapes and justifies foreign policy decision-
making.  
 The adaptation and application of interpretive approaches from social history, 
as well as than social science, comparative literature alongside comparative politics, 
and Religious Studies alongside Security Studies, opens up a vast array of possibilities 
within the field of International Relations and new opportunities to be explored by 
foreign policy analysis. The major deficiency with standard social science models  in 
analyzing how specific states make strategic decisions, according to Caroline Ziemke,  
is that events are plucked out of their historical context and measured against a general 
theoretical model, ignoring “a whole complex of motives, preferences, beliefs, 
prejudices, and ways of thinking   that have deep roots in history.”  States, like 
individuals, use their unique historical experiences that are stored in their national 
myths and symbols of identity to define the boundaries between self and other, and to 
guide their social and political life.  These myths and symbols are more significant for 
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 their motivational power than for their historical accuracy.  Analysts and policy 
makers who ignore them, Ziemke observes, tend to “dismiss the state’s behavior as a 
willful attempt to flaunt international norms, or somehow irrational.”44   
  “Rational choice theory” in the field of International Relations has revealed its 
limitations as well as its steadily declining relevance to policy formulation in recent 
years, most conspicuously with regard to foreign policy towards the Middle East. 45  The 
types of data generated by statistical analysis are proving inadequate and incapable, in 
and of themselves, for predicting, recognizing and dealing with the diplomatic and 
strategic challenges of the 21st century.  There is growing recognition of the need to 
develop and apply new qualitative research methodologies, particularly in research areas 
involved with the dynamics of religious influence on politics.  Unprecedented attention is 
now being given to interdisciplinary perspectives and methodologies from history, 
philosophy, cultural studies, anthropology, and theology “in a shared quest to understand 
the relationship of religion and politics, especially the roles that religion plays and will 
play in the public life in the years to come.”46   It is hoped that the research presented 
here will contribute to this quest. 
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 Literature Review        
Nearly all the available literature in the field of International Relations on Israeli-
Iranian relations is predicated upon a Realist theoretical paradigm.  Among the key 
features of this paradigm are a state-centric approach to international politics and the 
assumption of the state as a unitary actor, whose voice is that of its capital city and/or its 
head of state, irrespective of domestic policy debates and challenges to the legitimacy of  
the regime in power.   The most singular characteristic of the Realist paradigm is the 
assumption that all states act in order to best serve their national interests and to 
maximize their security and power.   Differences and changes in domestic leadership or 
of ruling party are generally considered relevant to foreign policy only insofar as these 
changes reflect, or require, realignment of alliances and/or the methods of enhancing 
power and security that impact external relations.   
One of the ways states maximize their security is by forming alliances in order to 
prevent larger powers from dominating them.   During the 1953-1979 period in Israeli-
Iranian relations, Israel and Iran, two non-Arab states in the largely Arab Middle East 
dominated by Arab states, are generally depicted as having formed an alliance, even a 
“friendship,” notwithstanding the Realist maxim that “states have no friends, only 
interests.”  
  There have been surprisingly few studies of the relationship between Israel and  
Iran, and even fewer which extend into the post-Khomeini decade of the 1990s and the 
twenty-first century. One notable and important exception is the cutting-edge research of 
Trita Parsi. In his most recent work, Treacherous Alliance, Parsi challenges many of the 
longstanding assumptions about the “friendliness” that characterized Israeli and Iranian 
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 relations during the reign of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.47  By the early 1970s, Parsi 
explains, the Shah’s top priority was cultivating ties with the Arab states, particularly 
Egypt.  
Israel, however, did everything it could to prevent a thaw in relations between 
Iran and Egypt and to subvert the Shah’s “Arab option” by publicizing his close ties to 
Israel. Based upon interviews with Iranian and Israeli officials who participated in the 
decision-making processes in the 1980s and 1990s, Parsi is able to provide the most 
sophisticated approach to the Israeli-Iranian relationship from a Realist perspective.  Parsi 
chronicles the negativity toward Iran that began to characterize Israeli policy towards Iran 
in the early 1990s, after the death of Khomeini, just as Iran’s policies seemed to be on the 
verge of moderating..  Having served for nearly a decade as Iran’s source of armaments 
in the Iran-Iraq war, in the 1990s “Israel wanted to put Iran under economic and political 
siege” and preempt any possibility of U.S.-Iranian dialogue.”48   
Until the recent publication of Parsi’s work, Sohrab Sobhani’s The Pragmatic 
Entente:  Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948-1988 had been the most  detailed analysis of the 
interactions of Israel and Iran both before and after the Islamic revolution from a Realist 
orientation.  Sobhani describes Israeli and Iranian relations, during the waning years of 
the Shah’s regime, as “deep and diverse, based on a persistent, resilient, and durable 
convergence of geopolitical, military and economic interests.”  On the Iranian side, this 
served to counter both Soviet influence and Arab radicalism, while providing a market 
                                                 
47. Trita Parsi:  Treacherous Alliance:  The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S. 
(New Haven: Yale. University Press, 2007) 39-78.  
 
48.  Parsi:  Treacherous Alliance, 181. 
 24
 for the sale of Iranian oil, obtaining Israeli military and economic development 
assistance, and providing the Shah with a useful and influential intermediary with 
Washington. From the Israeli perspective, the peripheral strategy and concern for Iranian 
Jews were the dominant considerations.49  The fate of Iranian Jewry  would  also be a 
factor in the Israeli government’s decision to provide military equipment to the Islamic 
Republic, along with the major importance of arms exports to Israel’s economy.50  
Sobhani had predicted that the future of the Israeli-Iranian “pragmatic entente” 
would remain “a mixture of tactical cooperation...tempered by ideologically motivated 
disagreements”51 until such time as the Iranian regime could be overthrown or might 
otherwise disappear, and when, in the words of then-Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, 
“this crazy idea of Shi‘ite fundamentalism is gone.”52  By the early 1990s, within five 
years of the conclusion of his research, the Soviet Union had collapsed, the Iran-Iraq war 
ended, and the “unipolar moment” made possible a U.S. drive for hegemony in the 
Middle East.  Key variables that Sobhani had regarded as constants and conducive to a 
“durable convergence of interests”  between Israel and Iran53  were no longer applicable.  
Khomeini and Israel, a slim tract by an Iranian journalist, Behrouz Souresrafil, 
published in 1988, argues that Israel and the Khomeini regime continued to cooperate 
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 closely even after the fall of the Shah because Israel’s Likud government, under the 
leadership of Menachem Begin, had been hostile to the Shah.  Israel stood to benefit from 
the Shah’s  downfall because Iran’s army, the only Middle Eastern capable of a seriously 
challenging Israel, would be weakened and would no longer pose a threat to Israeli 
regional preeminence.  According to Souresrafil, Israel viewed Khomeini’s revolution as 
changing the balance of power in the Middle East, thereby destabilizing the Arab regimes 
most hostile to the Jews.54 While Khomeini and Israel, published a year before 
Khomeini’s death, is redolent of some of the darker conspiracy theories that abound in 
the Iranian  press, Souresrafil’s conclusions are not very different than Sobhani’s.   
Souresrafil’s account of the support Khomeini’s revolution received from radical 
Palestinian groups is also attested to by Israeli political columnist Samuel Segev, a 
captain in Israeli army intelligence.  Various Palestinian factions with diverse Iranian 
political groups opposed to the Shah.55  Iran tends to be portrayed in academic literature 
as well as the media as the sponsor of rejectionist Palestinian groups, influencing, 
motivating, and radicalizing them, rather than the other way around.   Souresrafil and 
Segev disagree about Israel’s motives in selling weapons to Iran during the 1980s, 
particularly in the Iran-Contra “arms for hostages” debacle; Souresrafil, like Sobhani, 
says that apart from strategic and geopolitical considerations, economic considerations 
were Israel’s primary motive.  Segev contends Israel’s primary interest was keeping a 
                                                 
54. Behrouz Souresrafil,  Khomeini and Israel (I Researchers Inc., 1988), 38. 
 
55. Samuel Segev, The Iranian Triangle:  The Untold Story of Israel’s Role in the Iran-
Contra Affair (New York:  Free Press, 1988), 116-119. 
 
 26
 channel open to Iran until such time that regime change would make a resumption of 
Iranian-Israeli ties possible.56   
David Menashri  is one of the proponents of what Parsi calls the “ideological” 
view of the Israeli-Iranian relationship.  Religious factors are at the forefront of  his 
analysis of the treatment of Jews in Iran from Zoroastrian time to the Qajar era (1796-
1925), when Western travelers quoted by Menashri reported the poverty, ignorance and 
persecution of Iranian Jews to the Islamic revolution.57  Shi‘ite xenophobia branded 
unbelievers as unclean, and capable of defiling Muslims with ritual impurity.  Mid-
nineteenth century travelers to Persia described the physical separation and social 
segregation and economic limitations on Jews, including laws which forbade Jews going 
out on rainy or snowy days because the water might contaminate Muslims with Jewish 
impurity.  
 The Pahlavi era was a marked improvement for Iranian Jews, and the Shah’s  
“White Revolution” which began in 1953 was the “Golden Age” of Iranian Jewry, 
offering them political freedom and equality, economic progress, and cultural, 
educational and religious autonomy.  It was the Pahlavi era, according to Menashri, that 
was exceptional in Persian Jewish history, rather than the changes that took place after 
the Islamic revolution, after two thirds of Iranian Jews fled the country.  Just prior to the 
fall of the Shah, Iran’s Jewish community was “free, educated and wealthy.  Their part in 
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 economic, scientific and professional life was disproportionate to their share in 
society...In per capita terms, they may well have been one of the richest Jewish 
communities worldwide...” Young Jews were highly educated, and overrepresented in the 
student population, university faculty members, and the professions such as medicine. All 
of these assets turned to liabilities in the fall of 1977, their attachment to Israel, Zionism 
and U.S. “imperialism” made them targets of the new regime.  Within the community 
itself a fissure erupted between young leftist intellectuals and the traditional leadership. 58  
Menashri characterizes the Iranian government’s policy towards Jews during the 
Khomeini years as “the precarious combination of instigation and restraint.” He also 
points out Israel’s eagerness “to lead anti-Iranian camp, just as much as Iran undertook to 
lead the anti-Israel camp” of the Muslim world. Iran has remained “excessively 
uncompromising” in its unequivocal rejection of Israel’s legitimacy and its hostility 
toward Zionism, while Israel has no less vehemently portrayed and denounced the 
“Iranian threat” in the darkest and most menacing of terms.59 
Parsi’s groundbreaking work incorporates much of this previous research while 
updating, and occasionally undermining prior conclusions with new  information. Parsi 
argues that the majority of the literature on the Israeli-Iranian relationship 
overemphasizes ideological factors: 
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 On one side was Israel, portrayed as a democracy in a region beset by 
authoritarianism and an eastern outpost of Enlightenment rationalism. On the 
other side was the Islamic Republic of Iran, depicted as a hidebound clerical 
regime whose rejection of the West and aspiration to speak for all Muslims 
everywhere were symbolized by its refusal to recognize Israel’s right to exist.  
The Israeli-Iranian confrontation is far more complex than this ideology-based 
understanding would indicate, however.60   
 
Parsi emphasizes the importance of strategic competition as the primary factor 
shaping the dynamics of Israeli-Iranian relations. Dismissing, and perhaps even 
caricaturing, the notion that ideas shape interests as much as interests shape ideas, Parsi 
finds “ideology” to be of little explanatory value, since it is only a mask for the strategic 
interests being pursued by both state actors.  Many of the examples he offers of 
“ideology-focused” analyses focus almost exclusively on the attention paid to the Iranian 
side of the equation, ignoring the role that religious factors and cultural historiography 
play  in the conceptualization and articulation of Israeli foreign policy.   
The literature exploring the political role of religion within global politics in 
general, and focused upon either Israel or Iran in particular, have been dominated by 
studies of elite perceptions, interest-group bargaining, and institutional factors that lend 
themselves to positivist analysis. Jeff Haynes’ Religion in Global Politics, for example, 
devotes most of its attention to the development and relative success of religious parties 
as a measure of the salience of religious factors, maintaining a rationalist focus on power 
relationships relative to the state.61 The distinct challenges posed by religious paradigms, 
rather than parties, elude the conventions of “rationalist” analysis and therefore have  
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 ttracted little scholarly attention.  Yet, I argue, they represent a crucial aspect of  Israel-
Iranian relations. This study goes beyond Realism to explore the dynamics of the cultural 
and religious underpinnings of the “clash of narratives” that shape the dynamics of  
confrontation between  Israel and Iran.   
Significance of  Research 
Israelis are fond of quoting Henry Kissinger, a consummate Realist, who ruefully 
observed in 1975 that “Israel has no foreign policy, only domestic politics.”   In the past 
decade, and perhaps since the death of Khomeini, this observation has become 
increasingly true of Iran as well.  Religion plays a plays a significant and a defining in 
role in domestic politics in both Israel and Iran.  
My study approaches Israeli and Iranian foreign policy with an eye to their  
respective “unrealism.”  Raymond Cohen calls attention to what he considers some of the 
most effective aspects of Israeli foreign policy, which contradict the tenets of 
pragmatism. “To rehabilitate a shattered people and build a state required hefty doses of 
ideological romanticism, heroic mythology, benign illusion, and rhetorical hyperbole--in 
short, what we call ‘unrealism.’”62  This balancing of realism and “unrealism,” according 
to Cohen, has made Israeli foreign policy “unique.” 
  In a somewhat different sense, Rouhollah Ramazani also sees “unrealism” as a 
longstanding characteristic of Iranian foreign policy—the pursuit of political objectives 
that were beyond Iran’s capability to achieve.  Until the late nineteenth century, this 
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 “chronic unrealism” of Iran’s rulers and diplomats was “rooted in ignorance, superstition, 
lack of experience, and other factors.”  During the period of the Constitutional 
Revolution, the unrealism of the crafters of Iran’s first constitution was that they chose 
political objectives that were beyond their means, not out of ignorance or superstition, but 
out of disregard for the internal and external context in which they uncompromisingly 
sought national independence.63   
  These two examples of unrealism are mirror images of one another, rather than 
contradictory.  In the Israeli case, Theodor Herzl’s dictum, “If you will it, it is no dream,”  
called for pursuing objectives clearly beyond capability, implying that sheer will or desire 
to attain a political goal is not only a necessary but may even be sufficient condition for 
its attainment.   
Profoundly unconventional, very unrealist assumptions also drive Israel's foreign 
relations. At critical moments in the past, when practical realism would have 
counselled immobility, caution, and even submission, Zionist and Israeli leaders 
made a Kierkegaardian leap of faith, basing fateful decisions on will, intuition, 
and what comes down to religious belief. Unrealism is understood as the 
conviction of a community that it has a certain destiny, and that seeking this 
destiny requires a dismissal of conventional odds and a willingness to take risks to 
reach historical goals.64  
 
Ramazani asserts that what defeated the Iranian constitutionalists was their 
conviction that they could transcend the “internal and external context.” Following the 
same logic, what favored the unrealism of the Zionist movement and made its dream of 
Jewish statehood possible was a favorable external context of political expansionism—
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 buttressed by Protestant religious evangelism.  Throughout the latter half of the 19th 
century, Britain, France and Russia were vying for maximum control over the territories 
of the deteriorating Ottoman Empire.   The Balfour Declaration’s favorable view of the 
creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine (there was no mention of a state) under a 
British mandate served British interests in preserving its hegemony over the region 
between the Nile and the Euphrates and over the Suez Canal in a way that the aspirations 
of Iranian constitutionalists did not.  Furthermore, it complemented, and to a great extent, 
justified, these aspirations in religious terms.  
Where the research presented here differs from, and complements, rationalist 
approaches to the relations between Israel and Iran is its focus on religious and cultural  
factors, and not on military and material cooperation or conflict, that have shaped the 
“internal and external context” in which Israel and Iran have sought to achieve their 
objectives.   The Balfour Declaration favoring a Jewish homeland in Palestine, under a 
British mandate that would be recognized by the League of Nations, reflected a religious 
world view that animated British foreign policy during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century.  Its motivation was “Biblical rather than imperial:” according to 
Barbara Tuchman:  “If the Biblical culture of England can be said to have any meaning 
in England’s redemption of Palestine from the rule of Islam, it may be epitomized in 
Balfour.”  Although he may have been a skeptic and philosophical pessimist, Lord 
Balfour was “strongly infused, like the Evangelicals and the Puritans, with the Hebraism 
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 of the Bible.”65 Realizing the enormous power that the Bible had in mobilizing support 
for a Jewish state gave the architects of Israeli statehood and Israeli political leaders an 
incentive for justifying the creation of the state, and its policies, in terms of the 
fulfillment of biblical prophecy.     
In choosing to study the cultural sources of Israeli and Iranian foreign policy, and 
the responses of the “great powers” to them, from a comparative religious perspective,   
this research breaks new ground.  This study takes as its starting point the thesis that 
Israel and Iran are two states in the Middle East where religious symbols, values and 
practices play a contentious and contested role in shaping national identity, domestic 
politics, and foreign policy.  In both, there is a vocal and politically active of sector of 
society that is frequently labeled or characterized as “fundamentalist” by outsiders, but 
sees its own  “belief based leadership” as the most authentic expression of the values of 
the nation; another that contends that religious values, properly understood, are 
compatible with modernity; and another that advocates, to a greater or lesser extent, the 
separation of religion from politics, opposed in theory and/or practice to the interference 
of  government and religion in one another’s realm of authority and institutions, and to 
the imposition of religious dictates by the state.  
Neither contesting nor denying pragmatic, strategic, or structural explanations for 
the Israeli-Iranian geopolitical relationship before or since the Islamic Revolution in 
1979, the goal of this study is to identify, elucidate, and interpret some unexplored 
dimensions of Israeli-Iranian relations, integrating religious historiography and social 
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 history into the framework of the study of global politics.   Such an approach represents a 
challenge to the largely realist and positivist conventions of International Relations. 
Building upon Yael Zerubavel’s conceptualization of “master commemorative 
narratives,” I show how Israel’s “master commemorative narrative” of exile, return and 
redemption draws heavily upon the language and concepts of the Hebrew Bible.  Situated 
within a historiographic narrative paradigm of covenantal patrimony, exile and return, the 
overwhelming majority of even the most secularized Israelis asserts and accepts the 
modern state’s historical and geographic continuity with the biblical “promised land.”   
So do many western Christian millenarians, particular dispensationalist Protestant 
Evangelicals, who were in great measure responsible for generating British and American 
sympathy and public support for Zionist aspirations, parallel to strategic considerations.  
As Timothy Weber points out, “Even before organized Zionism, dispensationalists 
advocated a Jewish state in the Middle East.  For some time, they were more eager to see 
a restored Israel than most Jews.”66    
Extending this conceptual framework to Iran, I conceptualize Iran’s “master 
commemorative narrative” as drawing upon varied Iranian religious traditions and motifs 
that express Iranian suspicion of foreign invasion, encroachment and interference.   From 
the Shahnameh—the ancient epic that recounts the exploits of ancient heroes of ancient 
Iran—to contemporary exhortations delivered by religious and political leaders during 
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 Friday prayers exalting the martyrs of the past and present, the underlying theme of Iran’s 
“master commemorative narrative” is the ever-present danger of satanic foreign powers 
seeking to dominate, subjugate and exploit Iran, and glorifies the heroes who resist them.      
This study thus complements rationalist approaches to Israeli-Iranian relations by 
focusing on specific components of cultural and religious historiography, and  discursive 
practices that draw upon them.   Evaluating them on their own terms makes it possible to 
see more clearly the uses that various ideological positions may make of them.   In 
contrast to “political culture” approaches that treat political culture as static, this study 
focuses on the dynamics of the reinterpretation of cultural motifs, images and artifacts in 
both Israel and Iran.  
The uniqueness of this study is twofold.  On the one hand, it approaches the 
vociferous mutual hostility between Israel and Iran as the product of two historiographic 
traditions that have written each other off.  I call these “the Persian problem in Jewish 
historiography” and “the Jewish problem in Shi‘ite historiography.”  Judaism’s “Persian 
problem” is the overwhelming historical evidence that the three primary texts of 
Judaism—the Hebrew Bible, the prayer book (siddur) and the Talmud—were all 
produced or redacted under Persian rule and/or a Persian-influenced environment.   
Jewish religious historiography compressed the entire period of Achaemenid rule over 
Judea to as few as 39 years, in order to validate the prophecies in the biblical Book of 
Daniel.  
  Academic Jewish historians have marginalized the Jewish-Persian connection by 
referring to the descendants of the exilic community that chose not to return to Judea 
when offered the opportunity to do so as the “Jews of Babylonia.”  This designation 
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 ignores, or at least obscures, the historical fact that, from the time of its conquest by 
Cyrus in (539 BCE) until the Islamic conquest (650 BCE)—over a thousand years—
“Babylonia” was an integral part of the Persian Empire,.  With the exception of the 
relatively brief period between Alexander’s conquest of Babylon in 331 BCE and the 
Parthian conquest of most of the Achaemenid Empire by 141 BCE, when Persia was 
under Seleucid rule, the Jews of Babylonia were, in point of fact, living in Iran.   
  Focusing on the ways in which religious and cultural factors influence both 
Israeli and Iranian foreign policy discourse from comparative perspective, this research 
views religion not as a monolithic ideology in and of itself, but as the source and 
repository of images from which various ideological positions, competing narratives and 
contending discourses may draw in the construction and support of ideologies.   Israeli 
and Iranian leaders draw upon “lions and roses”—my term for culturally embedded 
images, motifs, and myths that can absorb and evoke a multiplicity of meanings, 
associations, and implications, that serve as framework for depicting and understanding 
the discourse about contemporary political issues--that not only challenge one another, 
but which use each other as a mirror to reflect domestic debates over the role of religion 
in state and society.   
 Chapter Outline 
In this chapter, I have outlined a broad basis for a comparative approach to Israeli 
and Iranian culture and identity.  Chapter Two of this study examines a variety of  texts 
and traditions concerning the first Achaemenid Persian king, Cyrus II. An iconic figure in 
Babylonian, Greek, Jewish, and Iranian historiography, Cyrus was appropriated by 
nineteenth century European and American end-time dispensationalist Christian 
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 evangelism that, in league with imperial ambition, sought the return of the Jews to 
Palestine as a precursor to the Second Coming.  It also explores the 20th century political 
contexts in which Cyrus has been invoked.  As Yaacov Shavit points out,   Cyrus is a 
fascinating case study that illustrates how and when available knowledge of a historic 
fact becomes institutionalized in active collective memory—or does not.67    
 Chapter Three provides an overview and analysis of the religious and cultural 
sources of Israeli and Iranian foreign policy, viewed through the optic of “master 
commemorative narrative.”  Israel’s master commemorative narrative draws heavily upon 
the Hebrew Bible, within a historiographic paradigm of covenantal patrimony, exile, and 
return.  Iranian “master commemorative narrative” is predicated on a paradigm of 
invasion, injustice, and resistance, reified in imagery from Iran’s pre-Islamic past as well 
as Shi‘ite martyrology.    
 The “Haman factor” provides a biblical personage who overshadows and 
overwrites Cyrus, as well as a crucial link the archetypal Israelite enemy Amalek with the 
Holocaust, which became a central motif of Israeli foreign policy discourse when the 
Likud gained power in 1977.  The Auschwitz paradigm views the Jewish people as the 
perpetual victims of history. Iranian use of imagery related to the martyrdom of Imam 
Husayn at Karbala depicts the Iranian people in the role of the Shi‘ite martyr in its 
confrontations with its enemies.  This chapter discusses the clash of these narratives. 
  Chapter Four consists of a study of “master commemorative narratives” in 
practice, case study that illustrates and illuminates the interconnection of two defining 
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 issues in which two primary arenas in which Israeli and Iranian interests come into 
conflict.  One is the Palestinian issue.  From the perspective of Israeli commemorative 
narrative that emphasizes the continuity between the Israelite polity depicted in the 
Hebrew Bible and the modern State of Israel, Jews are exiles returning home, and 
Palestinian Arabs, are the latest incarnation of the “peoples of the land” which they have 
Divine mandate, as well as the strategic need, to dispossess.  Iranian leaders depict the 
Palestinians as, like themselves, victims of invasion and injustice.  
 The second theme is  nuclear technology.  Israelis and Iranians both challenge the 
non-proliferation norm through different strategies of defiance, based upon their “master 
commemorative narratives.”  Israel’s nuclear strategy has been referred to as its “Samson 
option,” named for the biblical hero who uses his God-given strength to destroy the 
Philistine enemies of the ancient Israelites, although he himself perishes in bringing about 
their destruction (Judges. 13:1-6). For Iranians, acquiring nuclear technology has taken 
on enormous symbolic significance in the face of U.S. and Israeli opposition.  
 A broad spectrum of Iranian society views nuclear capability as Iran’s 
opportunity not only to once again be recognized as a great nation, and a major regional 
player, but, in keeping with its own “master commemorative narrative” to immunize 
itself against foreign invasion and   domination. Iranian leaders and clerics have 
repeatedly declared that the building or use of nuclear weapons is haram, forbidden by 
Islam, while insisting on Iran’s right, as a signatory of the NPT, to develop nuclear 
technology for peaceful purposes. The attempt by foreign powers, goaded by Israel, to 
force Iran to “voluntarily” desist from the nuclear research which it is entitled to pursue 
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 as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is viewed as  keeping Iran 
dependent and vulnerable to attack and invasion.  
In the post-9/11 effort to build a “coalition of the willing” against Afghanistan, 
Israel and Iran competed with one another for opportunities to attain their own respective 
foreign policy goals, the major themes in their “master commemorative narratives” are 
readily discernible in the rhetoric directed against one another and the U.S.   
The fifth and concluding chapter deals with the “clash of narratives” between 
Auschwitz and Ashura, which are mirror images of one another.  The negative images 
that Israelis and Iranians have of each other reflect the dangers most feared within their 
respective narratives.  For Iran, Israel is not only an intruder into the Middle East, placed 
there and protected by foreign powers; it also is an example of what happens when 
foreign powers are permitted to determine, undermine, or usurp national priorities and 
responsibility to God.  For secular Israelis, Iran is a case study of the danger of its own 
religious parties gaining political power.  In the press and in popular culture, comparisons 
between the rabbinate to Israel’s ayatollahs resonate profoundly.     
My conclusions also examine why Israeli and Iranian foreign policy discourses 
elicit diametrically opposite responses from the U.S.  While the pursuit of geo-strategic 
interests explains a great deal about state behavior, many political scientists and security 
analysts have questioned why U.S. interests would not be better served by alliances with 
states in the Muslim world.  I suggest that Israel’s discursive competitive advantage 
derives in part from the underpinnings of Americans’ own restorationist bias that 
provides a religious and cultural backdrop to the triangulation of the U.S., Israel and Iran 
that is largely ignored.   To the extent to which the contemporary State of Israel is viewed 
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 as a reincarnation of the ancient biblical “promised land” and the return of the Jewish 
people to it as a fulfillment of Jewish and Christian prophecy, there is a sympathy and 
acceptance of Israeli foreign policy as an aspect and extension of American “faith based 
foreign policy.”  Furthermore, in seeing itself as part of an ancient Greco-Roman 
historiography that serves as the underpinning the concept of “western civilization,” the 
U.S. has absorbed and advocates a largely negative view of Iran.     
  Finally, the conclusions of this study suggest some ways in which “master 
commemorative narratives” and the insights they provide into some of the religious and 
cultural factors can enrich the understanding of Israeli and Iranian foreign policy 
discourse.  They reveal not only how Israelis and Iranians depict each other, but how they 
view themselves.   I argue that greater understanding of “master commemorative 
narratives” and the religious, historical, and cultural components of foreign policy might 
enrich the fields of International Relations and Political Science.   I explain what the 
practical value might be for policy analysts and diplomats of adding to their 
understanding of religious and cultural concepts that are embedded in Israeli and Iranian 
foreign policy discourse.  
On the Title “Lions and Roses”    
This study takes as its starting point the proposition that Israel and Iran share a 
common cultural heritage that, for both religious and geostrategic reasons, both would 
prefer to ignore or deny.   Three of the most formative events in Jewish religious 
history—the canonization of the Hebrew Bible, the compilation of the Jewish prayer 
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 book and the redaction of the Babylonian Talmud—took place within a Persian cultural 
and religious milieu.  Persian words found in the Bible are still in use today.68  
Cyrus the Great set in motion the return of the Judeans who had been exiled to 
Babylon to return to Jerusalem if they wished, and allowed them to rebuild their Temple.  
Darius actively facilitated the Temple’s reconstruction and permitted the imposition of 
numerous laws and regulations that would constitute the legal and ritual framework of 
what would become halakha. 69  It should not be surprising that these two exceptionalist 
cultures—Iranian and Jewish—not only share a few flashpoints in their history, but a 
cultural cache of myths and symbols that, under current circumstances, they might prefer 
to forget.  While the symbolic content and use of these motifs have changed over time, 
they retain both their multivocal emotive content.    
There are several words for “lion” in Hebrew, the most general being ari or aryeh.   
In the Bible, the patriarch Jacob blesses his son Judah with supremacy over his brothers 
as well as his enemies, referring to him both as a lion cub (gur aryeh) and as a crouching 
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 lion (lavi) that no one dares to arouse (Gen. 49:9). The Midianite prophet Balaam 
compares the Israelite people to a lion that will arise and consume its prey ((Num. 23:24). 
The tribes of Dan and Gad are also compared to lions in Moses’ blessing of the Israelites 
before his death (Deut. 33:20; 33:23).  Lions attack humans as agents of God’s justice (I 
Kings 13:24; 30:36; II Kings 17:25), but heroes such as Samson (Judges 14:5) and David 
(II Sam. 23:20) fought lions barehanded, and prevailed because the Divine Spirit rests 
upon them.   In the prophetic books of the Bible, the roar of a lion variously represents 
the threat of an approaching enemy (Isa. 5:29; Jer. 4:7), corrupt rulers and false prophets 
(Zeph. 3:3; Eze. 22:25) and the voice of God (Jer. 25:30; Joel 4:16; Amos 1:2, 3:8).  
              In Persian tradition the identification of the head of state with the lion goes back 
at least two and a half millennia.  Two large terra cotta lions have been excavated that 
guarded the entrance to a temple in Susa.70 The statue of Darius discovered at Susa in 
1972, and every other royal depiction from Darius to Artaxerxes I, show the Persian king 
in a robe decorated with a row of striding lions.71  Lion hunts were the special 
prerogative of the Persian king. 72 Scenes of royal-hunter kings found on Achaemenid 
seals show kings in confrontations with lions, although clearly not intended to depict 
them with photographic realism.73   In Persian reliefs found at Persepolis, the royal figure 
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 is shown fighting real or mythical animals, including lions and monsters with horned 
lions heads, usually grasping the mane with his left hand and inserting his sword with his 
right, sometimes smothering the lion with his left arm while holding a lotus flower in his 
left hand and his sword in his right.74   
                                                
Ancient seals and rings, and royal inscriptions from the time of Artaxerxes II, 
show the king reaching out to the war and water goddess Anahita75 while she stands on a 
lion, a baton in her left hand and a flower in her right.76  Traditions about Anahita and 
water came to be identified with Fatima, daughter of Mohammed,  while her husband, Ali 
ibn Abi Talib, was associated with the lion and became known as the “lion of Allah.”77  
Water reservoirs in Iran had stone lions outside them, and traditional bathhouses had 
water faucets in the shape of lions’ heads.78  
 
 
 
74. Briant, 218. 
 
75. Anahita was also the patroness of women, and the goddess of both fertility and waters 
of rivers, lakes and childbirth.  After the Persian conquest of Babylon, she became increasingly 
identified with Ishtar.  She also is depicted as the consort of Mithra.  Temples in her honor were 
built in Susa, Ecbatana and Babylon during the reign of king Artaxerxes (436-358 BCE).  
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77. Massoume Price, “Distinguished Women, Past and Present: Fatima is Fatima,” (From 
a lecture,  CIRA, University of Toronto, 2001). Iran Chamber Society website, 24 April 2006. 
http://www.iranchamber.com/podium/culture/020915_fatima_fatima.php (accessed April 26, 
2006). Price notes that a rarely quoted story from traditional Persian literature draws an analogy 
between Anahita, who  bathes in a river  and emerges  pregnant with the Messiah who will save 
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Imam Hussein. 
 
78. This perhaps indicated that the lions were the guardians of the water, which was both 
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in the Art and Culture of Iran (n.p.:  Transbooks, 1985) points out that the Farsi word shir means 
both lion and the water spout (14-15).  On lion motifs in Persian carpets, also see Peter Anderson, 
 
 43
 According to the epic poet Ferdowsi, the symbol of the lion and the sun (Shir-o-
Khorshid) was used by Rostam, one of the heroes of his Shahnameh (written 1010 CE), 
which is replete with lion imagery.79  Lion motifs are prominent in Iranian decorative 
arts, and are particularly evident in the immense number and variety of lion rugs 
(gabbeh-ye shiri).80  Since 1031, lions in various postures have been a prominent feature 
of Iranian flags.  Sultan Mahmoud Ghazavi, the first Iranian ruler to adopt the  lion as an 
Iranian national symbol, was said to have been by the inscription of a lion on the walls of 
Persepolis and by  the excavation of an archaeological plate imprinted with a lion in 
Ray.81  The Safavid dynasty, which adopted Twelver Shi‘ism as the Iranian state religion 
after its establishment in 1501, made the lion the official emblem of the state, 
emphasizing the connection with Ali, to whom Shi‘ism traces its origin.  The Iranian 
Constitution of 1906 declared the official flag of Iran to be a green, white, and red 
tricolor with the lion and the sun.82   However, notwithstanding its association with Ali, 
the lion was removed from the Iranian flag after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. 
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 Roses are also a shared symbol, frequently found in ancient Persian art and 
architecture.   In both Iranian and Jewish tradition, the righteous, particularly martyrs, are 
compared to roses, the most precious of flowers.83   Idealized portraits of the Achaemenid 
kings show rosettes on their robes.  The Susa palace of Darius the Great (522-486 BCE) 
was decorated with rosettes.84  Shoshan, a Hebrew word for flower interchangeably 
translated as “rose” or “lily,”85 is etymologically derived from Shushan, the Hebrew 
name for the Persian capital city of Susa.86   According to the Mishna (Middot 1:3) and 
the Babylonian Talmud (Menachot 98a), the eastern gate of the Second Temple in 
Jerusalem, reconstructed during the reign of Darius I, was known as the “Shushan gate” 
and was distinguished by its sculptured mural of the Susa palace.   There, Yehudim bowed 
in worship of “the king of the king of kings” (melech malechi hamelachim).  Psalms 45, 
69, and 80 are designated in the Hebrew Bible as psalms of the shoshanim, and Psalm 60 
refers to the shoshan edut, the “rose of witness.”87   The shoshan was prominently 
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 featured on coins from the era of the early Hasmonean kings John Hyrcanus and 
Alexander Jannaeus.88  
Karaism, a heterodox anti-Talmudic movement within Judaism that originated in 
the seventh century, reached its fullest development in Persia during the ninth through 
eleventh centuries before spreading into Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and Spain. Among 
them were avelei tzion (Mourners of Zion), many of whom made their way to Palestine 
during the Middle Ages and settled there.   A tenth and eleventh century community  in 
Jerusalem, founded by the Persian Karaite Daniel al Kumisi (late 9th-early 10th century), 
called themselves the congregation of the Shoshanim.   The Shoshanim based their liturgy 
on the Bible and utilized a prognostic exegetical technique like that of the pesharim of 
the Dead Sea sect found at Qumran.  They read the prophecies in the latter chapters of  
Isaiah, which most scholars attribute  to a second or third Isaiah of the early Achaemenid 
period, and the metaphor of the “rose among the thorns” (2:1-2)  in the allegorical poetry 
of the Song of Songs (Canticles), as referring to their own community.89 A commentary 
to Psalm 80:1 by Japhet ben Eli (late 10th century),  the foremost exegete of the Jerusalem 
Karaite community, explains the significance of the Psalms of the Shoshanim to the sect: 
  “…we have already mentioned to whom the “Shoshanim refer…  We have 
stated that these Shoshanim are the people who sprout up amidst thorns…They 
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 are mentioned in three Psalms, “My heart overflows,” “Save me O God (Psalms 
45 and 69), and here in order to inform us that the Psalm is their prayer.”90    
 
This study draws upon the images of lions and roses in Jewish and Iranian 
tradition as emblematic of the rich variety of ways in which motifs and myths from 
sacred texts, interpretative commentaries, and legendary traditions, old and new, are 
appropriated into, or excluded from, into competing historiographic narratives, cultural 
practices, rituals and foreign policy discourse in the Jewish State of Israel and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.   That there has ever been any sharing of these motifs and myths has 
practically been banished from Jewish “collective memory” for well over two millennia.  
It has never become part of the State of Israel’s “master commemorative narrative” and 
has probably never been recognized within Iranian historiography.  References to shared 
images and practices are rare in Shi‘ite or nationalist discourse as well.  While the visual 
images retain outwardly recognizable forms, the understanding of their meanings, 
significance and their discursive utility are continually evolving, and are nonetheless are 
available to both.  
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 CHAPTER II 
USES OF THE PAST:  TEXTS AND CONTEXTS 
Cyrus: the Man and the Myth  
Few men personify the intertwining of history and myth more quintessentially 
than Cyrus II of Persia (ruled 557-529 BCE), best known today by the moniker “Cyrus 
the Great.”  His oldest known genealogy identifies him as the son of Cambyses 
(Kambujiya), grandson of Cyrus, a descendant of Teispes (Chishpish), and thus legitimate 
heir to the dynastic succession of “Great Kings of Anshan.”91  Archaeological evidence 
supports the identification of Anshan with Persis, the Greek name for the high country 
region of the Marv Dasht plain in Fars.92   
By the time of his death, Cyrus’ kingdom is said to have been the largest the 
ancient world had yet known, extending to the major coastal cities of Asia Minor along 
the Black Sea, absorbing the Chaldean empire, most of Central Asia, and, stretching 
eastward toward India, and westward to Cyprus and the border of Egypt.93 It extended 
“beyond the river” to where the trade routes of Asia, North Africa, the Persian Gulf and 
                                                 
91. James B. Pritchard, ed. Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament, 
3rd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1969), 315.  For purposes of standardization and 
simplicity of electronic reproduction, English spelling and Persian transliterations here follow 
Frye’s genealogy of the Achaemenids,” in The Heritage of Ancient Persia, Appendix 1, 318.   
 
92. Pierre Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander: a History of the Persian Empire, transl. Peter 
T. Daniels (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2002),  7. 
 
93. Muhammad A. Dandamaev and Vladimir G. Lukonin, The Culture and Social 
Institutions of Ancient Iran (Cambridge, New York et al.: Cambridge University, 1989), 90-91. 
According to the Cyropaedia of Xenophon, “On the east it was bounded by the Red Sea 
[according to the translation of Henry Graham Dakyns; other translators render the eastern 
boundary as the Indian Ocean], on the north by the Euxine [Black Sea], on the west by Cyprus 
and Egypt, and on the south by Ethiopia” (8:1). 
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 the Mediterranean Sea converged.  The Trans-Euphrates province included Yehud 
(Yehuda in Hebrew, anglicized into Judah or Judea), a remnant of the region that the 
ancient Israelites knew as “the land of Canaan” that the Romans, and later, the British, 
would call “Palestine.”94   
Ancient Babylonian Sources  
Several Babylonian artifacts attest to Cyrus’ historicity, although they provide 
minimal biographical data.  The reign of Cyrus appears on the Uruk King List,  a 
damaged chronological inscription on a cuneiform tablet listing  the kings  between the 
twenty-one year reign of  Kandalanu (ruled 648-627 BCE) through the twenty year reign 
of Seleucus II,  between that of Nabonidus and Cambyses, but the length of both reigns is 
missing from the tablet.95  
Another cuneiform tablet known as the Nabonidus Chronicle summarizes the 
major events during each year between the accessions of Nabonidus to the Babylonian 
throne (c. 556 BCE) until the 530s BCE.  In the sixth year of Nabonidus’ reign, King 
Ishtumegu (Astyages) marched his armies against Cyrus, the king of Anshan.  
Ishtumegu’s troops revolted and delivered him to Cyrus.  Beginning in the seventh year 
of his reign,  Nabonidus spent the first of  ten years of his reign in Arabia, where he 
established a based at the Tema oasis on the caravan routes, and leaving his son Bel-shar-
                                                 
 
 
94. For most of the nearly  two millennia between Roman and British dominance, 
including the centuries of Ottoman rule, this region  was part of Coelo-Syria, as it had been 
during Ptolomaic and Seleucid times. 
  
95. Pritchard, 566.  
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 usur (Belshazzar of the Hebrew Bible) in charge of administering the empire.  Because of 
Nabonidus’ absence, the annual spring festival rituals that required the king’s presence 
could not be held.  In the ninth year, the king’s mother died, and Cyrus, now called the 
king of Persia, marched against Lydia, killing its king. 96    
In the seventeenth year, according to the Chronicle, Nabonidus was back in 
Babylon, and the new year rituals were able to take place in their entirety.  However, in 
the month of Tashritu, the Babylonian army was defeated by the Persian army east of the 
Tigris River at Opis. The inhabitants of Akkad took the opportunity to revolt, whereupon 
Nabonidus massacred them.  The city of Sippar then surrendered to Cyrus without a 
battle, and Nabonidus fled.  Three days later, Cyrus entered Babylon, again with no 
resistance.  Green twigs were spread in front of him, peace (sulumu) was imposed on the 
city, and Nabonidus was arrested.  Cyrus sent his greetings to all of the Babylonian 
empire, and installed his own administrators.97  
The “Cyrus Cylinder,” a ten inch barrel-shaped clay charter placed in the 
foundations of the city wall soon after Cyrus’ conquest of Babylon in 539 BCE, recounts 
Cyrus’ benevolent treatment of the peoples he conquered.  The Babylonian god Marduk, 
who had searched for a righteous ruler to lead the annual procession of Babylon’s gods,   
chose Cyrus because of his good deeds and upright heart.  When Cyrus entered Babylon, 
it was without a battle.  Sparing its inhabitants any calamity, he allowed them to return to 
                                                 
96. Pritchard, 305-306.   
 
97. Pritchard, 306-307. 
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 their homes with their gods, restoring respect for the local Babylonian deities, their 
shrines and their priesthood:      
I am Cyrus, King of the world, great king, legitimate king, king of 
Babylon, king of the land of Sumer and Akkad, king of the four rims (of the 
earth), son of Cambyses, great king, king of Anshan, grandson of Cyrus, great 
king, king of Anshan, descendant of  Teispes, great king, king of Anshan, of a 
family (which) always (exercised) kingship; whose rule Bel and Nebo love, whom 
they want as a king to please their hearts. 
         When I entered Babylon as a friend and (when) I established the seat of 
the government in the palace of the ruler under jubilation and rejoicing, 
Marduk, the great lord, [induced] the magnanimous inhabitants of Babylon [to 
love me] and I was daily endeavoring to worship him.  My numerous troops 
walked around in Babylon in peace, I did not allow anybody to terrorize (any 
place) of the [country of Sumer] and Akkad.  I strove for peace in Babylon and 
in all his (other) sacred cities.  As to the inhabitants of Babylon [who] against 
the will of the gods [had/were…I abolished] the corvee (lit.: yoke) which was 
against their (social) standing.  I brought relief to their dilapidated housing, 
putting (thus) an end to their (main) complaints.  Marduk, the great Lord, was 
well pleased with my deeds, and send friendly blessings to myself, Cyrus, the 
king who worships him, to Cambyses, my son, the offspring of [my] loins, as 
well as to all my troops, and we all [praised] his great [godhead] joyously, 
standing before him in peace...98 
                                                 
 
98. Pritchard, 315-16.  Some translations found on websites append a spurious 
“translation” of a short Document B to the passage cited above.  Particularly suspicious is the 
substitution of (Ahura) Mazda for Marduk in this version of the  human rights charter reproduced 
by Shapour Suren-Pahlav, History of Iran:  Cyrus Charter of Human Rights on the website of the 
Iran Chamber Society  <http://www.iranchamber.com/history/cyrus/cyrus_charter.php> (to which 
I have made a few minor spelling and grammar corrections): 
Now that I put the crown of kingdom of Iran, Babylon, and the nations of the four 
directions on the head with the help of (Ahura) Mazda, I announce that I will respect the 
traditions, customs and religions of the nations of my empire and never let any of my 
governors and subordinates look down on or insult them until I am alive. From now on, 
till (Ahura) Mazda grants me the kingdom favor, I will impose my monarchy on no 
nation. Each is free to accept it, and if any one of them rejects it, I resolve to never reign 
by war. As long as I am the king of Iran, Babylon, and the nations of the four directions, I 
will never let anyone oppress any others, and if it occurs, I will take his or her right back 
and penalize the oppressor.       And as long as I am the monarch, I will never let anyone 
take possession of movable and landed properties of the others by force or without 
compensation. As long as I am alive, I prevent unpaid, forced labor. Today, I announce 
that everyone is free to choose a religion. People are free to live in all regions and take up 
a job provided that they never violate other's rights to prohibit exchanging men and 
women as slaves within their own ruling domains. .. 
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The cylinder affirms that Cyrus treated Babylon well and maintained peace there, and 
that Babylonians prospered because of the wealth pouring into the economy from tribute.   
In 1898, the German theologian Rudolf Kittel noticed a few of the similarities 
between Cyrus’s proclamation in the Babylonian cylinder and elements in chapters 40-48 
of the biblical book of Isaiah, believed by scholars to have been authored by the “second 
Isaiah.”  In both, the god calls Cyrus his friend, declares he has chosen Cyrus to do his 
will, and designates him as ruler. Kittel suggested that the two were dependent upon a 
general Babylonian court style.99   Morton Smith took Kittel’s observations even further, 
pointing out numerous details in the parallels than Kittel had not discussed:  the god 
calling Cyrus “by name,” his taking Cyrus “by the hand” and subjecting numerous 
peoples to him, as well as both gods’ delight in Cyrus because of his concern for justice.  
The second half of the Cyrus cylinder has no parallel in Isaiah, Smith observes.  It 
recounts that Cyrus  treated the Babylonians well, maintaining peace, and that the 
Babylonians were prospering because of the wealth pouring into the economy from 
tribute.  Foreign peoples and their gods were being sent home.100 
Smith suggests that neither the Babylonians nor the Judeans were actually 
deceived—“administration performance rarely lives up to campaign promises.101  
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 Ironically, centuries later, when the Zoroastrian scribes turned to Babylonian sources to 
reconstruct their own historiography, Cyrus, like Darius and Xerxes, was not there, “since 
the first terminated the independence of their land, the second suppressed a revolution 
there, and the third quelled a rising and punished those concerned.” 102    
Classical Greece:  “Inventing the Barbarian”  
The historians and playwrights of ancient Greece provide nearly all of what might 
be called “biographical” details about the life of Cyrus, as they were heard by Greek ears.  
Drawing exclusively upon oral history, Greek accounts of Cyrus are generously spiced 
with myth and legend, as well as a Hellenic hostility toward Greece’s greatest rival, 
Persia.  Pierre Briant cautions, “It is necessary, at each step, to distinguish the kernel of 
Achaemenid facts from the Greek interpretation—not always an easy task.”103  
Hellenocentric views of Persia, written long after Cyrus’ death, contributed to the 
invention and construction of a binary opposition between Greeks and “barbarians” from 
which Cyrus himself was largely, although not totally, exempt.    
Edith Hall notes that the Greek term barbaros [barbarian],  before the 5th century 
BCE, meant “not speaking Greek,” and was first applied to the peoples of the 
Achaemenid empire with whom the Greeks had contact, including Phoenicians, 
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 Egyptians, Thracians, and Phrygians as well as Persians and Medes.104    The term 
“barbarian” was first used pejoratively in the Persae of the Attican dramatist Aeschylus 
(525-456 BCE), a veteran of the battle of Marathon (490 BCE).  It began to conceptualize 
the Greek conflict with Persia as “as a struggle of united and disciplined Greeks against 
alien violence.”105  Nonetheless, in The Persians, Aeschylus depicts Cyrus as blessed 
with a lucky destiny, and as a ruler who secured peace for his friends.  As a ruler, he 
showed sound understanding, and because of this, “God did not hate him.”106  
                                                
Persian expansion into Asia Minor began with Cyrus’ campaigns into Lydia (547-
546 BCE) and Lydia’s vassal, Ionia, after which, Stephen Hirsch emphasizes, the Asiatic 
Greek cities lived quietly under Persian rule for about half a century.  During this period, 
“the Greeks of mainland Greece did not become entangled in the affairs of Asia Minor, 
nor did they cause Persia any trouble.”107  Cyrus had extended his empire through 
overland conquest.  Only after Darius and Xerxes ventured into the Aegean through the 
projection of naval power did the Greeks become defensive and hostile, Hirsch argues, 
because the Greeks regarded mastery at sea as being a part of the Greek nomos, while the 
nomos of the Persians confined them to the land.  “To the Greek mind, the Persians had 
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 disrupted the natural order of the world by taking to the sea at the beginning of the fifth 
century.”108 
 It was during the period of Persian expansion into the Aegean, Hall notes, that a 
Greek identity began to take shape that subsumed, at least temporarily, archaic ethnic ties 
to the various Hellenic city-states, constructing a binary opposition between Greek and 
barbarian, Panhellenic and Persian:   
The full significance of belonging to a wider Greek family was not to become 
apparent until most of the Greek-speaking communities came under threat from 
Persia; even then some were slower than others to recognize that they had any 
responsibility towards other Greeks, and quicker to abandon Panhellenism after 
the Persian wars.109  
 
Herodotus (c.485-425 BCE), credited with being the inventor of historical 
writing, was a native of the Ionian city of Halicarnassus, on the southwestern coast of 
Asia Minor.  As a vassal of Lydia, Ionia had submitted to Cyrus immediately after he had 
overcome Lydian resistance.  Herodotus’ single extant work, the Histories (also 
published under the title The Persian Wars), chronicles the decade of battles (490-479 
BCE) between Greece and Persia during the reigns of Darius and Xerxes. Born half a 
century after the death of Cyrus and too young to have fought in the wars against the 
Persians, Herodotus recounts that many of the Greek city-states of Anatolia chose to 
make their peace with the conquering Persians. In others, however, most of the 
population set sail for various islands of the Aegean, leaving behind their empty cities to 
the Persians.    In the background, he provides to the events leading up to the Greco-
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 Persian wars, Herodotus provides much of what little “biographical” information there is 
about the life of Cyrus.   Generally regarded as the most reliable of the Greek sources 
concerning the Achaemenid period, Herodotus nonetheless evidences a strong pro-Greek 
bias, while incorporating numerous and easily recognizable folkloric motifs into his 
account of Cyrus’ life.  
  For example, Herodotus recounts that Cyrus’ grandfather Astyages, son of 
Cyaxares, had dreams and visions which the Magi interpreted as portending that the son 
of his daughter, Mandane, and her husband, Cambyses, would be king over all of Asia.  
When Mandane gave birth to Cyrus, Astyages, fearing an eclipse of his own power and 
glory, ordered that the infant be abandoned and left to die.  Nevertheless, Harpagus, a 
member of the royal household entrusted with killing Cyrus, gives him to a herdsman and  
his wife to raise him (I:108-113).110  When Cyrus was ten years old, Astyages’ suspicions 
were aroused, and the herdsman, under threat of torture, gave a full account of the 
circumstances under which the child had come to him.  Hiding his anger at Harpagus, 
                                                 
 
 
110. Herodotus, Persian Wars I:107-121.  The folkloric motif  of an infant who the 
regnant monarch order to be abandoned or slain because of a prophecy that the child will 
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 Astyages tricked Harpagus into eating the flesh of is own son at a banquet purportedly 
celebrating Cyrus’ survival.   Harpagus avenged the murder of his son by aiding Cyrus in 
leading a Persian revolt against the Medean empire when he reached maturity (I 120-
130).  
  Herodotus admits he is most interested in those conquests of Asia Minor that 
gave Cyrus the most trouble, and were therefore, from his perspective, the most 
interesting and worthy of inclusion (I:156-177) .  According to Herodotus, Cyrus met his 
death in the twenty-ninth year of his reign, when he set out to add the northern Caspian 
kingdom of the Massegetae to his empire.  Cyrus was slain in a fierce battle that largely 
wiped out his Persian army.  Herodotus provides a lurid depiction of the Massegetae 
queen, Tomyris, dipping Cyrus’ severed head into a skin filled with human blood.111   
Herodotus notes, “Of the many different accounts which are given in the death of Cyrus, 
this which I have followed appears to me most worthy of credit” (I: 202-214).   
Herodotus’ assessment of Cyrus as a leader of his people is, overall, a positive 
one.  During the reigns of Cyrus and Cambyses, he says, no fixed tributes were required.   
Instead, “gifts” were brought by the nations to the king. Darius on the other hand, 
organized the empire into satrapies, and assigned fixed tributes to each of them.  “On 
account of these and other like doings, the Persians say that Darius was a huckster, 
Cambyses a master, and Cyrus a father;…Cyrus was gentle, and procured them all 
manner of goods” (III, 89).   
                                                 
111. Herodotus’ story of Cyrus’ death at the hand of Tomyris numerous parallels with the 
non-canonical Hellenistic Jewish novel of Judith and Holofernes, preserved in the Apocrypha, 
and a popular subject of Renaissance art. 
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 In Laws (c. 360 BCE), the Greek philosopher Plato (427-327 BCE), who was 
born about two years before the death of Herodotus, suggests that under Cyrus, the 
Persians had a government that represented a harmonious mean between freedom and 
slavery: 
In the reign of Cyrus they were freemen and also lords of many others: the rulers 
gave a share of freedom to the subjects, and being treated as equals, the soldiers 
were on better terms with their generals, and showed themselves more ready in 
the hour of danger. And if there was any wise man among them, who was able to 
give good counsel, he imparted his wisdom to the public; for the king was not 
jealous, but allowed him full liberty of speech, and gave honor to those who could 
advise him in any matter.   And the nation waxed in all respects, because there 
was freedom and friendship and communion of mind among them.  (Laws III: 
694) 
 
According to Plato, “Persians are shepherds—sons of a rugged land, which is a stern 
mother, and well fitted to produce sturdy race able to live in the open air and go without 
sleep, and also to fight, if fighting is required.”  However, he goes on to explain, Cyrus 
did not recognize that, as dynastic scions of royal lineage, his sons were being educated 
“in the Median fashion” by women and eunuchs.  Plato regarded Cyrus’ successors as 
having been corrupted by a decadent royal upbringing, to which the Greeks ascribed the 
weakness of all subsequent Achaemenid kings, with the exception of Darius I, who as a 
usurper, had not been raised in a luxurious royal environment.  
Xenophon (430-355 BCE), a contemporary of Plato, served as a commander in 
the battle for succession waged by two sons of Darius II, the great-grandsons of Darius I.   
He was a leader of the rear guard of the “army of ten thousand” mercenary Greek soldiers 
who had been left unemployed by the end of the Peloponnesian War.  They had been 
recruited by Cyrus the Younger (c. 424-401 BCE) to help him overthrow his brother 
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 Artaxerxes II Memnon.112   Xenophon’s  Cyropaedia (“The Education of Cyrus”),  is a 
novelistic treatise that views the  Cyrus the Great as having been the embodiment of royal 
virtues, and the product of a Persian education that designed “to make their citizens from 
the beginning incapable of setting their hearts on any wickedness or shameful conduct 
whatsoever” (2:3).  
 Xenophon’s idealized Cyrus “generally behaves and sounds like a perfectly pious 
Greek.”113 As in Herodotus, Cyrus is the son of the Persian king, Cambyses, and 
Mandane, daughter of the Median King Astyages (2:3).  However, there is no mention in 
the Cyropaedia of his grandfather attempting to kill him.   Instead, Cyrus becomes king 
of the Medes peacefully and legitimately by marrying the daughter of his uncle, 
Cyaxares, Astyages’ son.   Xenophon portrays the Medes and Persians as allies and Cyrus 
as the loyal vassal of his father-in-law when he conquered Lydia and Babylon.114  Less 
interested in reenacting the past than in portraying what he considers to be an the ideal 
ruler, “Xenophon shapes a story of Cyrus which is composed of dialogues that were 
never spoken, battles that never took place, and people summoned and dismissed from 
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114. In the Anabasis (3.4.8, 11-12), Xenophon  asserts that the elder Cyrus had led a 
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Stadter, 464; Gera 100. According to Herodotus, Cyaxares was the name of Astyages’ father 
(I:74).  
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 the written page without any shadow of historical reality.”115 According to the 
Cyropaedia, Cyrus died peacefully in Persia, after a lengthy discourse to his sons and his 
people, and was buried at Pasargadae (7:4-28).  
Roland Kent suggests that Xenophon wrote the Cyropaedia as a corrective to 
Artaxerxes II’s’ vicious propaganda against his brother, Cyrus the Younger, that 
extended to his namesake as well.  Evidence of Memnon’s smear campaign against the 
elder Cyrus can be found in the Persica of Ctesias, the Greek physician of Artaxerxes II 
Memnon for 15 years.  A fragment of the Persica preserved by Nicholas of Damascus 
claimed that the elder Cyrus was neither an Achaemenian by birth nor the offspring of 
Cambyses and Mandane, but of a lowly Mardian named Atradates.  After winning the 
favor of Astyages, Cyrus usurped his throne.116  Another Persica fragment, preserved in 
a summary by the patriarch Photiu, “transmitted nothing but a slanted view dominated by 
the tortuous machinations of wicked princesses and the murky conspiracies of crafty 
eunuchs,” which,  according to Briant, “is not without some adumbration of the 
‘Orientalism’ of the modern period, which analyzes the courts of the Near East through 
the haze of some very debatable readings, permeated mostly by observations on the 
murmurs of the harems and the decadence of the sultans.”117 
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 Even Xenophon’s hagiographic novella that idealizes Cyrus both as a man and as a 
ruler concludes with disgust with, and disparagement of, the degeneration of Cyrus’ 
successors.  In the epilogue (Chapter 8) of the Cyropaedia, Xenophon recounts that, 
immediately after Cyrus’ death, strife ensued between his sons and rebellion broke out in 
what had been the greatest and most glorious kingdom in the ancient world.  Deceit, 
impiety, cowardice, injustice, gluttony, drunkenness, laziness, love of luxury, and disdain 
for honor began to corrode the Persian body and soul.  “The Persians of to-day and their 
allies are less religious than they were of old, less dutiful to their kindred, less just and 
righteous towards other men, and less valiant in war” (8:27).   Furthermore, by Xenophon’s 
time, they could no longer be trusted to keep their word:    
In the early days, I am aware, the king and those beneath him never failed to keep 
the oaths they had sworn and fulfill the promises they had given, even to the worst 
of criminals. In fact, if such had not been their character and such their reputation, 
none of the Hellenic generals who marched up with the younger Cyrus could have 
felt the confidence they did: they would not have trusted a Persian any more than 
one trusts them to-day, now that their perfidy is known (8:2-3). 
 
As nationalist propaganda written in wartime, the Greek authors emphasized the 
superiority of the Greeks over “the Median menace.”  John Curtis holds the Greeks 
responsible for the representation of Achaemenid Persia “as a hotbed of tyranny and 
despotism, as an opponent of freedom and democracy” rather than a culturally hospitable 
and religiously tolerant empire in which local religions were allowed to flourish.118   
Abtahi views this as Greek civilization redefining itself in order to explain and to justify 
its own behavior:   
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 Feeling threatened by the dynamics of the Iranian Empire, the Greeks 
developed their sense of national identity through negative self definition, 
presenting the Iranians as the decadent Barbarians who sought to conquer all of 
Europe by any means.  In this dangerous enterprise, the Greeks had the heroic 
mission to defend the small but rational Europe from the vast but chaotic Asia.  
Exaggerations built upon exaggerations helped them finally to shape a myth of the 
victimized prey, but master of a refined civilization, attacked by the greedy 
Asiatic hordes, led by their Oriental despot.  A myth that has endured until the 
present day, and which continues to be reproduced in different moulds, as 
convenience requires.119 
 
Greek representations of Persians have made their way into modern scholarship 
through “the classics” of Greco-Roman literature.120  Nineteenth century European 
historians selectively drew upon the writings of ancient Greek authors to substantiate and 
justify their own “Orientalist” attitudes, making the struggle between West and East the 
centerpiece of their accounts, while ignoring the long history of constructive cultural 
exchanges between Greece and Persia.  Shahrokh Razmjou points out that “After the 
wars between Greece and Persia, there were good relations between the two, but we 
never hear about that.”121  Neil MacGregor points out that the absorption of Greek 
literature into the European intellectual and cultural mainstream laid the foundations for 
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120. The pro-Greek bias of European orientalism still pervades various disciplines  
within academia, and continues to shape attitudes toward Persia and what became, in 1935, 
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 the stereotypes that helped create the division between West and East, and between 
Europe and Asia, “those stereotypes of the freedom-loving, tough European versus the 
servile, luxurious, effeminate, despotic Asian.”122   
  As Briant points out, historians cannot choose their sources, and considering the 
meager evidence available from other sources, the Greek authors cannot be dispensed 
with: “…(W)e have no choice but overwhelming reliance on Greek historiography to 
reconstruct a narrative thread.  However much one may rail, not to say become frustrated, 
at the nature of their works, the situation becomes even more awkward when we must do 
without them!”123 
Jewish Text and Tradition: “Cyrus, My Servant”  
The Hebrew Bible (TaNaKh, known to by Christians as the “Old Testament”) 
views Cyrus from the perspective of the redactors of the prophetic books and 
historiographic “writings” (ketuvim).  The Book of Isaiah speaks of Cyrus as God’s 
anointed (mashiach), the liberator, restorer and redeemer, chosen by Yahweh to subdue 
all nations for the sake of Jacob and Israel.  Aroused in righteousness, the God of Israel 
declares, it is Cyrus who “will rebuild My city and let My exiles people go…”  (Isaiah 
45:1-13).124 The Hebrew Bible concludes with the verse: “Thus said King Cyrus of 
                                                 
 
121. Aspden.  “Enlightened Empire.”  
 
122. Aspden.  “Enlightened Empire.” 
 
123. Briant, 7-8. 
 
124. Modern scholars attributed this passage to Deutero-Isaiah, also known as “Second 
Isaiah,” a 6th century author believed to have been the author of  chapters 40-55 of  Isaiah.  
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 Persia:  The Lord God of Heaven has given me all the kingdoms of the earth, and has 
charged me with building Him a House in Jerusalem which is in Judah.  Any one of you 
of all His people, the Lord his God be with him and let him go up (II Chronicles 
36:23).”125 
As previously noted, Morton Smith points out numerous parallels between Isaiah 
40-48 and the first half of the proclamation in the Cyrus cylinder.  Smith suggests that 
Second Isaiah reflects Judean disappointment that Cyrus did not wreak vengeance on the 
Babylonians, as the Hebrew prophets who hailed him as a messianic restorer had foretold 
that he would.   Instead of ravaging Babylon when he conquered it, he adopted its 
administrative structure and even its language, Aramaic.  The good will and cooperation 
of the Babylonians were far more useful to Cyrus than pleasing the smaller and less 
politically significant Judeans, who wanted the Babylonians punished for sacking Judah 
and destroying its Temple.126 Nor did Cyrus impose uncompromising monotheism as the 
law of the empire, as Isaiah had hoped.  While granting the Judeans the right to return to 
Judah and rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem, Cyrus also restored the Babylonian god 
Marduk to local preeminence and reinstituted the authority of the Babylonian priesthood.  
He returned the Assyrian and Elamite gods to their former status in their own ancestral 
territories.  Cyrus appears to have been a henotheist who believed in the power of the 
various gods worshipped throughout his realm, and sought their favor.127  
                                                 
125. Cf. Ezra 1:2-3. 
 
126. Smith, “II Isaiah and the Persians,” 417-418. 
 
127. Dandamaev and Lukonin, A Political History of the Achaemenid Empire. (Leiden: 
e.J. Brill, 1989), 54-57. 
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   Interested neither in religious tolerance for its own sake nor in the propagation of 
Judean Yahwism as the one true faith, Jon Berquist suggests that Cyrus pragmatically 
sponsored the restoration of the temples and shrines of the various gods within his empire 
in order to enhance state control of the Persian empire’s resources.  His decrees regarding 
religious restoration “emphasize imperial domination, as expressed in the centralized 
ability to move populations and property, including symbolically valuable religious 
property.”128 Cyrus’ edict mandating the financial support of the Judean returnees was 
less a declaration guaranteeing religious autonomy than an indicator of a voluntary 
resettlement policy that provided financial incentives for reinforcing of the peripheries of 
the Persian empire such as Yehud.  Under Babylonian imperial administration, subject 
populations like the Yehudim were relocated to the more easily defensible center of the 
empire in order to increase its productivity.  Cyrus, on the other hand, wanted to reinforce 
the expanding boundaries of the Persian empire and fortifying its peripheries: 
A more robust and secure population in these areas increased the possibilities for 
tribute and peace along the military supply routes.  Since temples were involved 
in the collection of tributes and taxes as well as in the ideological grounding of 
the society, the periphery received a certain level of support for rebuilding its 
religious institutions. Cyrus intended that the support of Jerusalem and other 
similar areas would assist his policies of imperial expansion.129  
 
Voluntary emigration of some Yehudim to their ancestral territory reinforced the southern 
boundary of Cyrus’ empire, as a prelude, or alternative, to the conquest of Egypt.   
                                                 
 
 
128. Berquist, 25. 
 
129. Berquist, 26. 
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 The actual reconstruction of the Jerusalem Temple apparently did not take place 
during Cyrus’ reign, nor that of his son Cambyses.  According to the disjointed and 
inconsistent incidents recounted in the biblical Book of Ezra, the émigrés set up an altar 
for daily, new moon, and festival sacrificial offerings when they arrived in Judea.  They 
also arranged for the shipment of cedar wood from Tyre and the hiring of carpenters.  In 
the second year of their return, under the supervision of Zerubbabel and Yeshua, the 
foundations of the Temple were laid. (Ezra 3:1-3).  Nevertheless, the rebuilding of the 
Temple did not commence.   
 The fourth chapter of Ezra recounts that, during the reign of the Persian king 
Artaxerxes,130 enemies of the post-exilic community (tzaarei Yehuda—lit. “tormentors of 
Judah”), who had been resettled in Samaria during population transfers carried out under 
the Assyrian king Esarhaddon (reigned 680-669 BCE), offered to participate in the 
Temple’s reconstruction.  The community’s leaders, Zerubbabel and Yeshua, rejected 
their assistance, whereupon  the “peoples of the land” attempted to intimidate the 
                                                 
130. According to the Babylonian Talmud ((Rosh Hashanah 3b), Artaxerxes means 
“king” in Persian and was a title by which all of the Persian kings were known, just as all 
Egyptian kings were called Pharaoh.  In point of fact, Persian kings from Darius on adopted the 
title “Shahanshah” (“king of kings”).  Artaxerxes is a Greek corruption of the Old Persian  
Artâkhshatra.   The first Artaxerxes (ruled 465-424 BCE)  son of Xerxes ,was known as 
Artaxerxes Longimanus  (“the long handed,”) because his right arm was somewhat longer than 
his left, according to Plutarch, who also wrote (c. 359 BCE) that he was the most remarkable of 
the Persian kings for his “gentle and noble spirit.” Artaxerxes II Memnon (“the mindful”), was 
the eldest of four sons of Darius II and Artaxerxes I’s daughter Parysatis. He ruled Persia from 
404-358 BCE, and was succeeded by his son Artaxerxes III Ochus (ruled 358-338 BCE), and his 
grandson Artaxerxes IV Arses (ruled 338-336 BCE).   Since Rabbinic chronology compressed 
206 years  of Persian rule over Judah  into the Jewish years 3390-3428 (corresponding to 371-333 
BCE), the kings of Persia during this period all bore the name Artaxerxes during this period, 
although the rabbis must certainly have been aware that Darius III Codomannus, who ruled Persia 
during the last 5 years of the Achaemenid empire, did not.   
 
 66
 returnees.  They succeeded in deferring any progress on the reconstruction of the Temple 
“from the days of Cyrus king of Persia until the reign of Darius king of Persia” (Ezra 4:1-
5).  
After an eighteen year hiatus, the Judean leadership finally decided to move 
forward with the Temple’s reconstruction.  Alarmed, the Persian governor of the Trans-
Euphrates region alerted King Darius that the Judeans were rebuilding their Temple, and  
that the Judeans insisted that Cyrus had granted them the authorization to do so during 
the first year of his reign (Ezra 5:6-17).  During a search of the royal archives, a scroll of 
Cyrus’ decree was found in a palace library in Medea.  Darius then instructed the royal 
governor to cooperate with Judean leaders, and to impose the death penalty on anyone 
who dared to interfere with their work.  Thus, “by the decree of the God of Israel and by 
the decree of Cyrus, Darius and Artaxerxes,” the Temple was completed and rededicated 
with joy on the third day of the month of Adar, during the sixth year of the reign of King 
Darius  (Ezra 6:14-16).   
 As Yaacov Shavit points out, although this date was recorded in a scroll that 
became part of the Bible, it was never observed as a festival, nor were the return from the 
Babylonian exile and the resumption of the Temple service ever accorded any status in 
Jewish active memory.131  It did not even appear in Megillat Taanit  (“Scroll of Fasts”),  
a post-Hasmonean tract listing the days of the year on which fasting and communal 
mourning were prohibited on account of a joyous event once having taken place on it.      
                                                 
131. Shavit, 54-55. 
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 Flavius Josephus (37-c. 100 CE), in his Antiquities of the Jews (c. 94 CE),  claims 
that Cyrus had read the prophecy of Isaiah, written 140 years prior to the demolition of 
the Temple by the Babylonians, during the first year of his reign, seventy years after the 
exile of the Judeans.   Cyrus “admired the divine power,” and “an earnest desire and 
ambition seized upon him to fulfill what was so written.” Cyrus summoned the most 
eminent Jews of Babylon and gave them permission to return to their own country and 
rebuild their city, Jerusalem, and its Temple.  According to Josephus, the tribal leaders of 
Judah and Benjamin, along with the Levites and priests, immediately set out for 
Jerusalem, “and yet did many of them stay in Babylon, as not willing to leave their 
possessions” (11:1:2-3).   
Josephus depicts the neighboring peoples as plotting to undermine the Temple’s 
construction from the outset, of which Cyrus was unaware, being pre-occupied with his 
war against the Massegetae.  It was  not Cyrus, Josephus states, but his son Cambyses 
who, being “naturally wicked,” prohibited the reconstruction of the Temple during his six 
year reign, on grounds that the Jews of Judea had been seditious and warlike, their kings 
powerful and tyrannical, and the city of Jerusalem “an enemy to kings” (11:2:2).  In the 
second year of Darius’ reign, Cyrus’ authorization for the reconstruction of the Temple 
and Jerusalem was rediscovered, and the rebuilding of the Temple proceeded.   After 
seven years of construction, the Temple was finally completed on the 23rd day of the 
month of Adar, in the ninth year of the reign of Darius (11:7:104-106).  The regnal year 
of the Temple’s completion in Josephus differs by three years from that of the account 
found  in Ezra 6:15, and the date is different, although both accounts place the Temple’s 
completion in the month of Adar. Josephus’ date also is not accorded any recognition or 
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 status in Jewish tradition. The discrepancy in dating, however, confirms Shavit’s 
observation that the date of the Temple’s completion and dedication, although recorded, 
was not commemorated.  “Cyrus’ role in Jewish history has been relegated to the margins 
of the Jewish historical memory and he has not been accorded the status and honor he 
deserves.”132    
The case of Cyrus raises some interesting questions about Jewish historiography 
in the five centuries before and after the Common Era, particularly whether authors and 
commentators had access to the texts now cited by present-day scholars in their 
constructions of ancient historiography.  Josephus himself “was known only to a handful 
of Jews, and he was not the source of the Jews’ knowledge of the Second Temple or the 
ancient history of their nation.”133  As a historian, Josephus relied on writings that may or 
may not have included present-day versions or their sources.134 It is uncertain whether 
Josephus had access to what is now the biblical book of Ezra.  Since the day was 
apparently never commemorated, there would have been little incentive for later editors 
of either text to harmonize Josephus and Ezra.   
                                                 
132. Shavit, 52. 
 
133. Shavit, 53. 
 
134. Present day known versions available today include the Books of Ezra in the 
Hebrew Bible and the Greek Esdras 1, which was preserved in the Apocrypha, although not 
canonized by Jews.  1 Esdras incorporates textual parallels to some of what is now the Book of 
Nehemiah. Modern scholars surmise that at one time the biblical books of Ezra and Nehemiah 
were a single scroll, but were separated into two  “books” not later than the third century CE, 
since Origen shows them divided as they are today.    See F. Charles Fensham, “The Book of 
Ezra,” in Bruce M. Metzger and Michael D. Coogan, The Oxford Companion to the Bible 
(Oxford, New York et al,: Oxford University Press, 1993), 219-221.   
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 Medieval Rabbinic tradition treats Cyrus with considerable ambivalence.   
According to the Babylonian Talmud (Megillah 12a), redacted under Sassanian rule, it was 
Divine will that Cyrus rebuild the Temple, but Cyrus left the task to, or, alternatively, 
granted this privilege to, the Jewish people instead, much to the annoyance of the 
Almighty.  Medieval homiletic and exegetical (midrashic) commentaries disagree in their 
assessments of Cyrus’ role in facilitating the return of the Judeans and his role in the 
rebuilding of the Temple.   Pesikta Rabbati, an eighth century collection of homiletic 
commentaries, faults the Jews who preferred to remain in Babylon, rather than Cyrus, for 
the failure of the Divine Presence (shekhina) to return to Jerusalem.   Seder Eliyahu 
Rabbah (c. ninth century)135 states that Cyrus had wept and groaned over the destruction of 
the Jerusalem Temple, and thus became a Divine instrument for bringing the Divine 
Presence back to the Holy Mountain.136    Shir haShirim Rabbah, another midrashic work 
of approximately the same period, says that, having given the Jews permission to return 
to Jerusalem and rebuild the Temple, Cyrus had a change of heart and forbade further 
emigration from Babylon to Jerusalem because he did not want the country to be 
weakened by the departure of the Jews.137  
                                                 
135. The date of Seder Eliyahu Rabba is a matter of considerable scholarly dispute, but 
its origins seem to be not later than the ninth century, according to Eli Lederhendler, who points 
out that Seder Eliyahu Rabba is the  first Jewish source to articulate the idea that “the existence of 
rival empires was providential for Jewish survival.” The Road to Modern Jewish Politics: 
Political Tradition and Political Reconstruction in the Jewish Community of Tsarist Russia (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 164, no. 2.   
 
136. Meir Zlotowitz, ed. and transl., The Megillah:  The Book of Esther (Brooklyn, NY: 
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 As for the slow progress in the reconstruction of the Temple, biblical 
commentators Rashi (1040-1105) and Malbim (1809-1879) contend that Cyrus himself 
was the king who stopped the work on the Temple in the Book of Ezra.138  However, 
Elijah ben Solomon, the Vilna Gaon (1720-1797), argues that Cyrus was too righteous a 
person to have interrupted the construction of the Holy Temple, and  the work must 
therefore  have been stopped by his successor, Artaxerxes, who, according to rabbinical 
chronology,  reigned for less than a year.139  The most positive assessments of Cyrus in 
later rabbinic tradition exculpate him at the expense of his successors, leading to an 
overall negativity towards the period of Persian rule over Judea during the Achaemenid 
period. 
Shavit suggests that the medieval rabbis may have retrojected onto Cyrus their 
disappointment with Julian “the Apostate,” the Roman king who, in 362 CE, announced 
he was going to rebuild the Jewish Temple but did not do so during his brief reign, which 
led to the conflation of the King of Persia and the King of Rome in Jewish “historical 
memory.”  Similarly, Shavit cites the possible association or conflation of Cyrus with 
Chosroes, the Persian king who briefly succeeded in gaining control of Palestine from the 
Byzantines (614-626 CE).  Again, this led to unfulfilled expectations of another 
restoration of Jews to Jerusalem and the rebuilding of the Temple by a Persian king—
                                                 
138. Zechariah Fendel, Legacy of Sinai:. A History of Torah Transmission with World 
Backgrounds from Creation to the Close of the Geonic Era [1-4798] (New York:  Rabbi Jacob 
Joseph School Press, 1981), 120, no. 74.    
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 hopes dashed first by Byzantine victory, and again, almost immediately, by the Muslim 
conquest.140  
These unfulfilled longings for messianic restoration and redemption may have 
worked against the preservation of Cyrus’ memory.  Another factor, however,  may  have 
been “the “Persian problem in Jewish historiography”: the overwhelming evidence that 
the three primary texts of Judaism—the Hebrew Bible, the prayer book (siddur) and the 
Talmud—were all produced or redacted under Persian rule and/or a Persian-influenced 
environment. Nonetheless, Jewish religious historiography compressed the entire period 
of Achaemenid rule over Judea to as few as 39 years, in order to validate the prophecies 
in the biblical Book of Daniel.  
  Academic Jewish historians have further marginalized the Jewish-Persian 
connection by referring to the descendants of the members of exilic community who 
chose not to return to Judea when offered the opportunity to do so as the “Jews of 
Babylonia.” This designation ignores, or at least obscures, the historical fact that, from 
the time of its conquest by Cyrus in (539 BCE) until the Islamic conquest (650 BCE)—
over a thousand years—“Babylonia” was an integral part of the Persian empire. 141.  With 
the exception of the relatively brief period between Alexander’s conquest of Babylon in 
331 BCE and the Parthian conquest of most of the Achaemenid Empire by 141 BCE, 
when Persia was under Seleucid rule, the Jews of Babylonia were, in point of fact, living 
in Iran.  The Talmud, a compendium of rabbinic debates in late antiquity and  became the 
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 source of authority concerning Jewish praxis, was very much a product of the interaction 
of Persian and Jewish culture in late antiquity.142  Both the rabbis of the rabbinic tradition 
and Jewish enlightenment scholars who constructed the timeline of the modern Jewish 
historical tradition most likely preferred to forget this.      
The ultimate paradox of Cyrus in Jewish tradition is that, although the Bible 
depicts him as a divinely-chosen messianic restorer of the exiled Judeans to Zion, who 
made possible, even if he did not personally complete, the reconstruction of the Jewish 
Temple in Jerusalem,  neither he nor his Declaration  were ever accorded an honored 
place in Jewish collective memory.143  While passages depicting the destruction of the 
Temple in Jerusalem are read in synagogues and commemorated on no fewer than four 
fast days during the Jewish year, and prophetic passages envisioning peace, prosperity 
and the rebuilding of Jerusalem were carefully calibrated by the rabbis to provide solace 
and optimism in the wake of desolation, the passages recounting the role of Cyrus, and 
indeed the entire period of the return from Zion, are rarely studied, read, or even talked 
about:     
…neither the Return to Zion nor the Cyrus Declaration which inaugurated it 
achieved a prominent position in the active historical memory, and only during 
the brief period of Hibbat Zion did they serve as an active, that is, a “useful past.  
This, therefore, is an exemplary case of a striking difference between the 
                                                 
 
141 See Richard Kalmin, Jewish Babylonia between Persia and Roman Palestine (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006).    
142 Yaakov Elman, “Middle Persian Culture and Babylonian Sages: Accommodation and 
Resistance in the Shaping of Rabbinic Legal Tradition,” in The The Cambridge Companion to the 
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 importance of a unique, formative, even “messianic,” event at the time it 
occurred, in the consciousness of its contemporaries, and in Jewish history, on the 
one hand, and the status it achieved in historical writing throughout the ages and 
in the formative, organized Jewish historical memory through the various “agents 
of memory” on the other.144   
 
Cyrus disappeared from Jewish “active memory” for over 1,500 years.  
 
Christian Emancipators and Restorationists:  Cyrus Redivivus 
 
During the 18th-19th centuries, maskilim—proponents of the European Jewish 
Enlightenment movement (haskalah) seeking  to attain civil and political rights for Jews 
within the states of Europe—began drawing comparisons between Cyrus and Christian 
rulers who appeared to be on the verge of emancipating the Jews in their domains.  
Eliahu Morpurgo, an Italian Jewish maskil, compared the Hapsburg Emperor Joseph II to 
Cyrus in 1781 for issuing his Edict of Tolerance.  Ironically, in its final form the Edict 
did not extend religious toleration to Jews.145  The poem “The Road of My People,” 
written by the Russian-Jewish poet Yehudah Leib Gordon in 1865, cast Russian Tsar 
Alexander II in the role of “Cyrus my shepherd.”  Gordon praised Alexander II for 
ordering that Jewish children be sent to non-Jewish schools in order to promote their 
Russification and integration, claiming God had “roused his spirit as the heart of 
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145. Shavit, 65.  As issued in its final form in 1782, however, the Edict of Tolerance 
explicitly prohibited Jews from worshipping publicly and from printing prayer books, from living 
in rural areas, excluded them from citizenship and becoming masters in craft guilds, banned the 
use of Hebrew and Yiddish in public business transactions, and, in 1787, required the adoption of 
German-sounding surnames from a list approved by the government.  See Jeffrey Alexander, The 
Civil Sphere (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2006), 464.   
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 Cyrus!”146   Ironically, nearly sixty years earlier, Tsar Alexander I had denounced 
Napoleon as “the Antichrist and the enemy of God” for emancipating the Jews.147     
In the spring of 1799, during his Palestine campaign against the Turks, Napoleon 
Bonaparte declared the Jews to be “the rightful heirs of Palestine.”  He called upon them 
to seize the moment “to claim the restoration of civic rights among the population of the 
universe which have been shamefully withheld from you for thousands of years, your 
political existence as a nation among the nations” and the natural right to worship 
publicly in accordance with the precepts of the Jewish faith.148  Barbara Tuchman 
compares Napoleon’s proclamation to the Jews to his call to Arabs, encouraging them to 
                                                 
146. Shavit. 66.  For a detailed discussion of  the process and consequences of the 
emancipation of Russian Jews under Alexander II, see Simon M. Dubnow, History of the Jews of 
Russia and Poland (Bergenfield, NJ: Avotaynu, Inc., 2000),  276-321.  
 
147. Austria had also disapproved, as did the Prussian Lutheran Church.  See Weider, 
above.  
 
148. A French dispatch issued with Napoleon’s permission issued on April 17, in 
advance of the proclamation ( that was published in Le Moniteur on April 19, which states  [my 
translation], “Bonaparte has published a proclamation in which he invites all the Jews of Asia and 
Africa to come gather themselves under their flags to establish ancient Jerusalem,” Napoleon, 
who never actually reached Jerusalem, because of British support for the Mamluks  tore up the 
proclamation, which has never been found.  A manuscript copy of a translation of the 
proclamation into  German was found in the archives of a Viennese family in 1940.  Barbara 
Tuchman, Bible and Sword:  England and Palestine from the Bronze Age to Balfour (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1984), 163-167.  This challenges question Weider’s claim that the “Letter to 
the Jewish Nation from the French Commander-in-Chief Buonaparte” that he includes in  
Appendix 2 of his paper,  was translated from the 1799, as he claims.   According to Arie 
Morgenstern, the question of whether or not Napoleon issued such a decree was debated at the 
Second World Congress of Jewish Studies held in Jerusalem in 1957, with Prof. M. Verete 
contending that there was no evidence supporting the issuance of the proclamation.  Nevertheless, 
Morgenstern points out that Franz Kobler, in Napoleon and the Jews (Jerusalem, 1975) and N.M. 
Gelber, “Napoleon I and the Land of Israel,” published in Sefer Dinberg, ed. Yitzhak Baer et al, 
(Jerusalem, 1949), pp. 263-268, believe that Napoleon did issue a proclamation, the date for 
which Morgenstern gives as April 20, 1799.  See Arie Morgenstern, Hastening Redemption:  
Messianism and the Resettlement of the Land of Israel, transl. Joel A. Linsider (Oxford and New 
York:  Oxford University Press, 2006),  10; 216, n. 26;   
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 revolt against the Turks—a military stratagem that could not possibly have succeeded, 
given the circumstances in which he found himself in Syria.149  A Jewish Sanhedrin of 
one hundred and eleven representatives of the 40,000 Jews of France and northern Italy 
proclaimed Napoleon Bonaparte the modern Cyrus on March 9, 1807,150 announcing that 
“God of the world, who rules over all the kings of the earth, chose him as a ruler and 
commander of these lands.”151  The Sanhedrin compared Napoleon to Cyrus because he 
granted Jews full civil and political rights as citizens of France and Napoleonic Europe, 
not because of his scheme to restore Jews to Palestine under French protection.152    
Nevertheless, Napoleon’s unheeded call to Europe’s Jews to return to their biblical 
homeland was not without consequences. 
For after Napoleon it became axiomatic that whenever the powers fell to fighting 
in the Middle East someone would propose the restoration of Israel, and equally 
axiomatic that the someone would be indulging in a happy dream not only of 
                                                 
 
   
149. Ibid., 163.  Nissan Peretz points out that upon his arrival in Egypt, Napoleon 
attempted to win over the local population by  convincing that he was there to fight for Islam:  
“Nous sommes les vrais Musulmans” (We are the true Muslims).   Focus East:  Early 
Photography in the Near East 1839-1885 (New York:  Harry N. Abrams, 1988), 20.  
 
150. Ben Weider, “Napoleon and the Jews.”  Paper presented to the International 
Congress of the International Napoleonic Society, Allessandria, Italy, June 21-27, 1997 
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151. Shavit, 81, no. 28.  France was the first country in Europe to grant Jews full civil 
and political rights, and Judaism became the third official religion of France. After his defeat at 
Waterloo, some of the privileges French Jews had gained were retracted until 1830, and a 
backlash against Jews in other parts of Europe, particularly the Papal States where Pope Pius VII 
forced Jews back into the ghettos and required them to wear yellow badges. Weider, op.cit.  
 
152. According to Tuchman, Napoleon tore up the Letter to the Jewish Nation, and it was 
preserved only in a German translation found in the archives of an Austrian family in 1940.  
Otherwise it was preserved only  
 
 76
 acquiring thereby a sphere of influence over a vital strategic area, but also of 
drawing to his own side all the supposed wealth and influence of world Jewry.  
Political effort on behalf of the Jews was never exerted except as a by-product of 
other nations’ quarrels, as when the British assumed the Palestine Mandate in the 
twentieth century. But one cannot deny Napoleon credit for the idea.153 
 
British zeal to restore the Jews to Palestine emerged later than in France. 
Nevertheless, partly in response to the upheavals resulting from the French Revolution 
and the Napoleonic wars, England experienced a resurgence of deeply-rooted 
millenarianism, as Michael Ragusis notes.  Hebrew prophecies were reread for their 
predictions about when and how the restoration of the Jews to Palestine would indicate 
the imminence of the Second Coming.  Jews became the subject of books, pamphlets, and 
sermons which declared them to be at the center of a global crisis, and of world history 
itself:  “The on-going war between France and England became reconfigured as a contest 
over which of the two powers, ‘atheistical’ France or Christian England, would lead the 
Jews back to their homeland, with Napoleon variously represented as the anti-Christ and 
the Messiah (even of specifically Jewish birth).”154  Due to the geopolitical climate, 
particularly the need to exert some influence over the collapsing Ottoman Empire, the 
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 imperatives of millenarianism and geopolitics would converge.155  Henry Temple, better 
known as Lord Palmerston (who served as Foreign Secretary for most of the decade 
between 1830-41 and from 1846-51, and as Prime Minister from 1855-58 and 1859-65), 
wrote to the British ambassador in Constantinople, Viscount John Ponsonby, on Aug. 11, 
1840: 
There exists at the present time among Jews dispersed all over Europe, a strong 
notion that the time is approaching when their nation is to return to Palestine…It 
would be of manifest importance to the Sultan to encourage the Jews to return and 
to settle in Palestine because the wealth which they would bring with them would 
increase the resources of the Sultan’s dominions, and the Jewish people, if 
returning under the sanction and protection and at the invitation of the Sultan, 
would be a check upon any future evil designs of Mehemet Ali or his 
successor…I have to instruct Your Excellency strongly to recommend [the 
Turkish government] to hold out every just encouragement to the Jews of Europe 
to return to Palestine. 156  
 
Palmerston’s stepson-in law, Lord Anthony Ashley Cooper (soon to become the 7th Earl 
of Shaftesbury), who headed the London Society for Promoting Christianity Among the 
Jews (also known as “the Jews’ Society”), saw this move as “a prelude to the Antitype of 
the Decree of Cyrus.”157 
Ashley was an ardent, religiously motivated social reformer who forced the Ten 
Hours bill (“the Factory Act”) through Parliament, that, Tuchman notes, is “credited with 
staving off revolution in the industrial countries,” the Lunacy Act that sought to end the 
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 abuse of the mentally ill, the Lodging House Act (considered by Charles Dickens to be 
“the finest piece of legislation ever enacted in England” until that point), and the Mines 
Act.  His philanthropy was based on the gospels, and his Restorationism was based upon 
a millenarian vision of a world awaiting redemption.   For him, Jews were not a people, 
“but a mass Error that must be brought to a belief in Christ in order that the chain reaction 
leading to the Second Coming and the redemption of mankind could be set in motion.”158  
However, as was the case during other “Cyrus-ian” moments, there was little enthusiasm 
to be found among Jews, particularly among British Jews, for colonizing Palestine.  With 
the exception of Sir Moses Montefiore, president of the Jewish Board of Deputies, 159 
Jews were far more interested in securing their rights as Englishmen than in fulfilling the 
conversionist and restorationist fantasies of British Evangelicals.160  
 When the originator of the joint British-Prussian missionary project, Carl Josias 
Bunsen, learned that the Church of England had gained the unprecedented right to 
construct a Protestant Church and operate schools in Jerusalem, he called upon the British 
government to be “Cyrus redivivus” and assume the responsibility for restoration of the 
Jews. 161  Together with Shaftesbury, Bunsen succeeded in laying the groundwork for an 
agreement between the Prussian and British governments to establish a bishopric “to 
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 plant under the banner of the Cross, God’s people on the mountains of Jerusalem.”  
Between 1841 and 1883, the bishopric of Jerusalem, jointly administered by the Church 
of England and the United Evangelical Church of Prussia, was permitted by the Ottoman 
Sultan to only evangelize among the Jews.162  
More than any other single figure before him or since, Laurence Oliphant, a late 
nineteenth century British author and mystic, “was endowed with the lofty title of ‘Cyrus’ 
(a distinction which reveal more about the expectations of the time and the repertoire of 
current images than about the figure to whom it was applied).”163  Oliphant, “the first 
Christian Zionist who made a serious effort to advocate a British public policy supporting 
a Jewish homeland in historical Palestine,”164 unveiled a detailed and apparently practical 
plan for Jewish colonization, which he actively advocated with the apparent support of 
Benjamin Disraeli: 
For a short period between 1878 and 1880, it [Oliphant’s plan] combined the three 
elements that seem to have been historically necessary for any practical 
                                                 
 
 
162. Ibid. 13-15.  Ragussis points out that Christian calls for Jewish restoration to 
Palestine in the early 19th century had coincided with the development of nationalism  in both 
Germany and  England that was both anti-French and anti-Jewish, illustrating what Ragussis 
considers to be the political consequences of Romantic medievalism.  In the wake of the 
expulsion of  Napoleon from German territories, the German “Hep! Hep!” riots of 1819 invoked 
the war cry of the crusaders who massacred Jews in 1096.  “Writing Nationalist History: England, 
the Conversion of the Jews, and Ivanhoe,” ELN, Vol. 60, no. 1 (Spring, 1993), 181.   Having 
denied the Jews the right to citizenship they requested from the Congress of Vienna in 1815, 
many German territories attempted to return the Jews to their medieval status. See  Amos Elon, 
The Pity of It All: A History of the Jews in Germany, 1743-1933 (New York:  Metropolitan 
Books, 2002), 103. 
 
163. Shavit, 70. 
 
164. Norma Claire Moruzzi, “Strange Bedfellows: The Question of Lawrence Oliphant's 
Christian Zionism.” Modern Judaism 26:1 (2006), 57.  
 
 80
 achievement: an indigenous Jewish nationalism provided by Disraeli, even if it 
was romanticized almost out of recognition; evangelical Christian support 
provided by Oliphant and his circle of highly placed, spiritually curious friends; 
and Great Power strategic interest that both Disraeli and Oliphant, in their 
different ways, could appreciate and try to forward.   After 1880, the three strands 
unraveled, not to be pulled together again until the changed circumstances of 
1948 provided for a new Zionist consensus.165 
 
Eastern European Zionism, however, did not actively coalesce into a mass movement 
until after the pogroms that swept through southern Russia in the spring of 1881, in the 
wake of the assassination of Tsar Alexander II.  When it did, numerous pleas were 
written to Oliphant.  A letter from the Lovers of Zion movement in Nikolaev to Oliphant 
in 1882, told him that Divine Providence had given him the “scepter of leadership” of the 
Jews.166  That same year, Moshe Leib Lilienblum wrote to Oliphant:  
“…when Israel was in Babylon, they had little strength to find freedom for their 
souls.  Then the lord roused the spirit of his messiah, Cyrus King of Persia, who 
called for freedom for those imprisoned in exile and allowed them to migrate to 
the land of their ancestors…God willing, you will succeed in returning the 
redeemed to the land of their ancestors and they will call you a new name: the 
messiah of Israel.167 
                                                                                                                 
The Bucharest Society for the Settlement in the Holy Land also sent a missive to 
Oliphant:  
…our history teaches us that the Highest always chooses the chosen ones.  It 
preferred the redeemers of this despised and persecuted people, not one of the 
children of Israel, but of the Righteous Gentiles.  Cyrus King of Persia was the 
chosen one of God His Messiah.  God roused his spirit and he spread the word 
throughout his kingdom…And who knows if God did not choose His chosen one 
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 Oliphant…and due to your efforts, honorable sir, the cornerstone of our 
community will be laid in the ruined and desolate land of our forefathers…168 
 
Nonetheless, there were those who derided Oliphant as a “false Cyrus,” and denied his 
bearing resemblance to the Persian monarch.  Oliphant ultimately proved to be a 
disappointment.  After 1880, Oliphant, while still involved with working toward 
colonization of Palestine, became increasingly focused on the religious aspects of 
colonization, with little interest in promoting Jewish nationalism.169  
Restorationist zeal also made its way to the U.S.  On March 5, 1891, President 
Benjamin Harrison and Secretary of State James G. Blaine received a petition from 
William Blackstone, an ardent restorationist, to promote the convening of an international 
conference whose purpose would be to give Palestine back to the Jews, who had been 
expelled from their ancient home.   Four hundred and thirteen prominent Americans 
signed the petition, among them several members of Congress, including the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; the most prominent and wealthy 
industrialists of the day; numerous journalists and publishers and prominent Christian and 
Jewish clergymen.  Just as the Congress of Vienna had given Serbia to the Serbians, 
Bulgaria to the Bulgarians, and Cyprus to Great Britain, the Jews could be given 
Palestine by the world powers.170 
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   The “Blackstone Memorial” appealed to Harrison and Blaine to seize the historic 
opportunity not only to remedy a historic injustice, but to further the aims of the creator 
by helping to fulfill the Divine blueprint for prophetic fulfillment:  “Not for twenty-four 
centuries, since the days of Cyrus, King of Persia, has there been offered to any mortal 
such a privileged opportunity to further the purposes of God concerning his ancient 
people.”171   While no conference was ever convened, “the notion of American 
sponsorship of a Jewish return to Palestine was firmly planted in many minds.”172  
Nevertheless, while Blackstone continued to lobby for the U.S. to lead the campaign to 
establish a Jewish state, Harrison declined, as did successive U.S. presidents Grover 
Cleveland and William McKinley. Europeans did not support the Blackstone Memorial, 
and the Ottomans, fearing that Zionism might be tool for dismantling their empire, 
responded by sharply curtailing all Jewish immigration to Palestine.173    
Stephen Wise, an American rabbi and prominent Jewish leader, attempting to 
enlist the support of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson for the Zionist cause, pointed out 
that King Cyrus had become enshrined in the Bible because he had enabled the exiled 
Jews of his country to return to Jerusalem and to rebuild their Temple.  Wilson, the son of    
a minister and of a minister’s daughter, was enraptured, and he responded, “To think that 
I…should be able to help restore the Holy Land to its people.”174  On May 14, 1948, 
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 eleven minutes after its provisional government proclaimed its existence, President Harry 
S. Truman granted de facto recognition to the State of Israel.  A few months after the 
conclusion of his presidency, when introduced as the man who helped to create the 
Jewish State, Truman objected to the modesty of “helped to create,” and declared “I am 
Cyrus.  I am Cyrus.”175  
Israel’s Peripheral Vision 
During a brief period that began just a few years after the discovery of the Cyrus 
Cylinder in 1879, and in the aftermath of Russian pogroms that followed the 
assassination of Tsar Alexander II, the members of the  Hovevei Zion (Lovers of Zion) 
movement viewed themselves as re-enacting the “Return to Zion.”   When the Balfour 
Declaration by the British Government was issued in 1917, it was briefly viewed as a 
repetition of the Cyrus Declaration and as a typological  turning point.  According to one 
member of the Zionist Executive Committee in 1920, the Balfour Declaration and 
Mandate were worthy of being recalled alongside “the documents given to the Jews by 
Cyrus and Artaxerxes.”176    
As anger with British policies limiting Jewish emigration to Palestine set in 
during the 1920s, Cyrus once again became the historical precedent for Jewish 
disappointment with the unfulfilled promises of a foreign ruler.  The Jewish national 
home was “defective, even defiled” by being born under the authority of a foreign power:  
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 …anyone who continued to refer to the Cyrus Declaration and to compare the 
Yishuv to the Return to Zion was depicted as a political minimalist, a defeatist 
will to be content with a “day of small things,” a miserable autonomy granted by 
the grace of foreigners.  If there was a need for an analogous historical model, 
there were other, more positive, periods that could be cited:  the period of the 
settlement of the Land of Canaan and the kingdom of David and Solomon, or 
other chapters in the Second  Temple from the time of the Hasmoneans on.177 
 
While Shavit says it would be difficult to argue that the Lovers of Zion movement 
arose for the express purpose of  restoring the memory of Cyrus, or the return to Zion that 
he authorized, “processes, decisions and trends were endowed with historical ‘validity’ or 
a historical illustration after—and not before—the fact, by the memory of the historical 
precedent.” Shavit argues that after the brief resuscitation of the “return to Zion” by the 
Lovers of Zion movement, shortly after the discovery of the Cyrus cylinder in 1879,  the  
Cyrus model “no longer had content or signs perceived as relevant or useful” and ceased 
to have a role in active Jewish memory.178 
 In the case of Cyrus, except for references to him in historical literature 
and various legends, neither his name nor his deeds are preserved in the 
“collective memory” in any other way (not even in Hebrew first names as was 
Alexander of Macedonia):  no coins or stamps immortalize him, no popular 
legends or songs are devoted to him, there are no sites connected with his name, 
no ceremonies commemorate him on any public holiday.  Thus, although his 
name is indeed retained in canonic historical memory, has never been forgotten or 
repressed, it has also never moved to a central position. 179  
  
 Nevertheless, Shavit has perhaps overlooked the entrance of Cyrus into the 
historiography of the State of Israel and his return to “active collective memory” in 
structuring the perceptions of the Jewish state’s relationship with Iran.    While avowedly 
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 secular in his personal religious practices, David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first Prime 
Minister, who crafted not only Israel’s first post-revolutionary ideology of “statism” 
(mamlakhtiyut),180 but the “strategy of the periphery” in foreign policy, enjoyed playing 
the role of amateur Bible scholar.  He frequently gave talks in which he drew connections 
between biblical personalities and events and the challenges to the modern state of Israel.  
In one of these, entitled “The Image of Cyrus the Great,” delivered in the spring of 1951, 
Ben-Gurion pointed out that the two verses that conclude the Hebrew Bible (II 
Chronicles 36:22-23) were devoted to Cyrus, a unique privilege extended to a non-Jewish 
ruler.   Cyrus deserved this privilege, as well as the praise of the Hebrew prophets, Ben-
Gurion declared, 
not merely because of his proclamation and the permission which he gave the 
Babylonian exiles to return to their land and rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem.  
Cyrus was also one of the greatest figures, from a general historical point of view.  
He was one of the greatest military men in the history of nations, one of the 
greatest politicians of all time and, in addition, a merciful and big-hearted man at 
a time when there were few exceptional individuals among the great 
conquerors.181 
 
Ben-Gurion noted that “it is not clear if this year marks 2,500 years since Cyrus’ 
decree or if it is next year.” What was beyond doubt, however, was “Cyrus’ greatness as 
a mighty and enlightened ruler, and as the first to permit the return to Zion,” which 
should be remembered by Israelis and all civilized people.   
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 Iran had recently extended de facto recognition to Israel in March of 1950. Jewish 
Agency personnel were permitted to maintain a very limited, low profile, presence in 
Teheran, in order to facilitate the emigration of Jews from Iraq.182  The recollection of 
Cyrus took on a new, albeit clandestine role, to play in the historiography of the return to 
Zion.  
In spite of the Islamic Revolution, some Israelis have been reluctant to give up the 
near-messianic faith that another Cyrus will eventually restore the mythic strategic 
partnership that had once existed between Israel and Iran.  In a 2004 interview, Eliezer 
Tsafrir, who headed the Mossad in Iran and Iraq during the 1960s and 70s, expressed his 
optimism that the “Cyrus connection” between Israel and Iran would yet be revived and 
ultimately triumph over all other strategic and political considerations: 
Whatever the name of Iran—Pars, Elam, Media—and whatever the name of 
Iraq—Babylon, Assyria, Akkad, Sumer—there was always a rivalry and 
sometimes war [between the two]…The Iranians know this—and this is why I am 
optimistic about Iranian-Israeli relations in the future.  “Koroush-e  Kabir” [Cyrus 
the Great] knew that there is a common interest between the two sides of the 
Middle East—Iran and Israel. That is why Koroush let Ezra and Nehemja come 
back and rebuild the temple.  It was obviously an interest of his in order to 
dominate Babylon [Iraq]. Iran is Moslem but not Arab, and [to keep this balance] 
Iran needs another [non-Arab] people [who share that] common interest.183   
 
From Zoroaster to the Islamic Republic 
  Within Iranian tradition, Cyrus’ status—even his existence—has been 
surprisingly more ambiguous, even precarious.  Although the ancient history of Iran 
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 during the Achaemenid period is thoroughly documented by a wide variety of written 
sources—historical chronicles, law decrees, royal inscriptions, orders issued by kings and 
satraps, official correspondence, letters written by private individuals, tax receipts, 
religious and scientific literature, marriage contracts, promissory notes—the 
overwhelming majority date from the reign of Darius or later.   The trilingual Behishtun 
documents found near Kermanshah, inscribed on a cliff along the ancient caravan route 
connecting Babylon and Ecbetana, relate events that took place at the end of Cambyses’ 
rule and during the early years of Darius I,184 but they do not mention Cyrus.   
  Nor was there a place for Cyrus and the Achaemenids in the official national 
historiography of Persian’s Sassanian dynasty, the Khwaday-namag.  Composed under 
the influence of Zoroastrian priests in the fifth and sixth century CE, the Khwaday-namag  
traced the lineage of the Sassanians to the Avestan kings of the northeastern Iran rather 
than to the Achaemenids.   According to Shahbazi, Zoroastrian scholars  relied upon 
Babylonian, rather than Greek dates (the only two sources available to them) when they 
constructed their chronology.  While Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes played a dominant role in 
Greek historiography of the Achaemenid period, traditional Zoroastrian chronology, 
followed the Babylonian chroniclers, who had little reason to esteem them.185 
The ruins of Cyrus’ palace at Parsa, which the Greeks called Persepolis (the city 
of the Persians), was renamed Takht-i-Jamshid, “the abode of Jamshid,” the Iranian 
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 mythic hero, by the Sassanians in the third century CE.186   Richard Frye has suggested 
that “all Iranians had a common mythology but not a common epic,” and the 
Achaemenids of western Iran did not recount stories of the eastern rulers (kavis), 187 while 
the secular heroic and mythical traditions of northeastern Iran became the basis for the 
national epic of the Parthians188 and later the Sassanians.189   Since the early Islamic 
period, Cyrus’ tomb, near the palace of Pasargadae, has been known as Qabr-e Madar-e 
Sulaiman (‘the tomb of the mother of Solomon”), perhaps, some sources suggest, an 
ingenious renaming of the site to prevent conquering Arabs from desecrating or 
destroying it. 
   The Quran (Sura Al Kahf—“the Cave,”  18:83-98) tells of  Zolqarnain, a great 
ruler of the east, the west, and a third direction, who treated the peoples he conquered 
with compassion and justice.  Religious scholars and commentators have long debated to 
which of the two great pre-Islamic conquerors—Cyrus or Alexander the Great—the 
Quran refers.190   Molana Abolkalam Azad (1888-1958) pointed to the numerous 
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 allusions to Cyrus in the Bible, as well as the dream of Daniel (8:20-21), in which a ram 
with “two horns” signifies Cyrus’ Persian empire. (One possible translation of Zolqarnain 
is “two horned.”)  As a monotheist, Cyrus, who was granted power and authority by God, 
was closer to being a proto-Muslim than Alexander.191  Jews figure prominently in these 
Muslim commentaries, not only because the Bible provides texts and imagery that can be 
invoked in the identification, but because the figure of Cyrus is so closely connected in 
much of Islamic literature with his being the savior of the Jews.  
Early Islamic historiographers do not list Cyrus in their chronologies. The ninth 
century historian Dinawari (828– c. 890) identifies the Persian king who allowed the 
Jews to return to their homeland with Bahman.192   At the end of the tenth century, the 
Khorasanian polymath Abu Raihan al-Biruni, in his chronological tables of the kings of 
Persia, lists Cyrus in his table of the kings of Persia according to western 
historiographers, and identifies him with  the king who was known as Lohrasp by earlier 
chronographers.  Cyrus is preceded by Koresh, who al-Biruni identified with Kay 
Khosrow.193  (This is particularly intriguing since Koresh is the Hebrew name for what is 
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 invariably translated into English as Cyrus.)  Both Kay Khosrow and Kay Lohrasp are 
found on al-Biruni’s chronological listing of the kings that follows “the opinion of the 
generality of the Persians.” However, al-Biruni identifies Kay Lohrasp, midway through 
his reign, as having “sent Bukhtanassar [Nebuchanezzar] to Jerusalem, who destroyed 
it.”194   After assessing the discrepancies between the Persian genealogies of the eastern 
Avestan tradition and those of the western historiographers, al-Biruni writes, “I am 
inclined to think that they [the Greek historians] confounded the kings of Persia with their 
governors of Babylon.”195  Nor is Cyrus, by that name, counted among the heroes of 
Persia’s past by al-Biruni’s contemporary, Ferdowsi, whose  Shahnameh (Book of Kings) 
is Iran’s national epic.  
The early twelfth century Muslim historian Ibn Balkhi appears to be describing 
Persepolis in his Farsnameh, and identifies the images of Darius, Xerxes, and Artaxerxes 
as those of the mythic king Jamshid.  The tomb of Cyrus at Pasargadae, which Ibn Balkhi 
refers to as “the tomb of Solomon’s mother,” was turned into a mosque in the thirteenth 
century, indicating that it was considered a site with religious significance.  According to 
the Geography of Fars, by the fifteenth century historian Hafiz Abreu, Persepolis was 
one of a number of ancient sites near Shiraz visited by Iranian kings once a year.  “They 
said that from the time of Jamshid there was a temple in that place, and the ancients 
regarded it as a good augury.”196  
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  In the Ardashir-namah (Book of Ardashir), by the fourteenth century Judeo-
Persian poet Mowlana Shahin-i Sharazi, Cyrus is the son of the biblical Queen Esther and  
the Persian king Ardashir.197  Bahman is another name of Ardashir, the son of Isfandiyar,  
in Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh, and represents, according to Vera Basch Moreen, the fictitious 
“linchpin connecting Shahin’s epic with Iran’s great national epic.” According to the 
chronology of Dinwari, Bahman allowed the Jews of Babylon to return to Jerusalem.   
Little is known about Shahin except that he wrote during the reign of the Il-khanid 
Sultan Abu Sai‘d (1316-1335), to whom he composed a panegyric. He recast parts of the 
Hebrew Bible into a versified Persian epic mold using the language, grammar and 
rhetorical forms of classical Persian poetry.198  Moreen compares Shahin to Ferdowsi (d. 
1010), his greatest poetic influence, with whom he shares “the transcendent goal of 
commemorating and glorifying his nation’s origins, history and ideals.”199   As Moreen 
points out, Ardeshir Bahman of Ferdowsi is much later chronologically than the events in 
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 the Book of Esther, which are conventionally ascribed by traditional scholars to the reign 
of Xerxes, who is generally associated with the biblical Ahasuerus (486-465 BCE).    
Through the will of the Greatest Father, Esther 
Became pregnant, and when her time of birth came, 
God opened up for her the gates of purity, 
[And she gave birth] to a beautiful, sun-cheeked boy 
[Worthy] of the crown and throne of Jamshid. 
The shah rejoiced at the child’s birth’ 
He uprooted oppression from the world. 
He rolled back the tax on caravans, 
Distributed much gold and money to the poor… 
When Cyrus turned  
Four years old, his face was like the spring 
And like a tulip; that exalted princely jewel 
Indeed grew tall, a cypress.  Without him, 
At dawn and sunset, the shah found no repose.200 
 
In the Ezra-nameh (Book of Ezra), the leaders of Persia’s Jews, Ezra, Mattatiah, 
the sole princely descendant of the Jewish royal house, and the prophets Haggai and 
Zekhariah, receive an audience with Cyrus, now the king of kings, and ask his permission 
to return to Canaan and rebuild the Temple there.  Cyrus says he will grant their wish 
only if they agree to accept a cup of wine from him and drink it.  The wine of gentiles 
being prohibited to Jews, Mattatiah must consult with Ezra and other Jewish leaders.  A 
religious ruling (fatwa) decrees that they must drink the wine.  The sun goes dark and the 
world goes into mourning.  The next day, they return, drink from the cup of  wine, and 
Cyrus gives the command that the kingdom of Canaan be rebuilt, including the 
Temple.201     
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 Little is known about Shahin, except that he wrote during the reign of the Il-
khanid Sultan Abu Sai‘d (1316-1335), to whom he composed a panegyric, and that he 
recast parts of the Hebrew Bible into a versified Persian epic mold using the language, 
grammar, and rhetorical forms of classical Persian poetry.202  Moreen compares Shahin 
to Ferdowsi (d. 1010),  his greatest poetic influence, with whom he shares “the 
transcendent goal of commemorating and glorifying his nation’s origins, history and 
ideals.”
d histories of Iran and Israel, attesting to his love of both.”205  As Moreen 
points out: 
                                                
203    
Although his poetic account sets out to retell a biblical story, Shahin’s epic does 
not follow the conventions or the content of the Jewish homiletic commentaries of 
medieval Europe, which make Darius, not Cyrus, the son of Esther.  Rather, he testifies to 
the existence of an Iranian tradition of Jewish scholarship upon which he draws, 
including a little known fourteenth century midrashic work originating from Iran: the 
Sefer Pitron Torah.204 At the same time, Shahin is clearly looking to Ferdowsi’s 
Shahnameh as his literary model.  In making Cyrus, the Persian restorer of national 
sovereignty to the Jews, the offspring of Ardashir and Esther’s union, Shahin “intertwines 
the fates an
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 Judeo-Persian literature is the product of the confluence of two mighty 
literary and religious streams, the Jewish biblical and post-biblical heritage and 
the Persian (Muslim) literary legacy.  The uniqueness of JP literature derives from 
the fact that it is a lovely amalgam in which  these two streams, though 
 
rbaijan in 1907, the Iranian nationalist poet Malek al-Shu’ara-ye 
Behar  lamente
 Cyrus. 
ing 
For the games of the King and his prime 
I see it now, captive in the claws of insurgents.210 
                                                
recognizable, are strongly intertwined and interdependent.206 
  During the second half of the Qajar dynasty (1787-1925), Cyrus was 
rediscovered and became part of the narrative of nascent Iranian nationalism.207  
Ironically, the sense of homeland and national cohesion arose in some measure in spite 
of, and in reaction to, the predations of  Russia, Britain, and France.   In his book al-
Asrar al-Ghaybiyyah li Asbab al-Madaniyyah (“The Secret of Divine Civilization”), Abd 
al-Baha Abbas (1844-1921), the son of the Bahai prophet Bah’aullah, cites both 
biblical208 and Greek accounts of the greatness of Persia at the time of Cyrus the Great. 
Three hundred and sixty divisions of the Iranian empire extended from China and India in 
the east to Yemen in the west.  Iran was "the heart of the world.”209  When Russia 
occupied Iranian Aze
d:      
This was the land of armies at the time of
The resting place of warriors and the camp of the k
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Archaeology played a significant role in the development of Iranian nationalism.   
Although archaeological exploration of Persepolis had begun as early as 1772, it was not 
until the 1924 that a full-fledged survey of the ruins was undertaken by Ernst Herzfeld a 
German Jewish archaeologist and art historian, with the encouragement of Nosrat ad-
Dowleh Firuz Mirza, a founding member of the recently formed Society for Iranian 
Heritage (Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli).  After presenting his report, Herzfeld went on to 
excavate the site between 1931 and 1934, with the permission of the Iranian government 
and in cooperation with the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago.211    
Among Herzfeld’s findings at Persepolis, which had been legally and 
scientifically excavated with the permission and cooperation of the Iranian government, 
in contrast to most of the earlier digging (and plundering) done by the French, were 
numerous clay tablets.  They were written in Elamite cuneiform, attesting to everyday life 
in the Achaemenid  empire circa 500 BCE.  On long-term loan to the University of 
Chicago, the tablets became embroiled in a lawsuit brought by victims of a 1997 Hamas 
attack in Jerusalem, when a U.S. judge ruled that the Iranian government, which refused 
to recognize the jurisdiction of the court or the lawsuit and had not defended itself in the 
lawsuit, had materially supported Hamas. The judge’s 2006 verdict further stated that 
Iranian-owned assets could be seized and sold at auction to compensate the plaintiffs.   
The University of Chicago argues that the Oriental Institute items were cultural property, 
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 not “commercial assets,” having never been  before been bought or sold, and thus were 
exempt from seizure under the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.212   
Reza Khan, who became Reza Shah Pahlavi, was impressed by Herzfeld’s 
Persepolis excavations, which he visited four times.  It was a talk by historian Arthur 
Upham Pope (1881-1969) on April 22, 1925, however, that is believed to have inspired 
and convinced him to try to revive the glories of ancient Iran by supporting its arts and 
cultural heritage. Surveying Iranian art from Achaemenid, Sassanian, and Islamic times, 
Upham expounded on Iran’s cultural, artistic and spiritual contributions to world 
civilization.213   Of all the foreign scholars who worked in Iran during the Pahlavi era, 
Pope is regarded as most influential in shaping Iranian nationalism.214  
The revival of Iran’s pre-Islamic heritage was one of three prongs, according to 
Abdi, that Reza Shah used against the Islamic clergy, who had opposed many aspects of 
Reza Shah’s rule and his reforms aimed at promoting the modernization and 
secularization of Iran.  Accusing the clergy of being reactionary and devoid of nationalist 
feeling, Reza Shah promoted the revival of Iran’s Zoroastrian religious and cultural 
history and heritage.  The solar calendar was restored.  Public observance of Shi‘ite 
festivals was muted, and the self-flagellation marches and pageants during the solemn 
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 month of Moharram were banned.  Celebrations of the pre-Islamic Zoroastrian festivals, 
such as the new year festival of Noruz and the Indo-Iranian harvest feast of Mehragan,  
were revived and encouraged.215 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi continued his father’s 
marginalization of Islam in Iranian historiography, calling himself “the light of the 
Aryans,” and providing state sponsorship of “invented traditions” from pre-Islamic Iran 
while curbing the influence of the clergy.216  In March 1976, the Shah introduced the 
“Imperial Calendar,” which fixed the first year of the Iranian calendar from the founding 
of Cyrus’ empire 2,535 years earlier, rather than the migration of Mohammad from 
Mecca to Medinah in 622 BCE, according to the Muslim religious calendar, the use of 
which was prohibited by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.217 
Jalal Al-e Ahmad, whose writings Dabashi considers to be the first crucial link in 
a chain of what would become known as the ‘Islamic Ideology’ and making it the most 
significant mobilizing force prior to the Iranian Revolution,218 condemned the state 
sponsorship and promotion of pre-Islamic culture under the Pahlavis, which he 
considered to be a plot by the West designed to distort Iranian historical identity.219  On a 
visit to Israel in 1963 as a guest of the Israeli government,   Al-e Ahmad spoke warmly of 
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 the “vast arena of Irano-Judaic relationships, among them the reconstruction of the 
Temple by Cyrus.220 However, Al-e Ahmad, who  developed the concept of 
“Westoxication” and condemned it, subsequently accused Western colonial powers of 
having only one passion—“for Cyrus, Darius, and Zoroaster.”221   
Ali Shariati, another of the most influential thinkers in the pre-revolutionary 
period, argued for a return to Iran’s Shi‘ite heritage, rather than that of the Achaemenid 
period.  In one of his lectures, Shariati pointed out that a number of secular Third World 
intellectuals in decolonized Africa, Asia, and Latin America were calling for a return to 
their “roots” and rediscovery of their history.  Shariati declared: 
Some of you may conclude that we Iranians must return of our racial [Aryan] 
roots.  I categorically reject this conclusion.  I oppose racism, fascism and 
reactionary returns.  Moreover, Islamic civilization has worked like scissors and 
has cut us off completely from our pre-Islamic past.  The experts, such as 
archaeologists and ancient historians, may know a great deal about the Sassanids, 
the Achaemedians [sic] and even the earlier civilizations, but our people know 
nothing about such things.  Our people do not find their roots in these 
civilizations.  They are left unmoved by the heroes, geniuses, myths, and 
monuments of these ancients empires.  Our people remember nothing from this 
distant past and do not care to learn about the pre-Islamic civilizations…222 
 
The pinnacle (or nadir) of the Pahlavi attempt at a nationalist neo-Zoroastrian 
revival, and of the appropriation of Cyrus by the Pahlavi shahs, was the extravaganza 
hosted by Reza Shah’s son and successor, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, on October 12, 
1971.  Shojaeddin Shafa, an Iranian scholar, had originally proposed in 1960 that a 
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 pageant be held at Persepolis to commemorate the 2,500th anniversary of  the founding 
of the  Persian empire by Cyrus.  The event evolved into a three day encomium to the 
achievements of the Shah and the success of his White Revolution, at a cost of a hundred 
and sixty million tomans, according to one of its planners (approximately $22 million 
dollars at the time, although rumors alleged the cost to have been between $50 and $500 
million). 223      
British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart was instrumental in arranging for the 
British Museum’s loan of the Cyrus Cylinder to the Iranian government for the 
celebration, although his suggestion that the Museum present  the cylinder  to the Shah as 
a gift in order to secure his military and diplomatic cooperation was adamantly rejected 
by the Museum.224   The Shah, in turn, presented a replica of the cylinder to the United 
Nations, 225 at a time when, his critics noted, his own human rights record was the subject 
of severe criticism.226  Months of planning culminated at Cyrus’ tomb in Pasargadae, as 
television cameras beamed the image around the world, as the Shah, in full dress 
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 uniform, opened the ceremonies by addressing the founder of his empire and putative 
forebear:  
To you Cyrus, Great King, King of Kings, from Myself, Shahanshah of Iran, and 
from my people, Hail! We are here at the moment when Iran renews its pledge to 
History to bear witness to immense gratitude of an entire people to you, immortal 
Hero of History, founder of world’s oldest empire, great liberator of all time, 
worthy son of mankind.  Cyrus[,] we stand before your eternal dwelling place and 
speak these solemn words: Sleep in peace forever, for we are awake and we 
remain to watch over your glorious heritage.227  
 
In a work entitled “Kurosh the Liar and Murderer” (Kurosh-e dorughin wa 
janayatkar), Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali (1926-2003), excoriated not only the Shah, but 
Cyrus and Jews.  In a vitriolic response to the Shah’s invocation of Cyrus, Khalkhali 
attacked Cyrus’ lifestyle and his repressive rule, criticisms that were directed at the Shah.  
Khalkhali, who would become infamous  as the “hanging judge” and “the butcher” in his 
capacity as Chief Justice of the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary courts, also took the 
opportunity to draw upon and cite classical Islamic sources that affirmed that Cyrus’ 
mother was Jewish,228 and to vilify Jews as a race that has become “famous today as 
criminals and the enemies of mankind,” for distorting the holy scriptures and bringing 
evil to the world.229    
(Like the parallel “Persian problem in Jewish historiography,” it appears that t one 
source of Shi‘ite hostility towards Jews derives from accusations in Sunni scholarship 
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 and tradition that Shiites were more like Jews than authentic Sunni Muslims. Steven 
Wasserstrom has documented nearly thirty ways in which Shi‘ites (Rafida)  were accused 
of having adopted the beliefs and practices of the Jews from classical Sunni 
heresiography.230   It seems hardly surprising, therefore, that the adoption of Shi‘ism 
represents the most intense period of Jewish persecution in  Iran, and that the association 
of Cyrus with Jews has done him no good in the eyes of the ulama, past or present.)  
From his exile in Iraq, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini denounced the millions of 
tomans spent on the “absurd” Cyrus celebrations, asking, “Are the people of Iran to have  
a festival for those whose behavior has been a scandal throughout history, and who are a 
cause of crime and oppression, of abomination and corruption, in the present age?”231 
Eight years later, proclaiming the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran on April 
1, 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini would also deride Cyrus’ empire as a “satanic 
power” whose era of domination had finally ended after  two and a half millennia: 
This day of Farvardin 12, the first day of God’s government, is to be one of our 
foremost religious  and national festivals; the people must celebrate this day and 
keep its remembrance alive, for it is the day on which the battlements of the 
twenty-five hundred year fortress of tyrannical government crumbled, a satanic 
power departed forever, and the government of the oppressed—which is the 
government of God—was established in its place.232   
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 The revolution’s uncompromising anti-monarchical Islamist perspective not only 
rejected Cyrus, but Iran’s entire pre-Islamic past.  Pre-Islamic monuments became 
symbols of monarchical tyranny, although were no recorded incidents of archaeological 
sites or historical museums being vandalized.  Archaeology was demeaned as “nothing 
more than a pseudoscience in service of the court to glorify despotism and justify royal 
oppression.” The University of Tehran’s Archaeology department (the only one in the 
country at that time) was shut down entirely between 1979-1982, and would not resume 
operations until 1990.   Foreign archaeologists were barred from working in Iran, and 
most Iranian archaeologists were forced to retire or to leave the country.233  
Nevertheless, once the Shah was gone and the exigencies of the war with Iraq 
required national mobilization, the contribution that nationalism—initially denounced by 
the revolutionary leadership as un-Islamic and symptomatic of intellectual gharbzadeh —
could make to the war effort prompted a reconsideration of the role that the ancient past 
might play in the formation of an Islamic Iranian identity.  On April 20, 1991—two years 
after Khomeini’s death—Iran’s president, Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, visited  
Persepolis, where he wrote in the guest book, 
In the name of Allah, the merciful, the compassionate, visiting the incredible 
remains at Persepolis provokes considerable national pride in every individual. By 
seeing these remains, our people will discover their own capabilities and the 
cultural background of their country, and will believe that they will recover their 
historical role in the future  to uphold upon this talent and foundation, the blazing 
torch of Islam to light the path of other nations.234 
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 The revival of interest in Iran’s pre-Islamic heritage has not been without 
criticism. In 2004,  when the Tehran National Museum announced it would be putting on 
an exhibit on Cyrus, with the Cyrus Cylinder (on loan from the British Museum) as its 
centerpiece,  the hardline conservative newspaper Jomhuri-ye Eslami denounced the idea: 
“The exhibition is an attempt to raise the rotting bones of the Shahs from the dead,” an 
unsigned editorial complained.235  Accusations that Iran’s archaeological sites are being 
targeted for destruction evoke concern. The possibility of damage to Persepolis from the 
construction of the Sivand dam has aroused protest, particularly from Iranians now living 
outside the country.236  
Nonetheless, in the popular view of most Iranians, Cyrus is a source of pride for 
Iranian history and culture.  For Iranian exiles, whether they fled the country on account 
of the repressive measures of the Shah, or the Islamic regime that succeeded him, Cyrus 
provides a vision of what Iran once was, and should be.  Hirad Abtahi, an Iranian by birth 
who has worked at the highest levels of the International Criminal Court, compares 
Cyrus’ treatment of the Babylonians, and the other peoples of his domain, with the 
prescriptions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) that would be 
emerge from the United Nations General Assembly in 1948.  
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 Irrespective of whether or not he was a Zoroastrian, a matter of considerable 
debate among modern scholars,237 Abtahi suggests Cyrus granted his subjects religious 
freedom, which was “a very early equisse of secularism. The center, in addition to not 
imposing its spiritual beliefs on the periphery, permitted religious practice according to 
conscience, rather than according to an imposed canon, anticipating Article 18 of the 
UDHR.”238   Abtahi sees within the text of Cyrus’ proclamation—“My numerous troops 
walked around in Babylon in peace, I did not allow anybody to terrorize (any place)”—a 
forerunner to what would respectively become Article 3 of the UDHR, guaranteeing of 
the right to life, liberty and security of person, and Article 5, the right not to be subjected 
to torture, or to “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”   
Abtahi credits the behavior of Cyrus and his troops toward conquered peoples, as 
recorded in the cylinder, as prefiguring Article IV of the Geneva Convention protecting 
civilians during wartime from murder, rape, and displacement from their homes in times 
of war by 2,500 years.239   Instead of massacring or forcibly transferring populations to or 
from vanquished territories, Abtahi sees Cyrus as anticipating the Article 9 of the UDHR, 
which guarantees freedom of movement and the right to leave and return to one’s 
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 country.240 Reading into the cylinder’s reference to the abolition of the corvee the 
implication that Cyrus abolished or limited involuntary labor, Abtahi even suggests Cyrus 
complied with the spirit of UDHR Article 4, and with Article 7 of the International 
Criminal Court statute, which prohibit servitude, slavery, and the trafficking in 
persons.241  
Questioning “the assumption that Cyrus the Great promoted ‘human rights’ 
wherever he went,” Hamid Dabashi faults “the laudatory Orientalist language” in which 
such views of ancient Persia are narrated as being “of an entirely antiquarian, nostalgic 
and imperial disposition, with very little to offer toward a free and democratic nation 
state.”242  Yet for most Iranians, Cyrus remains a cultural icon, ready to leap from 
historiography to “active memory” when needed. 
Summary  
 
Through a diachronic and synchronic examination of the persona of Cyrus, 
numerous issues unfold.  The ancient Babylonian texts, and the subsequent ejection of the 
three major Achaemenid rulers from Babylonian chronology upon which the Zoroastrian 
priesthood would rely in their construction of Avestan historiography, bear testimony to 
the long and close involvement of Iran in what is present-day Iraq.  From the Greeks 
emerge the first texts to argue that there is a “clash of civilizations” between “the West 
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 and the rest,” which provide the discursive basis for nineteenth and twentieth century 
Orientalism, in which Persia (now Iran) represents and reifies the Other.   
The irony that the biblical image of Cyrus, as the protector and messianic restorer 
of the Jews, is one that, although found in the Bible as facilitator of a major turning point 
in Jewish history, plays no role in the “active memory” of the Jewish religious tradition. 
This stands in glaring contrast to the eagerness of dispensationalist Protestants to claim 
the mantle of Cyrus for themselves and bring about the restoration of the Jews to 
Palestine.   Contemporary Israelis, as the next chapter will discuss, have largely (but not 
entirely) overwritten the association of  Cyrus with the Shah of Iran that reinforced the 
“strategy of the periphery” with that of  Haman, a descendant of the archetypal biblical 
enemy Amalek whose thwarted genocidal scheme is commemorated annually during the 
observance of the Jewish festival of Purim, who is restored to active memory by the anti-
Zionist tirades of Iran’s Islamic leadership on the one hand, and the emphasis on 
commemorative events that emphasize that “the whole world is against us.”  
Finally, there are the Iranians, suspended between no fewer than three images of 
Cyrus: one as the idealized ruler embodying Iran’s ancient glory, who propounded  and 
defended of the concept of human rights;  another as a savvy, pragmatic politician and 
propagandist; and a third Cyrus—the first imperialist tyrant to  aspire to a global empire.  
Who does Cyrus speak for, and who speaks for Cyrus?  Where does Cyrus fit in, if at all, 
into Iran’s “Karbala Paradigm”?   Cyrus epitomizes the diverse uses of  religious images, 
political myth, and discourse that are recalled to active memory from literary and 
historiographic obscurity, and put to use in  numerous ways in the construction of 
political  myth and discourse. 
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 CHAPTER  III 
CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS SOURCES OF FOREIGN POLICY  
Introduction 
That “culture matters” in state and societal behavior has become a platitude in 
numerous social science disciplines in the past decade, although how and why remains a 
matter of contention.   As Nathan Glazer notes, while culture makes a difference, it is not 
easy to determine what in culture makes a difference, since many different outcomes 
have seemed to be compatible with the “great traditions” of any and every culture:  “They 
have all had their glories and their miseries, their massacres and their acts of charity, their 
scholars and their soldiers, their triumphs of intellectual achievement and their descents 
into silliness or worse.”  Glazer suggests thinking of traditions as storehouses from which 
suitable and useful practices may emerge.243   
As the iconic image of Cyrus illustrates, these storehouses contain diverse myths, 
images, events, and personalities that can be put to use in a number of ways.  “(M)odern 
nations and all their impedimenta generally claim to be the opposite of novel, namely 
rooted in the remotest antiquity, and the opposite of constructed, namely human 
communities so ‘natural’ as to require no definition other than self-assertion,” as Eric 
Hobsbawm observes.244  Yael Zerubavel explains that “National movements typically 
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 attempt to create a master commemorative narrative that highlights their members’ 
common past and legitimizes their aspiration for a shared destiny” by synthesizing the 
diverse memories of various individuals and groups.245  These “master commemorative 
narratives” serve as the basis for identity of what Benedict Anderson calls “imagined 
communities.”   Blurring the boundary between real and imagined, these narratives create 
their own version of historical time by eclipsing, elaborating, condensing, conflating, and 
omitting events, and selecting specific events as turning points—markers for change that 
serve to highlight certain ideological principles underlying the master commemorative 
narrative.246  
Commemorations, particularly under state sponsorship, often take the form of 
what  Hobsbawm calls “invented traditions”:  sets of practices, of a ritual or symbolic 
nature, that respond to novel situations by referring to suitable situations of the historic 
past, or by creating their own past.  Governed by explicitly or tacitly accepted rules, 
invented traditions seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior through 
repetition, and do so by asserting or implying a largely fictitious continuity with pre-
existing practice.   During major shifts in values and norms, invented traditions provide a 
stabilizing ritual and symbolic infrastructure, marked by new rituals and rhetoric.   
“Invented traditions” differ from custom, insofar as, even in so-called “traditional” 
societies, custom  recognizes the need for flexibility and adaptation within the framework 
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 of formal adherence to precedent, and does not preclude innovation and change. 247 
Invented traditions, on the other hand, “attempt to structure at least some parts of social 
life within it as unchanging and materials for novel purposes.   Every society has 
accumulated a large store of such materials in its past, and has an elaborate language of 
symbolic practice and communication is available for creation of the ritual and symbolic 
complexes of invented traditions.”248  Invention of tradition, Hobsbawm points out, is 
most likely to occur “when a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the 
social patterns for which the ‘old’ traditions had been designed.”249 
Israel:  A People that Dwells Alone 
As noted in the conclusion to the previous chapter, Jewish nationalism at the turn 
of the twentieth century expressed its ultimate disappointment with Cyrus, both in his 
ancient Iranian context and in his various reincarnations as the imperfect and incomplete 
restorer of Jewish sovereignty, by inventing new nationalist models that could serve a 
Jewish state constructed on nineteenth century concepts of nationalism for the “return to 
Zion.”  The Bible became a primary source of these models, providing historical 
continuity, legitimacy of territorial claims, national heroes who could be emulated, and 
enemies who must be conquered and destroyed.  The Bible also provided the language in 
which Israel’s master commemorative narrative and the invented traditions sustaining 
that narrative could be expressed. 
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 The Hebrew Bible had played a central role in the European Jewish cultural 
revival, the haskalah (enlightenment), which began in Central Europe  towards the end of 
the 18th century.  Maskilim looked to the Bible  to demonstrate that Jews were not simply 
a religion, but an ethnic minority who shared a national past, and who should be 
permitted to fully assimilate into their European host nations.  A hundred years later, 
however, the Bible would emerge as “an essential instrument for renewing Jewish 
independence in Palestine according to the ideals of modern nationalism…containing 
both a record of a national past and a powerful promise of a national future.”250    
From the outset, the Zionist movement utilized the Hebrew Bible as its primary 
source of “invented traditions.”  The phrase “return to Zion” was gleaned from Psalm 
126:1. The “Bilu” group of “Lovers of Zion,” who made their way to Palestine in 1882, 
took their name from an acronym of part of a biblical verse in Isaiah 2:5:  “House of 
Jacob, let us go up…” Emigration to Palestine became known as aliyah (ascent), 
appropriating the image of  the ascent to the Jerusalem Temple, required to offer 
sacrifices on the three biblical pilgrimage festivals, for travel to the Land of Israel for the 
purpose of settling there:   
The return to the land, to Zion and Jerusalem, to the national independence of the 
First Commonwealth, to cultivation of the land and military valor, to speaking and 
creating in the tongue of Amos and Isaiah, received quasi-religious inspiration 
from the Bible which, for that generation , embodied its immediate tasks and 
visions, as if the present were recapturing the past.  Leaders, authors and teachers 
all believed that, on the one hand, the Bible legitimized Zionism, in that it 
testified to Jewish ownership of the Land of Israel and foretold the nations return 
to its homeland, the rebuilding of the land, and the ingathering of the exiles; 
conversely, Zionism enhanced the glory of Scripture, in that it was realizing 
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 biblical prophecy and thereby confirming the eternal truth of the Bible.  Thus the 
Bible became an inspiring commentary on the present, just as the present became 
a concrete interpretation of the Bible. 251   
 
Nearly all Israeli leaders, political parties, and movements, past and present, have 
invoked the Bible to legitimate their policies and programs in one way or another, 
including adamant secularists who disdained any identification with the theological 
dogmas or ritual practices of traditional Judaism. The small but influential Canaanite 
movement of the 1940s and 1950s, for example, viewed the Hebrew Bible as a remnant 
of the literary heritage of the ancient Hebrews, a pagan nation that had lived in a Hebrew-
speaking area called “the Land of Kedem” that included Palestine, Jordan, Syria, and 
Lebanon.  For the Canaanites, the resettlement of Palestine was just the first step to the 
liberation of the Land of Kedem from the political domination, language, and culture of 
its Arab conquerors.  The Canaanite ideal was a Hebrew state throughout the erstwhile 
Land of Kedem, in which there was total separation between religion and state and 
absolute equality among all of its citizens.252 
In Zionist discourse and Israeli politics, the Scriptures often speak in 
contradictory voices and support of, or opposition to, diverse interests.253   Moshe 
Greenberg identifies three broadly discernable biblical voices in the State of Israel: 1) 
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 observant Jews, for whom  the Bible is a source of Jewish religious instruction and 
authority;  2) non-observant Jews, for whom the Bible as a socially progressive 
document, articulating the eschatological hope for  redemption of the Land of Israel and 
of its people in a peaceful world; and 3) non-observant nationalists for whom Scripture is 
their charter to the Land of Israel, a source of national pride, and as a mandate for a 
“muscular” imperial Israel that takes pride in war and conquest to affirm its independence 
and sovereignty.  While these three scriptural voices alternate and mingle within Israeli 
political culture, Greenberg emphasizes that they remain distinct, selective, partial, and 
very much subject to interpretation.254  These voices draw upon the Bible as the basis for 
the religious paradigm of covenant, exile, and redemption: 
Civilization centers on the divinely ordained mission of a chosen people, 
the descendants of individuals--Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob--who acquired a 
favored, unmediated relationship with the Creator of the universe. As a result of 
the primal covenant, his descendants have dedicated themselves to the service of 
God. This obliges them to preserve their separate identity from the non-elect. 
History is an unending struggle between the elect and everybody else (composed 
of Seventy Nations, according to the Midrash), the earthly enactment of a cosmic 
narrative of good and evil. At the culmination of history the Hebrew tribe, 
dispersed and chastened as a result of divine displeasure, is destined to gather in 
its scattered fragments from among the nations of the world and return redeemed-
-and acknowledged thus by the non-elect--to its original divinely promised 
homeland. 
The Zionist myth, which secularizes the foregoing, has been the major 
motif in the conduct of Israel's foreign relations.255  
 
This narrative is secularized into the Israeli “master commemorative narrative” of 
patrimony, exile, and return.  The transformation from a religious to a secular paradigm 
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 requires some significant, and radical, modifications to the biblical world view. Most 
prominent is the expurgation of all references to reward and punishment in the covenantal 
relationship depicted in the Bible. The promise of the land in Deuteronomy and the 
prophecies of return from exile are conditional, from a biblical perspective, and require 
absolute obedience to Divine precepts.  The elimination of the concepts of reward and 
punishment makes the Bible primarily useful both as a myth of origins and a deed of title 
to territory.  
Another fundamental change in the traditional Jewish myth of origins by Zionism 
is a re-gendering of the “people of Israel.” One biblical image of the relationship of the 
“chosen people” relationship of the male God, Yahweh, to the Israelites is of husband to 
wife (Jer. 2:1-2).  Some of the harsher prophetic passages depict this relationship as 
deeply dysfunctional, with Israel portrayed as an adulteress contaminated by the impurity 
of foreign seed (Jer. 2:20-22; Jer. 3:6-11).  In the Zionist recasting of the metaphor,  the 
collective Jewish people and its land are lovers, with  am yisrael (the nation of Israel) 
cast in the role of the heroic male, while “the Land” (ha’aretz)  is transformed into the 
beloved, feminized moledet.  In schools and in the army, courses on Israeli history, 
ethnology, geography, geology, and botany are a single curricular subject known as 
yedi’at haaretz (knowledge of the land).  “Those who coined the phrase were 
undoubtedly aware of the biblical meaning of yedi’a, an act of sexual possession,” 
observes historian Meron Benvenisti: 
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 The Bible became a guidebook, taught by reference to the landscape, less for its 
humanistic and social message—and not at all for its divine authorship  There is 
nothing more romantic and at the same time more “establishment than to be 
connected in some fashion with this cult. Its priests are the madrichim—guides 
and youth leaders.  An extensive institutional network sustains yedia’at haaretz:  
research institutes, field schools the Society for the Preservation of Nature in 
Israel (SPNI), the Jewish National Fund, youth movements, paramilitary units, the 
army.…It is impossible to comprehend the Israeli psyche without appreciating the 
impact of the cult of moledet. 256  
 
Many of Israel’s secular Zionist founders considered the Bible primarily as a deed of title 
to Palestine, as did the state’s political architect and first Prime Minister, David Ben-
Gurion.  In his testimony before  the  Peel Commission in 1937, he declared, “Our right 
to Palestine derives not from the Mandate or the Balfour Declaration.  It preceded 
them…The Bible is our Mandate.  The Bible, which was written by us in our Hebrew 
language and in this very land,that is our Mandate.”257  Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin sees 
Israeli secular nationalism not as a replacement for the theological version of Israel’s 
founding myth, but as an interpretation of the myth, making the distinction between 
“secular” and “religious” identities of Jewish Israelis questionable:  “They are called 
‘secular’ because they reject or abandon the Halakha, the Jewish law, but the myth that 
defines the so-called national-secular is itself based on an interpretation of the theological 
myth…God does not exist but he promised the land to us.”258 
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 One of the primary goals of Israel’s Zionist political culture has been “to make the 
continuity of the ancient past with the contemporary context a taken-for-granted 
reality.”259  The assumption and assertion of the geographical, historical, and 
ethnological continuity between the modern State of Israel and the biblical Israelite polity 
established in ancient Canaan more than three millennia ago—promised by God to 
Abraham, conquered by Joshua, ruled by David and Solomon, reclaimed by the heirs of 
the Hasmoneans—became the foundation of the Israeli “master commemorative  
narrativ
ent to the land, and therefore only a tenuous and 
transien
                                                
e.” 
 The establishment of the State of Israel represented the return of the Jewish 
nation not as a colonial settlement on foreign territory, but a return to its biblically 
promised ancient homeland from which it had been twice exiled—first by the 
Babylonians in 586 BCE, and again by the Romans after the Bar Kochba revolt in 135 
CE.  The modern state of Israel’s continuity with its ancient forebearer stands in marked 
contrast to the surrounding “new” and artificial Middle Eastern states, whose peoples had 
no real historical connection or attachm
t claim to legitimacy. 
  The Israeli Foreign Ministry’s website illustrates this by offering numerous maps 
from various historical periods that emphasize the continuity between the present state 
and its ancient antecedents.  One, referenced to I Kings 4:24 in the Bible, sketches the 
maximal boundaries of the antecedent Jewish state during the time of David and Solomon 
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 (1077-997 BCE), encompassing present-day Jordan, extending into Lebanon and the 
Sinai peninsula, and stretching into Syria far beyond Damascus to the Euphrates River.  
The second, a rendition of Herod’s post-biblical kingdom, 30 BCE to 70 CE, includes 
Jericho and the Golan Heights, which, the caption notes, was a gift from Caesar Augustus 
to the Judean king Herod as a reward for his loyalty.  Superimposed on both sketc
 
hes are 
the bou
period,  incessant internal struggles between polytheists and henotheists,261  between 
                                                
ndaries of the present State of Israel, including the West Bank and Gaza.    
As Biale notes, the builders of the early Zionist state invoked the collective 
memory of the biblical Israelite state as a unified, fully autonomous polity that could 
serve as a model for constructing a sovereign, western European-style nation-state that 
embodied nineteenth century European concepts of state sovereignty.  “The real character 
of the biblical state—disunited and externally dominated for most of its existence—plays 
no role in this memory.”260  According to the Bible, after the division of Solomon’s 
realm, the Israelite kingdoms Judah and Israel each formulated distinct foreign policies 
and even went to war with one another.   The northern kingdom of Israel was overrun by 
Assyria in 722 BCE, and its population was deported to various regions of the Assyrian 
empire, which at that point still included much of what would become Persia and Media.   
Judah, further to the south, retained its sovereignty for another century.  During that 
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 “accomodationists” and “nationalists,”262 and between those Judean political Realists 
who favored alliance with Egypt against the rising power of Babylon, and those  who 
counseled submission to the Babylon, characterized Judean politics.   
Geopolitically sandwiched on the perpetual fault line between one major imperial 
power to the north (Aram, Assyria, Babylonia, Persia, Greece, Rome) and another to the 
southwest (Egypt), and strategically situated at the continental confluence of Asia, Africa, 
and Europe, with the Mediterranean Sea to the west and the waterways abutting the 
Arabian peninsula to the east, the small Israelite polity of the first millennium BCE 
almost always found itself on the fault lines of imperial expansion from every direction. 
The political status of the ancient Jewish polity throughout most of antiquity, Biale 
emphasizes, was not national sovereignty, but rather a partial and very tenuous 
independence in an imperial world.263  Israel’s secular Zionist narrative and its religious 
version both “forget” that the Bible itself provides scant evidence of an extended golden 
age of Jewish power in antiquity, nostalgically glorified in liturgy and legend.   
                                                 
 
period.  The Israelites, to be sure, worshiped Yahweh, whose cult was then, as later, centered in 
Jerusalem, and they seem to have shared many other practices with the Jews.  For example, males 
seem to have been circumcised, pigs were rarely consumed, and mourning rituals seem to have 
included fasting, sackcloth and ashes. But on the whole, except for brief period of pietistic 
reform, most Israelites were not henotheists, and they may not have known  of many 
characteristic biblical observances, such as the festivals of Passover and Sukkot, allegedly 
instituted either by the reformist king Josiah (reigned 609-639 B.C.E.), shortly before the 
Babylonian conquest or by Ezra and Nehemiah, in the fifth century.  And their rituals seem often 
to have included practices forbidden by the Pentateuch, such as skin cutting, a mourning custom.  
Most importantly, perhaps, there is no evidence that the Israelites possessed a single authoritative 
“Torah” that bore any resemblance to the Pentateuch.” 
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   Under the ancient imperial system, small nations had generally been  permitted 
to govern themselves internally under kings, priests or ethnarchs, who were given a 
relatively high degree of autonomy, provided that they paid the required tribute to the 
dominant hegemonic power and did not attempt to rebel against  its authority.   Rebellion 
against the dominant power took the form of refusal to pay taxes or tribute.   The Bible 
records that the results of these rebellions were usually disastrous, and the “true prophets” 
of Yahweh invariably advised against them.  During periods of imperial decline, 
hegemonic transition, and disputes over succession, a greater exercise of sovereignty and 
territorial expansion was possible.   The  period of  political transition from Egyptian to 
Syrian (Aramean) dominance in the tenth century BCE, for example, allowed the 
kingdom of David and Solomon to negotiate political arrangements with surrounding 
peoples through diplomacy, alliance (frequently effected through marriage), or war.   In 
the latter half of the second century BCE, the hegemonic transition from Seleucid to 
Roman dominance enabled the Hasmonean dynasty of Judea to expand and establish 
Judea as a regional power.   
The biblical books of Kings and Chronicles provide ample testimony that even the 
Davidic and Solomonic state at the pinnacle of Israelite power, idealized by Zionist 
visionaries, was characterized by internal dissent, political intrigue, heterodoxy, religious 
pluralism, and rebellion.   Rivalry between north and south, reifying older traditions of 
inter-tribal animosities attested to in the Book of Judges,  consistently jeopardized the 
formation and maintenance of a unified Israelite political entity, even under the most 
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 fortuitous of geopolitical circumstances.  After the death of Solomon, popular discontent 
and longstanding political rivalry culminated in the division of the kingdom of David and 
Solomo
at “Abraham gave all that he had to Isaac,” biblical 
                                                
n into two mini-states, Judah and Israel (the latter often referred to as “Ephraim,” 
the dominant tribe in the region, or “Samaria,” the capital city).  
Presumption of the geographical, historical, and ethnological continuity between 
the ancient polity of the Bible and the modern State of Israel underlies political discourse 
justifying present-day Israeli territorial rights.  Various biblical depictions of the divinely 
mandated boundaries of the biblical Land of Israel differ in both their extent and 
specificity. The nomadic patriarchs move about almost exclusively within the region west 
of the Jordan, for the most part between Hebron and Beersheba.   They interact positively 
with local tribal leaders and conclude treaties with them.  The land promised to the “seed 
of Abraham” is broadly situated geographically as being between the Euphrates River 
and the “river of Egypt,” and is ethnographically specified as the land of the Kenites, 
Kenizzites, Kadmonites, Hittites, Perizzites, Rephaim, Amorites, Canaanites, Girgashites, 
and Jebusites (Gen. 15:18-21).264   The promise to Abraham that his “seed” would inherit 
the land,  before he had fathered any children, would seemingly have included not only 
Isaac but Ishmael, as well as  his numerous descendants through Keturah, enumerated in  
Genesis 25:2-4.  However, by linking the promise of the land to Abraham’s seed to the 
assertion in Genesis 25:5 th
 
264. See Moshe Weinfeld, The Promise of the Land: The Inheritance of the Land of 
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 comme
and that had never been promised to the 
patriarc
 
                                                
ntators were able to exegetically override the territorial claims of any other 
“Abrahamic” descendants.     
In  Numbers 34:2-12, the  land promised to Abraham’s descendants extends 
eastward from the Great Sea along the northern boundary of the mountains of present-day 
Lebanon to  Mount Hor (Hermon), and stretches northward to  Hazar-enan (about 
midway between modern day Balbeck in Lebanon and present-day Damascus in Syria).   
The eastern border runs along the Kinneret Sea (Sea of Galilee) and the Jordan River as 
far as the southern edge of the Dead Sea, and the southernmost boundary stops near 
Kadesh Barnea, at  the beginning of  Edom (Idumea), the heritage of the Esau tribes.   
There is no mention of either the River of Egypt or of the Euphrates.   However, as the 
Israelites prepare to conquer Canaan, the geographical boundaries of the Israelite 
patrimony begin to shift eastward, with the tribes of Reuben and Gad asking to be 
allowed to settle east of the Jordan River.  As Irving Zeitlin observes, “The pattern of 
actual conquest failed to correspond with the boundaries of the land of ancient promise.”  
The tribes find themselves conquering l
hs—Transjordan.”265  A very different paradigm for relations with the various 
inhabitants of the land begins to emerge.     
In Exodus 23:31, the divinely mandated boundaries of the Land extend from the Sea
 of Reeds to the Sea of the Philistines, and from the desert to the river.  God reiterates to 
Moses’ successor, Joshua, that the borders of the Israelite conquest will span the territory 
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 from the desert and the Lebanon to the P’rat River, usually translated as Euphrates, and 
the Great Sea in the west, encompassing all the land of the Hittites (Joshua 1:2-4).  
(Jewish commentators disagree as to whether the Hittites referred to here are those which 
originate in southern Turkey or those further south in Lebanon.)  These verses from 
Joshua also include the admonition that “Every place that the sole of your foot shall tread 
Israel’s first Likud Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, and the Revisionist movement, 
                                                
upon I have given to you,” i.e. anywhere the Israelites transited or occupied, becomes de 
facto a part of the “Promised Land.” 
 Although the expansive borders of the Davidic-Solomonic kingdom and the 
Hasmonean state were both short-lived exceptions to the geopolitical boundaries of both 
biblical Israel and Second Temple Judea, they have remained the discursive backdrop of 
Israel’s “historic” claim to not only to the West Bank and Gaza, but to the Sinai, 
Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria.  From the outset, the founders of the Yishuv, the pre-state 
infrastructure of what became the State of Israel in 1948, looked at the chronographic as 
well as the territorial ambiguity of ancient Israel’s borders, as depicted in the Bible, as an 
asset, rather than as a liability. During the armistice negotiations in 1949, Israel’s political 
architect, David Ben-Gurion, told his aides, “In the Bible as well as our history, there are 
all kinds of definitions of our country’s borders, so there’s no real limit.  No border is 
absolute.  If it’s a desert—it could just as well be the other side.  If it’s a sea, it could also 
be across the sea.”266  Vladimir Jabotinsky (1880-1940), the ideological mentor of 
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 wanted a Jewish state not necessarily as it was promised to Abraham, but inclusive of all 
the territories controlled in the past by Jews,” including substantial parts of 
f which subsequently received de facto recognition from the Israel 
government: 
                                                
Transjordan.267   
 Right-wing territorial maximalists, past and present, have openly advocated 
annexing these regions to the State of Israel when the opportunity arises, and have 
vehemently opposed Israeli withdrawal from those that are already under Israeli control. 
The agenda of the Manhigut Yehudit (“Jewish Leadership”) movement, which became a 
faction of the Likud party in 2000 at the invitation of party leader Benjamin Netanyahu, 
declares, “A law will be passed for the restoration of lands—the main essence of which 
will be that all land that is conquered, acquired or held by Jews within the Biblical 
boundaries of the Land of Israel shall immediately become an indivisible part of the State 
of Israel.”268  They contend that Israel has already relinquished much of its divinely 
promised biblical patrimony to Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, and the territories conquered 
during the 1967 war may never be relinquished.   The Gush Emunim movement and its 
successors used religious law to justify illegal settlement activity immediately after the 
war, much o
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 For Gush Emunim, the basic notion of "Greater Israel" as constituting the 
“promised land” is essentially a religious one. For the national religious 
community, territorial withdrawal and settlement evacuation is in direct 
contradiction to the law of the Torah, which takes precedence over any form of 
human decision making process, however democratic that process may be. As 
such, the West Bank Rabbis Forum (Yesha [Rabbis]) has become the most 
important ideological forum, to which the political leadership have become 
increasingly subservient. The Yesha Rabbis have issued public statements that 
governmental decisions which negate the Greater Land of Israel ideology are in 
contradiction to Torah law and are therefore "immoral" and not to be observed. 
As the national religious population has become increasingly fundamentalist in 
matters of religious observance and ritual in the past two decades, so too the 
Rabbis have greater influence over the political activities and decisions of the 
settlers themselves.269 
 
The Bible is also invoked in Israeli political discourse emphasize the continuity 
between the enemies of the biblical Israelites and those of today’s Israelis, with whom 
conflict is both inevitable and perpetual. “The Realpolitik assumption that yesterday's 
enemy is tomorrow's potential friend flies in the face of the Jewish image of an 
implacable enmity between Israel and its eternal foes,” observes Raymond Cohen.    
“Israel’s leaders have inherited an entire vocabulary and set of metaphors from Biblical 
and especially Rabbinic sources to describe and prescribe relations with ‘the nations’ 
(goyim).”   Israel’s political isolation and near-pariah status in the United Nations 
reinforce, and are reinforced by, the biblical image of “a people that dwells alone” 
(Numbers 23:9).270  
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 Although the Bible recognizes the kinship between the Hebrews and neighboring 
peoples, such as the Ishmaelites, who were descended from Abraham through Sarah’s 
slave Hagar, the Hebrews are unwilling to share their land with them.   Abraham, 
designated in the book of Genesis as “the Hebrew,” is the father of Ishmael and of Isaac.   
Sarah demands that Ishmael be disinherited when Isaac is born, and, as Ze’ev Falk points 
out, God Himself appears to share this exclusive attitude (Gen. 21:12).  The figures of 
Isaac’s son, Esau, and Esau’s grandson Amalek, represent a quintessential example of the 
use of a biblical motif to define relationships with enemies in Israeli political discourse.  
Isaac and his wife Rebecca have twin sons, Jacob and Esau.   While she was pregnant, 
Rebecca was told that the struggle between the twins in her womb that she could feel 
during her pregnancy presaged the conflicts between the nations descended from them.  
Years later, Jacob manipulates Esau into selling him his birthright, and, with Rebecca’s 
help, tricks his blind father into giving him the blessing intended for Esau.   It was for this 
reason,
                                                
 according to the Bible, that “Esau hated Jacob for the blessing with which he was 
blessed by his father” (Gen. 27:41).  
After the Hebrew slaves leave Egypt, they are referred to in the biblical books of 
Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy as B’nai Yisrael (sons or children of 
Israel), or occasionally as Beit Yaakov (the house of Jacob).271 Jacob (Yaakov), whose 
name is later changed by an angel to “Israel” (Yisrael), is the symbol of the Jew in 
rabbinic literature, while his twin brother, Esau, represents the non-Jew and the 
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 archetypal anti-Semite in traditional Jewish legend and commentary (midrash).  Jewish 
legend identified Esau, who had emerged from the birth canal red (adom) and hairy, and 
was therefore also called Edom, with the empire of  Rome, and eventually with 
Christianity. According to Pinchas Peli, “Both are of the same race and the same breed, 
children of the same mother and father, and yet representing contrasting worlds.  Their 
juxtaposition is not a one-time affair or an antiquated myth; it is enacted and re-enacted 
anew e
manifestations of anti-Semitism throughout the ages.  According to the medieval 
                                                
very day.  Any attempt at an understanding of what one may call by extension 
Anti-Semitism must take into account the primal Jacob-Esau encounter.”272 
The region of Edom (Idumea), which, as noted above, was not within the biblical 
boundaries of the Land of Israel, was forcibly Judaized during the Hasmonean conquests 
during the mid-second century BCE.  During the civil war between the grandsons of the 
Hasmonean John Hyrcanus, Antipater, the Idumean (Edomite) father of Herod “the 
Great,” intervened on behalf of Hyrcanus, inviting Roman intervention, and successfully 
gaining Roman support for Antipater’s own dynastic aspirations.  After the death of 
Antipater’s son  Herod,  Roman procurators ruled Judea directly on behalf of the Roman 
Empire, eventually destroying the Jerusalem Temple in 70 CE.    The imputed 
historiographical and allegorical reference to “Edom” served not only to connect the 
biblical Esau with the Romans, but, more significantly, to reinforce the continuity 
between the biblical Esau’s inferred hatred for his brother Jacob with subsequent 
 
272. Pinchas HaCohen Peli, “Responses to Anti-Semitism in Midrashic Literature.”  In 
Anti-Semitism in Times of Crisis, eds.. Sander Gillman and Steven T. Katz (New York: New 
York University Press, 1991), 107.  
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 commentator Nachmanides, “in my opinion…we initiated our downfall through the hand 
of Edom. For the kings of the Second Temple [i.e. the Hasmoneans] entered into a treaty 
with Ro
 
s the 
absence
me.”273   
 As Liebman and Don-Yehiya explain, the main line of  Jewish tradition considered
 anti-Semitism to be  normative, and the natural response of non-Jews to Jews.  It wa
 of hostility toward the Jew—i.e. anti-Semitism—that required explanation: 
Esau hates Jacob  symbolized the world the Jews experienced.  It is deeply 
embedded in the Jewish folk tradition.  Its resonance, however, rests on the fact 
that it not only reflects Jewish experience but, at the same time, it avoids a direct 
statement about non-Jews’ feelings toward Jews.   Such a statement, something 
like ‘all non-Jews hate Jews,’ would be not only offensive to non-Jews but clearly 
correct…But the allegory of Esau and Jacob evokes a sense of reality that 
 
                                                
in
functions to maintain a boundary around Jews and cement Jewish unity. 274 
The treatment of Esau in medieval Jewish sources was not uniformly negative.  
According to Maimonides, Esau, although an evildoer, was rewarded for honoring his 
father.  Although the descendants of his grandson Amalek were doomed to extinction, 
some descendants of Esau would remain in Edom as Israel’s neighbors, while others 
would eventually achieve greatness through Rome and then through the Catholic 
Church.275  However, such nuances have largely been lost in the use of Esau vs. Jacob in 
 
 
 
273. Cited in Amos Funkenstein, Perceptions of Jewish History (Berkeley, Los Angeles 
and Oxford: University of California P, 1993), 110-111. 
 
274. Liebman and Don-Yehiya 138-139. 
 
275. Salo W. Baron, .  “The Historical Outlook of Maimonides.”   Proceedings of the 
American Academy for Jewish Research VI (1935)., 5-133, reprinted in  History and Jewish 
Historians:  Essays and Addresses by Salo W. Baron , compiled with a foreward by Arthur 
Hertzberg and Leon A. Feldman (Philadelphia:  Jewish Publication Society, 1964), 119. 
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 Israeli political discourse, as they become internalized and associated with present-day 
politics, irrespective of religious context and observance.  “I believe in one thing:  that 
Esau h
 declares, “The Lord will be at war with Amalek throughout the ages” 
he died, as 
they pr
                                                
ates Jacob,” an Israeli military commander stated in a newspaper interview.276     
The eternal hatred of the Jewish people is also carried out through Esau’s 
grandson Amalek, who is reincarnated into the enemies of the Jewish people in every 
generation.   Although the Book of Genesis refers to the existence of Amalekites even in 
the time of the patriarch Abraham (Genesis 14:1-12),277  Amalek, the eponymous 
ancestor of the Amalekites, was Abraham’s great-great grandson, according to the 
genealogy of the Esau tribes in Genesis (Genesis 36:12). Two passages in the Bible deal 
with the source of eternal enmity between the descendants of Amalek and the Israelites 
fleeing their enslavement in Egypt.  During an unexplained and apparently unprovoked 
attack by the Amalekites on the Israelite camp at Rephidim, Moses enables the Israelites 
to prevail by holding up the rod of God.   God then tells Moses to write out a document 
as a reminder that He “will utterly blot out the name of Amalek from under heaven, 
whereupon Moses
(Ex. 17:8-13).     
  Another biblical passage concerning Amalek is found in a retrospective account of 
the Israelite sojourn in the desert that Moses delivered to the Israelites before 
epared to enter Canaan and conquer it.  Moses instructed the Israelites: 
 
276. Maariv, August 22, 1980, cited by Liebman and Don-Yehiya 141. 
 
277. During the War of the Kings, in which Abraham takes participates in order to rescue 
his abducted nephew Lot, the Amalekites are also victims of the invasion led by the Elamite king 
Chedorlaomer . 
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 Remember what Amalek did to you when you left Egypt—how, undeterred by 
fear of God, he surprised you on the march, when you were famished and weary, 
and cut down all the stragglers in the rear.  Therefore, when the Lord your God 
grants you safety from all your enemies around you, in the land that the Lord your 
od is giving you as a heritage, you shall blot out the memory of Amalek from 
 
to a state of non-existence, i.e., Amalek is to be drummed out of the world 
order.”
referred to Christians as Amalekites,280 while the uses of Amalek as a Hebrew term for 
                                                
G
under heaven.  Do not forget! (Deut. 25:17-19).     
The command appears to be, according to Louis Feldman, a directive to the Israelites “to  
return Amalek 
278        
“Jews have a tendency to seek out the  latest embodiment of Amalek, the 
nefarious enemy of the tribes of Jacob who, according to legend, arises in every 
generation to attempt to carry out his satanic mission,” observes Raymond Cohen.279  The 
biblical Amalek evolved in medieval rabbinic commentary from a hereditary distinction 
or ethnicity to a categorical behavioral paradigm, which facilitated the designation of 
specific persons or groups as a manifestation of Amalek.  In medieval Europe, Jews 
 
278. The historical evolution and multifaceted Jewish understandings of the “genocidal 
commandment” to eliminate all Amalekites—men, women and children-- as well as a survey of 
the literature discussing the moral and ethical problems raised by this seemingly unequivocal 
Divine imperative to consign a particular people to oblivion has been dealt with in depth by 
Feldman.  See Louis H. Feldman, “Remember Amalek!”: Vengeance, Zealotry and Group 
Destruction in the Bible According to Philo,  Pseudo-Philo, and Josephus (Cincinnati, Hebrew 
Union College Press, 2004), 10.     
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280. Eugene Korn, “Moralization in Jewish Law:  Genocide, Divine Commands, and 
Rabbinic Reasoning,” Edah Journal 5, no. 2, Sivan 2006,   11.   
http://www.edah.org/backend/JournalArticle/KORN_5_2.pdf, (accessed Feb. 3, 2007), 11. 
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 “Armenian” dates back to the author of Yossipon in the tenth century and was still in use 
in among Jews in Galicia, Georgia, and Greece in the 19th century.281    
In the twentieth century, Amalek and his descendants continue to represent the 
archetypal lineage of all enemies of the Jewish people and, by extension, of the modern 
Jewish state.  During the Nazi era, Rabbi Moses Soloveitchik extended the designation of 
Amalek to any person who attempted to destroy the Jewish people.    “There is no doubt 
about it. Hitler was Amalek.  I am speaking in halakhic terms.  Hitler and his entourage 
were Amalek…the incarnation of total evil.”282  His son, Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik 
(1903-1993), labeled as “Amalek” the Arabs attempting to eliminate Israel in the 1950s, 
while excluding innocent “Amalekite” women and children from the application of the 
command to expunge the name of Amalek.283  The epithet of Amalek was subsequently 
directed against Arab states opposed to Israel’s existence, Palestinian suicide bombers, 
and to Arabs in general, including civilians.  Israeli legal scholar Amnon Rubinstein, a 
longtime advocate of a secular, humanistic Zionism that grants full equality for Arabs in 
Israel, decries the application of biblical and halakhic directives  to the modern State of 
Israel’s security dilemmas: 
The Deuteronomy injunction to smite Amalek and ‘blot out his memory’ is taken, 
despite all religious evidence to the contrary, as referring to the Arabs.  
Consequently, and because Israel’s wars are described a “war of religious 
obligation,” ordinary rules of humanity should not be applicable to these new 
                                                 
281. Elliott Horowitz, Reckless Rites:  Purim and the Legacy of Jewish Violence 
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2006), 124.  
   
282. Aaron Rakeffet-Rothkoff and Joseph Epstein, eds. The Rav:  the World of Rabbi 
Joseph B. Soloveitchik (New York: Ktav, 1999), 152-153. 
 
283. Korn, 11.  For  J. Soloveitchik’s ruling that there is no obligation to kill non-
complicit Arab women and children,  See  9, n.36. 
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 “Amalekites.”…Military chaplains have scandalized the public by asserting that 
under Halachic law, Arab civilians may be killed in these wars of religious 
obligation.284   
 
The Hebrew Bible contains one book that, more than any other, has been 
interpreted as paradigmatic of the Jewish historical encounter with Amalek. One of the 
last books added to the Hebrew Bible:285 the Scroll of Esther (Megillat Esther, often 
referred to as the “Book of Esther”) is a gripping novella with sex, violence, intrigue at 
the highest echelons of government, and a happy ending.  It is the only book of the Bible 
in which God is never mentioned. Numerous biblical and classical scholars, Jewish and 
non-Jewish, consider the Scroll of Esther as a Hellenistic novel dealing with the Seleucid 
period, rather than a historical account of any events that took place in Achaemenid 
Persia. 
 From a literary perspective, the style of the work is straightforward, even 
“journalistic” (and very un-Persian in the sort of details recorded).  Queen Vashti, wife of 
King Ahasueros, refuses to obey her husband’s order to present herself at an all-male 
party he is hosting, at which a profusion of alcohol was being served, in order to show off 
her beauty.  The king’s advisors convince him that the queen’s disobedience will set a 
bad example for the women of the empire, and that he must therefore get rid of her.  
Ahasueros reluctantly agrees, but he soon regrets his decision.  To console him, his chief 
courtiers persuade him to gather together the most attractive maidens of his empire and to 
                                                 
284. Amnon Rubinstein, The Zionist Dream Revisited:  From Herzl to Gush Emunim and 
Back (New York:  Schocken Books, 1984), 116.  
 
285. Scholars disagree as to whether Daniel or Esther was the last book added to the 
Hebrew Bible.  Most agree that both are Hellenistic novels.  
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 choose Vashti’s replacement from among them.   In popular renditions of the story of 
Esther, the process is almost invariably depicted as a beauty pageant in which attractive 
women competed to become part of the king’s harem, although the text of the novella is 
ambiguous about the process by which the massive roundup of thousands of beautiful 
women from the vast borders of the Persian empire took place.  Among them is Esther, a 
young woman whose deceased parents were descended from Judean exiles. 
  Once in the king’s harem, the women are under the supervision of the palace 
eunuchs.  Each woman receives an entire year of cosmetic treatments—described in 
detail—to prepare her for a single night with the king, after which she moves to another 
women’s house within the palace where she remains for the rest of her life, never again 
called to the king unless he specifically requests her by name.  Reminiscent of the 
Arabian Nights, Ahasueros avails himself of one virgin after another until at last, after 
three years, he spends the night with Esther.  Smitten with her beauty and charm, he 
crowns her queen in place of Vashti. 
Esther does not reveal her ethnicity to anyone in the palace on the advice of her 
uncle/cousin Mordechai, who cared for her after the death of her parents.286  One of the 
literary devices upon which the plot of the story depends is the fact that, although Esther 
maintains constant contact via messengers with Mordechai, who is well known to all the  
functionaries and courtiers within the palace complex as Mordechai ha-Yehudi 
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traditions, Esther and Mordechai were married.  For a discussion of some of the textual and moral 
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 (Mordechai the Judean, usually translated as Mordechai the Jew), for five years, no one 
in the palace even suspects that Esther is of Judean/Jewish ancestry.  When Haman, the 
king’s vizier, devises a genocidal plot to destroy all of the Yehudim of the empire and 
Esther, at the risk of her own life, intervenes, revealing Haman’s plot to be an attack on 
her and her people. 
While the Persian king is powerless to rescind a command promulgated by 
Haman for the destruction of the Jews by Haman with his own signet ring and with his 
permission, Ahasueros authorizes Esther to take his ring and do whatever she sees fit to 
save her people. Mordechai dictates an edict to the royal scribes that authorizes the 
Judeans throughout the empire to defend themselves from attackers and avenge 
themselves on anyone who carried out Haman’s instructions by killing them and 
plundering their property.  According to the “happy ending,” thousands of Persians who 
obeyed Haman’s decree to attack the Jews and plunder their property, even after it had 
been countermanded by a decree from Esther that Jews would be permitted to defend 
themselves, were slaughtered by the Jews.  (There is no mention of any such massacre of 
Persians by Jews in Persian or Babylonian tradition.) 
Haman is “the son of Hammedata the Agagite,” which, according to rabbinic 
exegesis, identifies him as a descendant of Agag, the Amalekite king during the reign of 
King Saul (I Samuel 15:9).   Haman represents the Amalekite determination to 
exterminate the entire Jewish people, while Mordechai, in bringing about Haman’s 
downfall, does what his own ancestor, Saul, had refused to do—to follow God’s 
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 command to wage war on Amalek and kill him, showing no mercy.287  The Book of 
Esther provides the historiographic framework for the “collective memory” of life in 
Persia within Jewish historiography throughout the ages.  In the process, Haman, who, 
according to rabbinic interpretation, is  descended from Amalek and shared his genocidal 
intentions towards the Jews, largely overshadows and overwrites the more benevolent 
biblical traditions associated with Cyrus.  This is also used to define the current Israeli-
Iranian relationship, with Haman representing Iran. 
As Adele Berlin observes, “Very few twentieth-century Bible scholars believed in 
the historicity of the book of Esther, but they certainly expended a lot of effort justifying 
their position.”288  According to Robert Littman, “Whatever one’s judgment about the 
origins of Purim…it is agreed that the Book of Esther has a historical setting in the reign 
of Xerxes and it is replete with details of Persian court life.”289  Elias Bickerman 
contends that the author of Esther was probably a Jew from Susa, writing sometime in the 
second century BCE, and definitely before 78/77 BCE (the date of Greek Esther), who 
combined two popular folk motifs in order  to explain a festival observed by the Jews of 
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 Susa on the 15th of Adar, but observed by other Jews in the countryside on the 14th.  
Bickerman believes the author wanted to make this local feast into one that is recognized 
and voluntarily observed by all Jews, in much the same way that the Hasmoneans in 
Maccabees II invited the Jews of Alexandria to observe the festival of the restoration of 
the Jerusalem sanctuary.290    
Theodor Gaster suggests that “Purim may have originally been the Persian New 
Year festival [noruz] held at the time of the vernal equinox and characterized by all the 
rites and ceremonies associated with that occasion,” pointing out that Purim frequently 
falls within a week of the vernal equinox.291  Although the story purports to be one about 
Jews and explaining a Jewish festival, “every detail of its Jewish coloration involves 
something either anomalous or incredible,” from the non-Jewish names of the hero and 
heroine, to the chronological implausibility of Mordechai having been one of the original 
deportees from Jerusalem to Babylon 112 years earlier, and Esther’s having been the 
consort of a Persian king, which Gaster says, in light of Persian custom, can only be 
considered “bizarre.”292  Furthermore, Gaster notes that the word pur (lot) from which 
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 the festival allegedly derives its name, exists neither in Hebrew or Aramaic, the two 
languages spoken by the Jews.293    
  That the Book of Esther is set in the reign of Xerxes, who was heavily 
committed to Zoroastrianism of an orthodox variety, is neither a coincidence nor an 
accident.  The historical Xerxes reversed the practice of religious tolerance of his 
predecessors.  Darius had followed a policy of funding temples throughout the realm, 
including Jerusalem, while Xerxes, says Berquist, radically changed Darius’ policy, 
withholding construction and operation funds from temples, and destroying them in some 
places in order to curb temple-centered nationalist movements.  “The destruction of 
temples was not so much a religious act as a political act to remove the base of power for 
rebels and nationalistic feeling and organization that these rebels could foster.”294  After a 
Babylonian revolt in 482 BCE, the Persian general Megabyzus, Xerxes’ brother-in law, 
took firm control of Babylon and melted down the 18 foot high, 800 lb. solid gold statue 
of Bel Marduk into bullion.295   Littman contends that the victims of Xerxes I in the 
                                                 
 
and foreign women were limited to the status of concubines. Brosius, 191-196.    That a woman 
whose family origins were unknown, Judean or not, would be granted the status of queen seems 
to defy possibility.  The biblical Esther, if she existed, could not have been more than a 
concubine.    
 
293. Gaster, Ibid. 33. 
 
294. Berquist, 89. 
 
295. Berquist, 88. 
 
 136
 original story upon which the biblical Book of Esther is based were not Jews, but 
Babylonians who worshipped Marduk and Ishtar.296  
Ironically, it was the staunch and uncompromising monotheism promoted by 
Xerxes to squelch nationalist movements that resulted in his villainous reputation in 
Jewish folk literature.  From a religious perspective, Xerxes had done precisely what the 
Hebrew prophets had  hoped Cyrus would do—he had cut off support for the numerous 
shrines and cults of Babylon and, in some cases, destroying them—although he did so in 
the name of Ahura Mazda, rather than Yahweh.  The consequence of this monotheistic 
policy was the reduction or elimination of state financing of other non-Zoroastrian 
shrines, including the Jerusalem temple.   There is no record in biblical or Persian sources 
of a Judean rebellion under Achaemenid rule  (unlike the revolts that took place after the 
Babylonian conquest and would take place in the first century CE under Roman rule), 
and, correspondingly, no reference to any destruction or damage done to the Jerusalem 
temple.   However, Berquist observes, “it does appear that Yehud’s temple suffered a 
radical decrease in funding, and thus the temple experienced a protracted time of 
financial problems,” one of the themes of the biblical Book of Malachi.297    
  The power and popularity of the Purim legend would seem to derive in good 
measure from the opportunity to celebrate a holiday, most likely of foreign derivation that 
had none of the prohibitions applicable on the biblically mandated festivals. The 
celebration of Purim not only permitted, but encouraged levity, and allowed for lifting 
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 normal restrictions on feasting and drinking to the point of inebriation, gambling, and 
levity, coupled with the drowning out of the name of Haman (Amalek) during the ritual 
reading of the Scroll of Esther in the synagogue, and the custom of festive theatrical 
reenactments (purimspiels) of biblical events.  
   The custom of burning Haman in effigy on Purim was common to many Jewish 
communities in the early centuries of the Common Era and during the geonic period in 
Babylonia.298  It was banned by the Church and abandoned by Jews in Christian Europe 
because of accusations that the hanging, crucifying, and burning of Haman was a 
symbolic crucifixion of Jesus.299   In predominantly Muslim countries, however, the 
practice continued well into the twentieth century.   In Iran, children traditionally 
prepared a large effigy of Haman, and filled its clothes with gunpowder. They set up a 
large stick in the middle of the courtyard, from which Haman was hung.  After throwing 
oil over the effigy, they would set it alight.300   Similar Purim rituals that burn Haman in 
effigy have also been recorded in various Jewish communities in Yemen, Bukhara, the 
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 Caucasus, Tunisia, and Libya.301  The Jews of southern India were also familiar with 
custom of burning Haman as part of the celebration of Purim.302  
The events found in the Scroll of Esther have been also been marked in other 
ways. The medieval traveler. Benjamin  of Tudela, attested to a longstanding tradition of 
the Jews of Persia of making pilgrimages to Hamadan, the ancient city of Ecbatana, 
where Esther and Mordechai were said to be buried.303  From medieval to modern times, 
Jewish communities, vulnerable to persecution, have commemorated deliverance from 
danger as a “second Purim.”  Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi identifies several local Purim 
reenactments (Granada 1038; Narbonne 1236; Syracuse 1380 or 1420; Morocco 1497; 
Cairo 1520; Tangier 1844; and unspecified nineteenth century events during the 
Napoleonic Wars), and points out that they shared certain common features. 
Local in character, the observance of this local Purim commemoration was 
limited to a specific geographic area.  A “scroll” narrating the event, modeled on the style 
and structure of the Scroll of Esther, was composed and read.  “For all of them the 
original Purim served as a paradigm, and the new events were interpreted according.”304 
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 The Jews of Iran proclaimed a holiday they called ‘id-i basharat (Festival of Good 
Tidings) when, in 1629, Shah Safi I, shortly after he ascended the throne,  gave royal 
permission to the Jews of Isfahan, who had been forced to convert, to return to Judaism.  
The festival was celebrated annually on the date of their deliverance as a sort of local 
Purim.  “In the memory of the community of Isfahan, this deliverance was not less 
miraculous than that which engendered the Festival of Purim.”305     
The period between the sabbath before Purim (Shabbat Zakhor, the “sabbath of 
memory,” when the scriptural reading to exterminate Amalek is read) has also been 
associated with incidents of violence precipitated by Jews.  Jewish settlers made their 
way into Hebron in 1981 and refused to leave.  Provocative incidents subsequently 
occurred on Purim that deliberately incited Hebron’s Arab population.  It was on Purim, 
in 1994, that Baruch Goldstein, a Kiryat Arba settler, shot twenty-nine Muslims as they 
prostrated themselves at the Tomb of the Patriarchs.306  Goldstein was the role model for 
Yigal Amir, the assassin of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.   
Amalek and Haman provide a conceptual as well as a narrative link between the 
Bible and what became the defining paradigm for Israeli security and survival—the 
European Holocaust.  Israel’s Declaration of Independence enshrined the assumption that 
“the Holocaust had proven once again that the only solution to the Jewish problem was 
an independent state in Israel,” while the assumption that “the rest of the world—literally 
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 every nation—was hostile and had nothing to save the Jews during the Holocaust” was 
embodied in Israeli security discourse and doctrines.307  In May, 1967, as the prospects of 
a war with Egypt loomed in which tens of thousands of Israelis were expected to die, 
Israel’s civilian population was warned that a “second Holocaust” was on the way.  
Analogies to the European Holocaust were widely credited with mobilizing and 
motivating Israeli soldiers to prevent the annihilation of the Jewish nation.  As one 
Knesset member put it, “At our sides fought the six million, who whispered the eleventh 
commandment in our ear, ‘Thou shalt not be killed’—the commandment that was omitted 
at Mount Sinai but given to us now, during the Sinai battles.”308  
  Paradoxically, Israel’s victory and territorial expansion as a result of the Six Day 
War were accompanied by increased feelings of insecurity and a sense of Israel’s 
isolation in the international community demanding in U.N. Resolution 242 that Israel 
withdraw to its 1967 boundaries, which also found expression in Holocaust political 
metaphors.  The Jewish fate (ha-goral ha-yehudi) —reified in the tiny State of Israel, 
encircled by enemies bent on its annihilation, and singled out for condemnation by the 
nations of the world—was “eternal isolation, unending anti-Semitism, and a continual 
threat to Jewish survival.” 309   
   Nurith Gertz, like Biale and Peleg, sees several factors that influenced “the 
melding together of Jewish and rightist narratives and their penetration into mainstream 
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 Israeli society.”  The trial of Adolf Eichmann opened the previously repressed subject of 
the Holocaust for public discussion, and introducing its horrors into public discourse to a 
new generation of Israelis and to the nearly half of Israeli Jews whose roots were in 
Muslim countries.   The Six Day War aroused messianic sentiments as well as anxiety, 
with the remnant of the Temple in the Old City of Jerusalem and the ancient cities of 
Hebron, Nablus, and Jericho in Israeli hands.310 
  Israel’s Labor party, which had dominated Israeli politics since the founding of 
the state nearly 30 years earlier, was blamed for Israel’s lack of preparedness for the Yom 
Kippur War of 1973, as well as for ideological bankruptcy. Menachem Begin, who broke the 
 monopoly of Israel’s Labor party, served as Israel’s Prime Minister between 1977 and 
1983.  Begin brought grievance to the forefront of Israeli politics with the unprecedented 
use of Holocaust imagery in domestic and foreign policy.  He transformed the European 
Holocaust into a symbol of the religious persecutions suffered by all Jews, including 
those from Arab countries, and based his domestic coalition on it. “For Begin, all Jews 
are united by the hostility of the non-Jewish world, a hostility at once historical and 
contemporary.”311 The structure of Begin’s speeches, Nurit Gertz observes, “viewed the 
world as a great wasteland peopled by only two protagonists—‘we’ and ‘they’—who 
play out the final scene of the familiar drama in which the isolated few triumph over the 
mighty many.”  The struggle, however, is not one of faith, determination, or 
resourcefulness, but of sheer military might, brought to bear in what was portrayed as “a 
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 contest between Israel and the rest of the world, one that can be resolved only through 
destruction or redemption.” 312 
Begin not only based his domestic coalition on identification with the European 
Holocaust, but he invoked it to justify his foreign policy as well.  Since the Holocaust, 
Begin repeatedly stated that the nations of the world had no right to demand any 
accountability from Israel for its actions313  Launching the invasion of Lebanon, Begin 
told his cabinet, “Believe me, the alternative is Treblinka, and we have decided that there 
will be no more Treblinkas.”   When an Israeli air strike demolished the Osiraq nuclear 
facility in Iraq in June 1981, Begin declared, “We must protect our nation, a million and a 
half of whose children were murdered by the Nazis in the gas chambers.”314 After the 
Osiraq raid, which set back, but did not eliminate, the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, 
Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon asserted the “Begin Doctrine” that Israel would 
never allow any enemy state (some versions say “Arab state”) to acquire nuclear 
capability.  An unspoken corollary to the “Begin Doctrine” was that any Middle Eastern 
state that acquired nuclear capability was, de facto, an enemy.  
Beyond the facts of what occurred in the European concentration camps, 
however, the question for Israelis was how to absorb the Shoa (as the Holocaust is 
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 referred to in Hebrew) into Zionist narrative.  “(T)he history of Israel’s painful 
confrontation with the Holocaust is a story of uncertain identity,” according to Tom 
Segev.   “The Israelis’ vision of the Holocaust has shaped their idea of themselves, just as 
their changing sense of self has altered their view of the Holocaust and their 
understanding of it meaning.”315 
 After a great silence in the years immediately after the war, suspicions began to 
be aired about who had survived the death camps, and how.  In cases where some Jews 
were saved but not others, questions arose about the choices of who to save, and why.  
Accusation of collaboration began to be raised.  Debate ensued over establishing 
diplomatic relations with West Germany and acceptance of reparations by individuals 
and by the state.  “The Holocaust came to be seen as a Jewish defeat.  Its victims were 
censured for having let the Nazis murder them without fighting for their lives or at least 
the right to ‘die with honor,’” an attitude that, Segev says, “became a sort of 
psychological and political ghost that haunted the State of Israel—reflecting scorn and 
shame, hubris and dread, injustice and folly.”316  Furthermore, Segev points out:  
The most fateful decisions in Israeli history, other than the founding of the 
state itself—the mass immigration of the 1950s, the Six-Day War, and Israel’s 
nuclear project—were all conceived in the shadow of the Holocaust.  Over the 
years, there were those who distorted the heritage of the Holocaust, making it a 
bizarre cult of memory, death and kitsch.  Others too have used it, toyed with it, 
traded on it, popularized it.  As the Holocaust recedes in time—and into the realm 
of history—its lessons have moved to the center of a fierce struggle over the 
politics, ideology, and morals of the present.317  
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 One of the ways this memory is maintained is through the observance of 
Holocaust Day (Yom HaShoa), a week after Passover.  The process by which the 
commemoration day was decided upon reflects the fissures within Israeli political culture 
at the time.  On April 21, 1951, the Knesset declared the 27th day of the Hebrew month of 
Nissan would be designated “Holocaust and Ghetto Rebellion Memorial Day,” since the 
Warsaw ghetto revolt in Poland had begun on Passover eve. Many of the Warsaw 
rebellion fighters were affiliated with the youth movement of the left-wing socialist 
Mapam Party.  In 1959, the day was redesignated Holocaust and Heroism Memorial. 
Day, and two years later, named “Holocaust, Rebellion and Heroism Memorial Day.” 
Flags are flown at half mast. Movies and other entertainment places are closed, although 
some restaurants and cafes stay open in defiance of the law.  Radio and television stations 
are dedicated to the subject of the Holocaust, as are newspapers.  A siren is sounded, and 
people stop whatever they are doing, including driving, as it blares.318  
   Israeli high school students are required to study a thirty hour curriculum about the 
Holocaust in eleventh and twelfth grade. The Holocaust is including on their 
matriculation exams.319 Since the mid-1980s, high school students have visited 
concentration camps in Poland on class trips, often referred to as “pilgrimages”.  An 
estimated 24,000 Israeli students visit Poland on these trips each year.320 
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 With the Holocaust being one of the few things Israeli Jews agree upon, the 
comments of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad questioning the Holocaust and 
convening a conference on the subject provoked outrage in Israel.321  Not surprisingly, it 
invited comparison with Haman.  “Not far enough away from Jerusalem, the modern-day 
king of Persia, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, threatens to wipe Israel off the 
face of the earth, and he’s building the nuclear capacity to make that happen,” lamented 
one columnist on the 9th of Av, commemorating the destruction of the First and Second 
Temples.322   “Today, we are faced with two new dangers: 1) the nuclear threat from Iran 
and 2) the Jew-hating government of  Hamas being formed in the West Bank and Gaza,”  
opines an op-ed column for the Purim holiday reproduced on  the Israel National News  
news site.   “The goal of these two groups is to purge the Jews from their land, the land 
that G-d in His infinite kindness desires to have rebuilt and resettled by the children of 
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.” 323   
Iran:  The “Karbala Paradigm” 
The major motifs and metaphors of Iranian commemorative narrative have deep 
roots and elements dating back to the axial age:  the ongoing cosmic battle between the 
forces of justice and those of oppression, and fear of foreign intervention in Iranian 
affairs.   Iranian commemorative narrative focuses upon the overarching theme of 
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 confrontation with invasion and injustice that draws upon pre-Islamic mythic imagery as 
well as Shi‘ite and Sufi themes.   Situated on the crossroads of Central Asia, Iranians  
have had to adapt to the presence of foreign invaders and conquerors throughout their 
history, whether by means of submission, resistance, or an adaptive fusion of the two 
known as zerengi.324  
Iran’s “master commemorative narrative” draws upon Iranian religious tradition, 
including themes and motifs from Zoroastrian tradition and Sufism as well as Shia Islam,    
and expresses Iranian vulnerability to foreign invasion, encroachment and interference in 
Iranian affairs.   From the Shahnameh—the ancient epic that recounts the exploits of 
ancient Iranian heroes—to contemporary exhortations delivered by Iranian political and 
religious leaders extolling resistance to evil and injustice, and, if required, martyrdom, the 
underlying theme of Iran’s “master commemorative narrative” is the ever-present danger 
of foreign domination, and the resistance of the Iranian people to the satanic powers 
seeking to exploit and subjugate Iran by co-opting and corrupting its leaders. 
  The tenets of Zoroastrianism, which date at least as far back as the 6th-8th 
century BCE, posit that a benevolent creator deity and an evil spirit were locked in a 
dualistic struggle in which the forces of good would ultimately triumph.  Led by the 
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 Saoshyant, the third of three world saviors who would lead the followers of truth and 
justice to an ultimate victory against the forces of lies and darkness, the victory of good 
over evil would culminate in a day of judgment, the resurrection of the dead, and the end 
of history. 325    Zoroastrian beliefs about the active involvement of angelic and demonic 
spirits in human affairs and reward and punishment of individual souls in the afterlife 
date back to this period, and survive through their incorporation into the tenets and 
traditions of Judaism and Christianity,326  as well as those of Islam.327  Both the dualism 
of good versus evil and the intervention of demonic forces in human affairs are very 
much in evidence in Iranian political discourse.   
The cosmic struggle between good and evil is also reflected in Manichaeism, a 
dualistic philosophy founded by the third century Persian prophet Mani.  Manichaeism, 
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 which incorporated elements of Buddhism and Christianity into Zoroastrianism, 
identified the “satanic” material world with evil and darkness, and the world of the spirit 
with good, divinity, and light.  “At the end of the struggle, the world would vanish and 
God would emerge victorious.”328  Some scholars see Manichaeism as reflecting the 
growth of a rigid class system in an era of economic decline.  Regarded as dangerously 
heretical both before and after the rise of Islam, its leaders were persecuted by Iranian 
rulers.329  Zoroastrianism and Manichaeanism have left their mark in Iranian political 
discourse:  “In the dual world of Zarathustra and Mani, one is either on actively involved 
on the side of the forces of goodness to bring about the realization of divine justice or 
devoted to an adamant defiance of the material world and to an ascetic life for spiritual 
enrichment.”330    
In the fifth century, a radical offshoot of Manichaeism, which incorporated 
Zoroastrian dualistic concepts, was founded by Mazdak, son of Bamdad, who Dorraj 
calls “the founding father of the Iranian intellectual tradition of communalism and 
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 populism.”331 Mazdak’s was a political and religious rebellion against poverty, warfare  
economic decline, and social stratification, that Keddie suggests may  have paved the 
way for the Muslim conquest of Persia in the sixth century.332  According to one hadith, 
followers of Mazdak fled to Arabia and joined the Prophet Muhammad, encouraging him 
to overthrow the Sassanian dynasty in Iran as well as to incorporate Mazdak’s ideas into 
Islam. Dorraj argues that the concern for justice in Zoroastrianism, Manichaenism and 
Mazdakism prepared and predisposed Iranians toward the adoption of Islam.333  From its 
inception, Shi‘ism, which became Iran’s state religion in the 16th century), has claimed to 
speak in the voice of, and on behalf of, the poor and the dispossessed.  
 The Shahnameh (Book of Kings) is a multilayered pre-Islamic epic synthesizing 
ancient mythological, religious, and national themes with epic traditions dating back to 
the era of Zoroaster. The very earliest legends have parallels in Indian myth and legend, 
and may derive from the period prior to the division of Indo-European peoples into 
Indian and Iranians.334   The best known rendition of the Shahnameh, by the tenth century 
eastern Iranian poet Abolqasem Ferdowsi (940-1020), begins with the creation of the 
world, and covers the reign of fifty monarchs—forty seven kings and three queens, some 
receiving only a few lines of attention, others several thousand—who fight against 
supernatural forces of evil and teach humanity the arts of civilization.  Ferdowsi divides 
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 pre-Islamic Iranian history into four dynasties:  the Pishdadan, Kiyanian, Ashkanian, and 
Sassanian during three eras—mythical, heroic and historical—spanning the course of six 
thousand years.   Dick Davis notes that although Ferdowsi was doubtlessly a sincere 
Muslim, who may have “combined ‘nationalist’ sentiments with Shia sympathies,” his  
Shahnameh ignores Islamic historiography and cosmology, placing Persian creation 
myths at center stage and following Persian legendary chronology.335  
The mythic period and the mythological Pishdadi dynasty began with Kayumars, 
the primal human and first Persian king, who tamed the animals of the field and taught 
humans about how to prepare food and clothing.336  His beloved son Siamak aroused the 
jealousy of the evil spirit Ahriman, who engineered his death at the hands of the black 
demon.337  Kayumars and Siamak’s son Hushang, with the help of the animals, waged 
war against the demons and defeated them.   Hushang slew the black demon who had 
killed his father, and succeeded his grandfather as ruler of the world.  Just and prudent, 
Hushang discovered how to make fire from flint and how to separate iron from ore, 
which led to smithery and the crafting of metal tools.  He devised river irrigation, making 
agriculture possible, and established the festival of Sadeh to celebrate God’s gift of 
fire.338  
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 Sadeh provides a quintessential example of “an act of commemoration that 
reproduces a commemorative narrative, a story about a particular past that accounts for 
this ritualized remembrance and provides a moral message for the group members.”339  A 
mid-winter festival celebrated in Iran and by many Iranians worldwide on the 10th of the 
month of Bahman, it is widely described as marking the triumph of the forces of light 
over darkness. The word Sadeh, meaning one hundred, marks the 100th day since the 
beginning of winter, one hundred days until the beginning of summer, and fifty days 
before Noruz, the New Year.340  Sadeh illustrates the process of narrativization which 
selectively draws upon a wide variety of sources and synthesizes them in a diachronic 
progression to construct the rationale for its commemoration.341   
The present day “myth of  origins” of the festival’s observance regards Sadeh not 
only as the commemoration of  the mythic tale of the discovery of fire by primal man, but  
the lighting of fires by Zoroastrian priests to assist in the sun’s revival in the spring and 
summer.  Bonfires were set near temples on the festival, and after they had burned all 
night, women would take some of the sacred fire to their homes for blessing.   A remnant 
of the sacred fire was maintained inside the temple from year to year.  Fires were also lit 
near water, to keep away demons that could cause water to turn to frost and ice.  Its moral 
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 message to the group, from a Zoroastrian perspective, is recollected as being, “the light 
inside us is a sign of the existence of Ahura Mazda.” 342 
Iranian ambivalence toward, and adaptation to, the Arab conquest that brought 
Islam to Iran is also refracted through the commemorative narrative of Sadeh’s 
observance.  Special Sadeh ceremonies are held near Yazd at a cave in a mountain where, 
according to legend, the last Zoroastrian princess took shelter during the Muslim invasion 
in 640 CE.  Mardavij Zeyari, a ruler of Isfahan in the tenth century, is credited with 
keeping pre-Islamic Persian traditions alive, setting up bonfires on both sides of the 
Zayandeh River, and providing lavish feasts, music and fireworks to celebrate Sadeh.343    
By the twentieth century, the observance of Sadeh was largely confined to Zoroastrians 
until the festival was popularized by the Shah of Iran, and its observance became 
widespread, with no religious association.  Although there were efforts to repress the pre-
Islamic festivals after the Islamic Revolution, these ultimately proved unsuccessful.     
Hushang’s son, Tahmures, taught his people how to domesticate animals and how 
to shear their wool and spin it into fibers from which to make clothes and carpets, as well 
as how to utilize their milk.  With the guidance of his just and righteous vizier, Shahrasb, 
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 Tahmures was able to avoid evil, subduing demons by spells and with his mace.  In 
exchange for sparing their lives, these demons taught him the sciences, and the art of 
writing in nearly thirty foreign languages, including Persian, Arabic, and Chinese.  
Demons became the administrators of Tahmures’ empire, bringing prosperity but also 
some unintended consequences that would become evident during the reign of Tahmures’ 
son, Jamshid.344 
Jamshid was a wise and innovative ruler for five hundred years, during which he 
radiated the royal farr (divine grace and insight bestowed upon a king).345   He 
designated four occupational castes (priests, warriors, farmers, and tradesmen),346 
designed weaponry for his soldiers, created enormous wealth for his kingdom by 
extracting gold, silver, and precious stones from the earth, and undertook massive 
construction projects.  Jamshid inaugurated the New Year festival, Noruz, (new day), still 
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 celebrated at the vernal equinox as a major national festival in Iran, and throughout the 
Persianate world.  During the reign of Jamshid, death was unknown in the world, and 
with the demons as their slaves, people knew no sorrow or evil.347  
                                                
 However, when he became overly proud, Jamshid’s farr dimmed, and his 
wisdom abandoned him.  As a result, dissension and disobedience broke out in Persia.   
After he had killed his father, the good and generous Arabian king Merdas, Zahhak was 
granted the kingship of Persia by a contingent of Jamshid’s fractious soldiers.   Cruel and 
tyrannical, the serpentine Zahhak ruled the world for a thousand years from his palace in 
Jerusalem348 until a blacksmith by the name of Kaveh led a revolt against him.  Kaveh’s 
apron (derafsh kaviani) became the banner of the insurrectionists.349   
 Shahnameh imagery still pervades Iranian political culture.  Ayatollah Khomeini 
himself  stated, “The religious leaders will hoist the banner of Islam to exact vengeance 
on this Zuhhak of the age…” 350   In the Iranian election in June 2005, it was widely 
publicized that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the unexpected victor, was the son of a 
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 blacksmith.  The western media inferred from this that it was Ahmadinejad’s humble 
origins that won him the votes of Iran’s lowest social and economic classes.  Iranian 
commentators, however, also pointed out that Ahmadinejad represented more that a man 
from a Iran’s lowest socio-economic stratum who was able, through military service in 
the Basij and Revolutionary Guards, to become Teheran’s mayor and Iran’s president:  
“He symbolized the legendary Kaveh, the son of a blacksmith in Iranian history who had 
led a successful revolt against the tyranny of Zahhak.”351    
In the Shahnameh, Kaveh sought out and located Feraydun, a descendant of the 
Pishdadi royal line. Feraydun joined Kaveh’s revolt, and after a cosmic battle between 
good and evil that defeated Zahhak, became king.    After ruling for 500 years, Feraydun 
divided his kingdom among his three sons.  He gave his eldest son, Silim, the region of 
Rum.352   Tur received Turan (Central Asia, Turkistan, and China).  Feraydun gave Iran, 
the largest and choicest part of his kingdom, to Iraj, his youngest and most beloved 
son.353  Jealous, his step-brothers murdered the unarmed Iraj as he attempted to reconcile 
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 with them, even offering them his crown and throne.354   Eventually, Feraydun groomed 
Iraj’s grandson Manuchehr to be his successor.  After Manuchehr had avenged the death 
of his grandfather by fighting several battles with Silim and Tur, killing them, his great-
grandfather presented Manuchehr with his kingdom and the royal farr.355  Yet the 
division of Feraydun’s kingdom between Iran, Turan, and Rum remained in place, and 
the wars between Iran and Turan continued for generations.    
The period from Manuchehr to Sikander (the latter known in Western 
historiography as “Alexander the Great”) represents Iran’s heroic age, to which about two  
thirds of Ferdowsi’s 60,000 couplets are devoted.  The king of Turan, Tur’s bellicose 
grandson Afrasyab, killed Nozar, Manuchehr’s son and successor.  Taking advantage of 
the power vacuum after Nozar’s death, Afrasyab ruled Iran himself for twelve years.  
Iranian champions, rejecting the entitlement to kingship of Nozar’s, sons, placed eighty-
year old Zav, Feraydun’s descendant, on Iran’s throne.  During his brief six years as king, 
during which he ruled wisely and justly, Zav fought Afrasyab.   Zav and Afrasyab then 
signed the first of what would be many treaties confirming the Oxus River as the 
territorial boundary between Iran and Turan, which Turan’s rulers would affirm—and 
violate—throughout the course of the epic.356  
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 Even the most superficial reading of the Shahnameh reveals that, while its title 
and major protagonists are Iran’s kings, the true heroes of the epic, to whom Ferdowsi 
devotes the most attention, are the wise viziers and the intrepid “champions” whose 
shrewd intelligence and bravery enabled Iranian kings to gain and retain power.  
Ferdowsi says of Shahrasb, the vizier of Tahmures, “(H)e was the king’s star of good 
fortune, and the souls of the malevolent were under his control.”  Wishing Tahmures’ 
reign to be a just one, “he guided him in righteous paths, so that Tahmures lived purified 
of all evil, and the divine farr emanated from him.”357    The exploits and achievements 
of Sam, the champion during the reign of Manouchehr, his son Zal, who, during his 
thousand years as champion, not only serves but shapes the Kayanian royal line, and 
Zal’s son Rostam, whose physical prowess is matched by his mastery of “psychological 
warfare” during his 600 years as champion, drive much of the dramatic momentum of the 
Shahnameh.    
The character of Seyavash provides a link not only between Iran’s pre-Islamic and  
Shi‘ite traditions, but also contains some motifs from the biblical and Quranic story of 
Joseph, a popular personality among Persian poets.  Seyavash was the son of the king Kai 
Kavus and a beautiful Turkish princess, a descendant of Feraydun, rescued by Kavus’ 
knights.  Brought to Kavus and made one the concubines of his harem, she gave birth to a 
beautiful son, a “lion cub” who was entrusted for princely training to Rostam.   Years 
later, the young  prince  returned to his father’s court.358 
                                                 
 
357. Ferdowsi, 5. 
 
358. Ferdowsi, 215-217. 
 158
   The queen, Sudabeh, developed a passion for Seyavash. The daughter of the 
king of Hameveran, who hated the Persian people, Sudabeh secured Kavus’ permission to 
marry Seyavash to one of her daughters, but tried to seduce him herself.  Seyavash 
resisted Sudabeh’s lustful advances, despite her persistence.  When Sudabeh accused 
Seyavash of rape when he refused to yield to her, Kavus, was skeptical.  While Kavus 
recognized Seyavash’s  innocence,  he nonetheless loved Sudabeh, and this allowed her 
to persist with her scheming again Seyavash.359  
In the meantime, Kavus learned that Afrayasab was preparing an attack on Iran 
with  a hundred thousand cavalry massing at the border.  Seyavash persuaded Kavus to 
allow him to lead the army in its battle against Turan, proving his loyalty to his father and 
getting him away from Sudabeh. Kavus then asked Rostam to accompany Seyavash.  
Seyavash was successful in a series of battles.  Afrasyab, after a dream that, a dream 
interpreter explained, predicted the dire consequence of war between Turan and Iran, 
decided to sue for peace with Seyavash, who sent Rostam with a letter to Kavus for 
permission to reconcile with Afrasyab.  Kavus refused, treating Rostam with anger and 
contempt, sending him back to Seyavash demanding that he break his oath of truce to 
Afrasyab.360 
Heartsick at his father’s rejection, because he would not violate his pledge, 
Seyavash took shelter with Afrasyab in Turkistan, marrying his beautiful daughter 
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 Farigis.361  But the scheming of Afrasyab’s brother Garsivaz (Seyavash’s own great-
grandfather)  persuaded Afrasyab that Seyavash had betrayed him.  Seyavash was 
brutally attacked on Afrasyab’s orders, and his head was cut off.362  The gruesome and 
graphic details of the murder of Seyavash and the mourning for him are similar to those 
recounted of the martyrdom of Husayn at Karbala (see below).  The son of Farigis and 
Seyavash, Kay Khosrow, survived, and became the successor to Kay Kavus.  But Kay 
Khosrow became weary of kingship.  Immersing himself in prayer, he was visited by the 
angel Sorush in a dream, and offered the opportunity to choose occultation. After 
explaining his decision to Zal, and conferring the kingship on Lohrasp, Kay Khosrow 
disappeared.363 (His occultation can also be connected to the Islamic theme of the 
occultation of the Twelfth Imam.)    
Ferdowsi devotes far less of the Shahnameh to the more historical dynasties of the 
Ashkanians and Sassanians, and, as Davis notes, the narrative lacks some of the epic 
force of the heroic era.  Compensating for that is Ferdowsi’s underlying sense of 
foreboding that Persian civilization is soon to come to an end with the Arab conquest.364 
In their final battle, Ferdowsi contrasts the resplendent commanders of the Iranian army 
with their fierce, hardy, and ascetic Arab opponents.  The epic ends (except for 
Ferdowsi’s account of how he wrote it) with a stark and muted assertion of fact:  “After 
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 this came the era of Omar, and when he brought the new faith, the pulpit replaced the 
throne.”365    
The Shahnameh is an enormous compendium of Iranian legend, containing 
hundreds of characters  involved in myriad incidents and encounters with each other, only 
a few of whom have any recognizable historic referents.   What the Shahnameh provides 
is not history per se, but a broad mythographic narrative framework, replete with 
commemorative associations and possibilities.  It also provides a diachronic glimpse, 
from a cultural and literary perspective, of the Iranian view of power and authority in 
their own country, as well as Iran’s relations with other states.  
 Caroline Ziemke’s rather faulty reading of the Shahnameh leads her to infer that 
its lesson is that “Persian culture thrives when its leaders use their power to keep it 
isolated and suffers when they pursue power-sharing with the outside world.” While 
xenophobic sentiments are evident in the Shahnameh as well as in the Iranian “master 
commemorative narrative,” it is almost always the corruption of Iran’s own leaders by 
pride, greed, and arrogance that makes them amenable to pursuing unholy alliances with 
demonically-inspired forces outside Iran. 366   Wars, while sometimes waged for noble 
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 reasons such as honor and justice, are sometimes the result of misunderstandings or 
worse, the deliberate and provocative machinations of devious and power-hungry 
characters acting manipulatively out of malice and/or greed.    
These are themes that resonate in Iran’s master commemorative narrative 
irrespective of regime.  Davis notes that the poem was popular with the Pahlavi shahs 
because it exalted Iran’s pre-Islamic civilization, and implies some question as to whether 
the exalted status of the Shahnameh continued under Iran’s Islamic regime.  Heggay 
Ram’s study of Iranian school textbooks demonstrates that, despite many of the 
revolutionary regime’s differences in educational goals from those of the Shahs, “the 
Islamic Republic’s evident endeavor to integrate the Islamic tradition more forcefully 
into Iran’s political culture comes hand in hand with an equally forceful articulation and 
inculcation of the ancient regime’s national tradition.”  The Islamic Republic has 
appropriated the Pahlavi narrative, “which presupposed a linear movement of the 
                                                 
 
World Order (Cambridge and London: MIT, 2000), 91.  According to the Shahnameh, Zahhak’s 
father, also an Arab, is a wise and good king.  It is only after Jamshid  has ruled for 500 years and 
becomes  proud and arrogant against God that Zahhak is able to gain control of his kingdom. 
Other errors in Ziemke’s brief summary of the Shahnameh include:  1) Zahhak rules for a 
thousand years, not three hundred;  2) Fariydun’s son Tur and his descendants are the “central 
Asia warlords” who wage war against Iran.  3)  Jamshid, having lived over a millennium and a 
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 ‘Iranians’ as a unified group from pre-Islamic to Islamic times.”367  Furthermore, Ram’s 
study reveals that Islamic consciousness is not a replacement for or alternative to Iran’s 
national myth, but adds Islamic terminology to that myth. “Consequently, political Islam 
remains within the confines of Iranian nationalism.”368 
Another religious and cultural source of foreign policy imagery is the traditions 
associated with  Ali ibn Abi Talib, and his son, Husayn.   Ali, who became the Prophet’s 
son-in-law when he married Mohammad’s daughter, Fatima Zahra, was the last of “the 
four “rightly guided caliphs” and of the first imams revered by Shi‘ites.369  The heroic 
figure of Ali plays a special role in Shi‘i ritual and tradition.  A collection of ethical 
aphorisms, letters, and sermons, the Naj al-balagha (Path of Eloquence), is believed to be 
an authentic work, second only in importance to the Qu’ran.   His words and actions are 
invoked in legal procedure, and he epitomizes Islamic piety and commitment to social 
justice.370  
Ali Shariati argued that there was a disjuncture, not between Sunnism and 
Shi‘ism, but within Shi‘ism itself, with authentic Shi‘ism being the Shi‘ism of Ali.  On 
one side was the current existing Shi‘ism that had become Iran’s state religion under the 
Safavids.  Shariati posited that “Safavid Shi‘ism” was, in reality, Umayyad Sunnism 
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 (tasanon-e Ummavi), an institutionalized counter-revolutionary movement that operated 
through the clergy to defend the status quo and support the ruling class, “reconciling 
religion with ‘authoritarian and corrupt monarchies.’”  In contrast, “Ali’s Shi‘ism” was 
the original, revolutionary Shi‘ism that was identical with “Mohammad’s Sunnism” 
(tasanon-e Mohammadi).371  Ali was the last of “the four rightly guided caliphs” and of 
the first imams revered by Shi‘ites.372   
 Ali’s instructions and advice served as models during the Iraq war.  The Battle of 
Sifflin was used both to mobilize for and to justify the war.  Paradoxically, Gieling points 
out that Ayatollahs Kashani and Ardabil exhorted Iranians “to drench their swords in 
Saddam’s blood.”  When Iran repelled the Iraq onslaught and went on the offensive, 
Ardabil quoted Ali as saying that “people who fight on their own ground will not find 
salvation, and courageous Muslims must not allow their enemy to fight on their 
territory.”  That the Battle of Sifflin in which Ali engaged ended in arbitration was not 
mentioned by Iranian leaders.373 
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 What Michael Fischer describes as the “Karbala Paradigm”374 is constructed 
around Imam Husayn, the son of Ali and Mohammad’s daughter Fatima.  According to 
the traditional Shi‘i account, Husayn’s elder brother, Hasan, the second  imam, 
relinquished his claim to the caliphate, acknowledging Mu‘awiya, the first Umayyad, as 
caliph.  After Hasan’s death, his younger brother, Husayn, became the third imam, and 
also did not challenge Mu‘awiya.  When Mu‘awiya died in 680, the caliphate passed to 
his son Yazid, to whom Husayn refused to swear loyalty. 375 According to the broad 
outlines of the most commonly accepted accounts in Shia tradition,376 letters were 
dispatched to Husayn in the Hejaz from southern Iraq, asking him to lead a rebellion 
against the “politically oppressive and morally corrupt” Yazid, headquarted in Damascus. 
  Husayn, after sending out scouts to the region, decided to journey to Kufa with 
only his family and a few dozen supporters, although he had been warned that the Kufans 
could not be trusted, since they had proven themselves unreliable to both the Prophet 
Mohammad and to Ali. When they arrived in the Karbala desert, Husayn and his party 
were surrounded by the troops of the Governor of Kufa, Ubayd Allah ibn Ziyad, who cut 
them off from any access to water and would not let them enter the city. Attempts to 
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 negotiate a retreat back to Mecca failed, Husayn continued to refuse to swear an oath of 
allegiance to Yazid, and assistance from Kufans, never materialized.  Husayn’s half 
brother, Hazrat-e Abbas (popularly known in Iranian tradition as Abolfazl), was killed 
while  trying to get water for the women and children.  On the 10th (ashura) day of the 
month Muharram, Husayn and all the men with him were slain and decapitated.  The 
women and children were sent with the severed heads to Yazid in Damascus. 377     
The “Karbala Paradigm” became a metaphor for the relations between Shi‘is and 
Sunnis, and the basis for numerous Shi‘i beliefs and practices, as well as a turning point 
event in the Shi‘i narrative of the unfolding of human history.   Mourning for the family 
members of the Prophet Mohammad provides a means for salvation and the opportunity 
to enter paradise, through the performative reenactments that take place on the tenth of 
Ashura.  Kamran Scot Aghaie points out that “the rituals associated with the battle have 
historically served as a vehicle for expressing and strengthening a variety of political and 
social relationships, associations, and identities.”  Observance of mourning rituals for the 
Prophet’s family, which began almost immediately after the Battle of Karbala, was not 
limited to Shi‘ites—Sunnis participated in them as well.  Political use of Karbala served 
as the prototype for several rebellions within the caliphate, the most successful of which 
culminated in the Abbasid overthrow of the Umayyads in 649-650. By 963, there were 
accounts of public mourning rituals that appear to be precursors of what became the 
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 Muharram processions, promoted by the Buyid rulers of southern Iran, who were 
Shi‘ites.378  
Numerous historiographic accounts and elegies about Karbala were composed.  
The Safavids, who adopted Twelver Shi‘ism as the official religion of Iran, gave new 
meaning and new forms to the Karbala commemorative rituals under state sponsorship, 
which became more exclusively identified with Shi‘ism, since not many Sunnis were left 
in Iran.379  The rowzeh khani began as a Muharram sermon given by a specially trained 
speaker, designed to elicit cries of mourning for Hussein that were regarded by Shi‘ites as 
a means of attaining salvation in paradise.  The speaker’s goal was “to move his audience 
to tears through his recitation of the tragic details of the Battle of Karbala.” By the late 
eighteenth century, the rowzeh khani had evolved into an elaborate ritual that became 
known as the taziyeh khani, an elaborate theatrical performance with a large cast of 
actors, both professional and amateur, a director, props, elaborate costumes and a staging 
area. 380 
 Ta’ziyehs reached their peak popularity during the late Qajar period in the late 
nineteenth and early 20th centuries. Banned frequently by the Pahlavi shahs, and lacking 
wealthy sponsors,  the taziyehs continued to  be performed in traditional neighborhoods 
and villages.  Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the Ministry of culture has tried to 
preserve the taziyeh tradition, at least as a cultural artifact, by broadcasting taziyehs on 
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 television and sponsoring performances.  However, in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the 
rowzeh khani and the Muharram processions are the primary public Karbala 
commemorations, although taziyehs are have a large following in some sectors of Iranian 
society and are still performed regularly.381     
The rituals of the rowzeh khani the taziyehs made the story of Karbala familiar to 
most Iranians. It offered “a ready-made analogy for both identifying and countering 
injustice,” and provided the faithful with an opportunity to redeem Husayn’s death by 
struggling against injustice.382   Inherent in the Karbala Paradigm, and within Shi‘ism, is 
a paradox, in that the message of Husayn’s martyrdom lends itself to both “patient 
endurance of suffering at the hands of those with political power,” while at the same time 
“Husayn is praised and commended for not submitting to tyranny…fighting even in the 
face of overwhelming odds and certainty of martyrdom.”  Mobilization for martyrdom 
could thus take activist or quietist forms.383  This paradox, according to Momen, gives 
the Karbala Paradigm “extraordinary political versatility.”384 Fouad Ajami compares 
Karbala to “a tapestry of many threads”: 
                                                
No tale of such great pathos and tragedy could have left men with a single 
unambiguous message.  Stood on one end, Karbala was a tale of choice and 
principle, the story of a man standing up when he could have groveled and 
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 acquiesced.  Stood on the other end, it was a tale of doom and defeat.  Karbala 
celebrated the grandson of the Prophet who fell in battle.  But in the dark recesses 
of the mind, Karbala and the reiteration of its grim happenings could be an 
invitation to submission to powers that could not be defeated, to odds that could 
not be overcome. 385 
 
A decade before the Islamic Revolution in 1970, Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari 
(1920-1979), who Dabashi considers to be “the Chief Ideologue of the Islamic 
Revolution,”386 delivered one of his lectures on the 40th day after the commemoration of 
the martyrdom of Imam Husayn.  “Karbala is not only in one day, it always is,” he 
declared.  Dabashi points out that what distinguished Motahhari’s use of the phrase was 
the context in which it was delivered. Motahhari believed that the dual pincers of the 
Shah’s tyrannical monarchy and the revolutionary claims of secular youth had to be 
countered with an Islam that not only had been updated with the revolutionary and 
rationalistic spirit of the age, it also had to be rid of the misery and passivity into which it 
had fallen.  
In principle, Motahhari opposed any mode of identification with the 
Karbala event that did not simultaneously and immediately create a sense of 
heroism, sacrifice, and activist commitment to take one’s destiny into one’s own 
hands…Those who were not killed in Karbala in person are still martyrs if they 
truly believe in the martyred Imam and follow his example in valor, sacrifice, and 
struggle for justice. ..This is a remarkable extension of the reconstructed sacred 
history into the contemporary realities of Mottahari’s time.  The ideal and idyllic 
state of having fought alongside Imam al-Husayn is historically progressed and 
symbolically identified, on a one to one basis, with fighting for just causes today  
or any other day.  Finding a just cause to fight for, in the immediacy of their 
historical concerns, could very well be left to people’s imagination.387 
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The most critical factor in the outcome of the Islamic Revolution, Momen 
suggests, was the way Khomeini  was able to capture the imagination of the masses by 
drawing upon numerous Shi‘i themes with strong emotional appeal.388  On November 23, 
1978, Khomeini issued a declaration from his exile in Neuphle-le Chateau in France, a 
week before Muharram:  “The leader of the Muslims taught us that if a tyrant rules 
despotically over the Muslims in any age, we must rise up against him and denounce him, 
however unequal our forces may be, and that if we see the very existence of Islam in 
danger, we must sacrifice ourselves and prepare to shed our blood.”389 Khomeini called 
upon Iranians to use the Muharram observances to mobilize in opposition against the 
Palahvi monarchy:   
There is no need to remind you that mourning assemblies must be fully 
independent, and not depend on permission by the police of that subversive body 
called the security organization.  Dear people, organize your gathering without 
referring to the authorities, and if you are prevented fro holding them, gather in 
public squares, in thoroughfares and streets, and proclaim the sufferings endured 
by Islam and the Muslims and the treacherous acts of the Shah’s regime.390 
 
In early January, 1979, Khomeini began to give instructions for the transfer of 
authority taking place in Iran, while calling for continued demonstrations.  The slogan for 
the revolution became kullu yaw ashura, kullu maqam Karbala (“Every day is ashura, 
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 every land is Karbala”).391  The fortieth day after  Ashura commemorating Imam Husayn 
had an exceptional meaning, during a year in which the monarchy would come to an end. 
It is as if the blood of our martyrs were the continuation of the blood of the 
martyrs of Karbala, and as if the commemoration of our brothers were the echo of 
the commemoration of those brave ones who fell at Karbala.  Just as their pure 
blood brought to an end the tyrannical rule of Yazid, the blood of our martyrs has 
shattered the tyrannical monarchy of the Pahlavis.392  
   
Husayn’s self-sacrifice, depicted as a struggle against tyranny, was the model for 
resistance against the Shah. “The identification of rulers with Yazid had been used before 
by their clerical opponents as an instrument to rouse people against the Shah, but during 
the revolution the use of ‘Karbala” as a representation of Iranian politics was broadened 
to include Husayn’s sacrifice and martyrdom as an example for the Iranian 
population.”393   
After the Iraqi attack on Iran, Husayn became the symbol of Iranian resistance 
against Saddam Hussein.  Karbala, being in Iraq, became not only a model for, but a 
literal reenactment of, Husayn’s martyrdom.394  Immediately after the outbreak of the 
Iraq war, Iranian leaders compared the task of the Islamic republic to that of Husayn, 
restoring justice, protecting Islam, and fighting against tyranny. Khomeini declared that 
no propaganda or conspiracy theory could hide the fact that “You are in the right just like 
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 the imam, Lord of the Martyrs, was in the right and become superior with so few in 
number.  Although he was martyred together with his sons, he revived Islam and brought 
disgrace on Yazid and the Ummayad dynasty.”  Iranian solders were compared to 
Husayn’s followers who stood with him at Karbala.395  
Since the Iraq war ended, “Karbala” has been invoked after the war to warn 
Iranians “to draw the line between friend and foe,” not just against “global arrogance, but 
also against Iranian leaders favoring rapprochement with the West: “It is sad to see  
certain politicians making overtures to the enemy, even though that enemy is only getting 
more hostile and more cruel daily…We must remember Karbala and the struggle of 
Imam al-Husayn…”396 Ashura, like Auschwitz, is a sacralized image with enormous 
power for mobilizing resistance and defense.   
Summary   
The Auschwitz paradigm presents the Jewish people as the perpetual victims of 
history. Iranian use of imagery related to the martyrdom of Imam Husayn at Karbala 
depicts the Iranian people in the role of the Shi‘ite martyr in its confrontations with its 
enemies.  Both the “people that dwells alone” and the “Karbala paradigm” are master 
commemorative narratives that might be expected to emerge from beleaguered and 
isolated political cultures. 
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 In point of fact, however, neither Israel nor Iran has ever been isolated.  Jews and 
Iranians have been among the most cosmopolitan of peoples, absorbing and serving as 
mediators in cross-cultural transmission but also in generating their own rich literature 
and traditions.  This cosmopolitanism, ironically, may explain why, in the process 
creating a new political definition of nationhood and circumscribing it within ethno-
religious parameters, images from are adopted that deliberately convey an image of 
exceptionalism and isolation.   
These images of Auschwitz and Ashura testify not only to the reverence for 
martyrdom in Jewish and Shia religious tradition, but also testify to their potential for 
transformation into models for rejection of political passivity.  The recasting the 
messages from the past transmitted through these paradigms into messages of resistance 
testifies to the power of myth, particularly religious myth to adapt to radical shifts and 
major alterations in the political environment while maintaining a historiographic tie to 
tradition through narrative and invented traditions. 
     
 
 CHAPTER IV 
ISRAEL, IRAN AND THE “WAR ON TERROR”: 
MASTER COMMEMORATIVE NARRATIVES IN PRACTICE 
Introduction 
  Within a day of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
 on September 11, 2001, counter-terrorism analysts had identified Osama bin Laden’s Al-
Qaeda network as its most likely perpetrator.397  Al-Qaeda was an umbrella organization 
known to be operating in over sixty countries, affiliated with terrorist groups from Egypt 
to Pakistan and Kashmir, with fundraising offices in the U.S. and Europe. Bin Laden, 
who had openly declared a jihad against Americans in early 1998,398  had issued a threat 
of a major operation against the U.S. three weeks earlier.399   Experts agreed that Al-
Qaeda, considered to have been responsible for the subsequent terrorist attacks against 
the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam, and linked to numerous terrorist 
attacks including the explosion of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993, the 
massacre at Luxor, the bombing of the USS Cole, and to conspiracies to assassinate the 
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 Pope as well as U.S. and Egyptian presidents, was probably the only network with the 
motivation, capability and means to carry out such a large scale attack.400  
 The immediate reaction in Israel to the September 11 attacks anticipated that the 
 U.S. public, as well as its policymakers, would now be better able empathize with the 
horror of vulnerability to random terrorist attacks with which Israelis have had to cope for 
decades.401  Within hours, Israeli government leaders and politicians were envisioning 
and calling for massive U.S. retaliation against “Islamic fundamentalism” in which Israel 
was uniquely equipped to be a partner, even a mentor, of the U.S., rather than shunted to 
the sidelines, as it had been during the Gulf War a decade earlier.  One of its prime 
targets, Israeli sources were certain, would be Iran.  
Iranian President Mohammed Khatami was among the first Muslim leaders to 
convey his condemnation of the events of September 11 and to express his sympathy for 
the American people.  Khatami condemned the hijackings and the terrorist attacks, and 
expressed his deep sorrow and sympathy with the American nation.  He called for the 
international community to stem and eradicate terrorism, noting that Iran “is treading a 
road to uproot terrorism and to this end, it will spare no efforts.”402   A influential 
conservative Iranian spokesman declared that the perpetrators of the attack were most 
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 likely Israeli agents, since only they would have had access to the resources needed to 
carry out the attack and because the consequences of the attack favored Zionist 
interests.403  
This chapter presents a detailed chronology and content analysis of the statements 
of political leaders immediately after the events of September 11, 2001, in order to 
demonstrate the ways in which Israeli and Iranian political leaders confronted each other 
and competed to achieve their foreign policy goals through the U.S. “war on terror” 
declared on September 11, 2001.  It provides a content analysis of published statements 
by politicians and other politically influential individuals between the September 11 
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the aftermath of President 
George W. Bush’s State of the Union address on January 29, 2002.  
 This research does not attempt to empirically evaluate any “objective” military 
threat that Iran and Israel pose to one another, whether in terms of ballistic missile range, 
nuclear weapons development or small arms sales to their respective enemies.  Rather, it 
observes some interesting features of the ways that Israelis and Iranians talk about each 
other, and the ways in which they use discourse predicated upon their respective 
commemorative narratives in order to articulate foreign policy goals.  These have not, to 
my knowledge, been closely analyzed elsewhere, particularly not from a comparative 
perspective.  
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 The Clash of Narratives  
 In Israel, shrill warnings about an imminent “Iranian threat” have observable and 
definable characteristics. These include the consistent use of statements attributed to 
anonymous and unverifiable sources usually identified as “high level” diplomatic, 
military and/or intelligence experts; the frequent circularity of sources in the citation and 
dissemination of these statements; and the refusal to acknowledge that Iran has any 
legitimate regional security concerns which play a role in its defense policies. Any 
Iranian weapons procurement, and the acquisition of any type of nuclear technology, are 
depicted as having Israel as their primary, even sole, target.  Israeli spokesmen almost 
invariably portray “Iran” as a unitary state-level actor, making no distinction between 
hardliners and moderates, or between state-sponsored and rogue operations carried out by 
anyone of Iranian origin. 
Iranian rhetoric against Israel during this period (as well as before and after it) has 
been virulent and incendiary.  Recognition of the right of the “Zionist entity” (as Israel is 
almost always referred to in the Iranian media) to legitimately exist within any 
boundaries at all, be they those of 1967 or of 1948, is rarely axiomatic or apparent.  
Israel’s existence, as well as its actions, is often depicted as “criminal.”    Iranian 
“satanization” of Israel takes no note of the highly diverse elements of Israel’s political 
culture, which manifest themselves in open, lively debate in the Israeli media, and the 
ubiquity of criticism of Israeli government actions within Israel from both the right and 
the left of the political spectrum.  No compassion is ever expressed for Israeli victims of 
suicide bombings or their families.  
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 Iranian diatribes take place within a long cultural tradition of “conspiracy 
theories” to explain Iranian  failures to achieve and exert its rightful political, military, 
cultural, and religious superiority.  Among the enemies identified by conspiracy  theorists 
as undermining Iran’s security and economy, and are often depicted as being in league 
with satanic forces, have been Freemasons, the Bahais, Jews, the Shi’ite ulama, and the 
Shah, in addition to  Jews and  Zionists, as well as  European powers, particularly the 
British and the CIA, who indisputably  intervened  in Iranian affairs and undermined 
Iranian sovereignty.  An amalgamation of these conspiratorial grievances depicts Israel’s 
existence as  well as its  actions are depicted as “criminal,” irrespective of its boundaries. 
The “little Satan” incarnates Western encroachment into Muslim lands.  
Iran is verbally supportive of the Palestinian cause, although it tends to be cool or 
even hostile towards the Palestinian leadership.   Palestinian actions precipitating the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon disastrously impacted the generally peaceful Shia villages 
along Israel’s northern border more than two decades ago, and Palestinian support of Iraq 
during the Iran-Iraq war, have made Iranians cautious.404  It should also be noted that 
Iranian support of Hizbullah, which has been much more openly acknowledged by the 
Iranian government than its assistance to the PLO and/or other Palestinian political 
groups, has had as its primary goal the liberation of Lebanon rather than of Palestine, not 
only from Israeli occupation but from Syria and from the political domination of Israeli-
backed Christian forces.  Veiled threats of Iranian use of ballistic missiles or nuclear 
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 weapons in response to an Israeli attack never mention the effect such a counter-attack 
might have on the Palestinians to whose cause the Iranian government is expressing its 
inalienable commitment, due to the small size and irregular boundaries between “green 
line” Israel and the Palestinian communities of the West Bank and Gaza. 
The post-September 11 Israeli rhetorical campaign against Iran had three 
objectives, none of which were new.  They had been articulated as policy priorities for at 
least a decade.  What was new were the opportunities for legitimating and achieving them 
as a concomitant of the U.S. “war against terror.” One of these longstanding objectives 
was the prevention of normalization, or even of any modest improvement, in relations 
between the U.S. and Iran.405  Another is to depict Iranian instigation and its military and 
financial support of terrorist organizations as the major barrier to Israel’s achieving peace 
with the Palestinians. This deflects attention from Israeli policies, such as the continued 
establishment and expansion of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and left the 
“peace process” in shambles.   The third goal was, and remains, to encourage the U.S. to 
use “the war on terror” to either attack Iran and destroy its presumed nuclear capability 
on its own, or to acquiesce to an Israeli strike against Iran similar to that on the Osiraq 
nuclear facility in Iraq.  That presumption that Iran even had a nuclear weapons program 
had been based largely on evidence provided by Israel.  Iran’s leaders had declared the 
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 use of such weapon to be un-Islamic.  Nonetheless, there was public debate over whether 
or not Iran should pursue nuclear technology or even weapons.406  
 From the Iranian perspective, the “war on terror” and Bush’s insistence that “you 
are either for us or against us” offered both dangers and opportunities.  The greatest 
danger was, and remains, that Iran might become its direct target.  However, in the 
immediate aftermath of the events of September 11, “the war on terror” seemed to 
present potential opportunities for Iran as well.  When Bush announced his intention of 
building a coalition which included “anti-terrorist” Muslim states, it appeared possible 
that the U.S. might modify its position sufficiently so as to allow for Iranian participation, 
as well as for the first steps of reconciliation, between the U.S. and Iran.  In mid-
September, Iran articulated four demands which would influence its participation in the 
coalition:  1) the definition of “terrorism” would encompass Israeli actions against 
Palestinians and in Lebanon; 2) military action in the “war against terrorism” would be 
conducted under the auspices of the United Nations rather than the United States; 3) the 
U.S. and Europe would  crack down on the activities of  the Mojahedin-e Khalq, which, 
although listed by the U.S., the U.K. and other countries as a terrorist organization, 407 
was raising funds and operating radio and satellite television stations through front 
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 organizations in the U.S. and Europe; 408 and  4)  the regime replacing the Taliban would 
not be hostile to Iran. 
 The research presented here suggests that the five months between the September 
11 events and the aftermath of President George W. Bush’s State of the Union address 
may be viewed as encompassing four distinguishable periods: 1) from the initial 
responses to the airplane hijackings on September 11 until Israeli Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon’s meeting with U.S. President Bush on November 7; 2) from Sharon’s departure 
from Washington until the revelation of the Karine A affair; 3) from the aftermath of the 
Karine A affair through Bush’s reference to Iran as part of an “axis of evil”; 4) the “post-
axis” period (February 1 through the present).   In each of these periods, one can observe 
some potential for rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran.  In each of them, Israel 
provided information, based largely or exclusively on unverifiable and almost always 
unidentified sources, which (legitimated by subsequent quotation by reliable sources) not 
only prevented any warming of relations between the U.S. and Iran, but exacerbated 
tensions between them. 
  The thoroughness with which Iranian  overtures and responses were eventually 
rejected by the U.S., in good measure due to Israeli prompting, quickly delegitimized 
them within the Iranian government and strengthened the positions of anti-American 
hardliners.  This not only pushed Iran further beyond the U.S. foreign policy pale, but 
undermined the domestic political position of Iranians favoring accommodation with the 
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 U.S.   Furthermore, the denunciation of Iran as part of an “axis of evil” has unified 
Iranians across the political spectrum, blurring the boundaries between hardliners and 
moderates.  Ironically, this in turn vindicates the exponents of the “Iranian threat” in both 
the Israeli and U.S. governments, who have consistently argued that Khatami was no 
different than his predecessors, and that nothing less than the overthrow or collapse of  
Iran’s Islamic regime will transform Iran into a suitable partner for peace and security in 
the Middle East and Central Asia. 
  Containment of Iran had been a top priority for Israel since the Rabin 
administration, and was one of the few things about which he was able to agree with 
AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee), the premier U.S. “Israel lobby” who 
Rabin castigated for meddling in Israel’s with the U.S.  Immediately after the attacks on 
the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, a spate of Israeli 
pronouncements drew upon a decade of declarations of Iranian complicity in terrorist 
attacks and warnings about the Iranian nuclear threat, to which Israel had directed the 
attention of U.S. and Russian policymakers for nearly a decade.  A war of civilizations 
had begun, in which Islamic fundamentalist forces had just launched their first strike.  
The next strike might be a nuclear attack by Iran.   
 During a stopover in London on his return from a visit to the U.S., where he had 
been on September 10, former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak told interviewers that 
he did not know who had carried the attacks, and, while it was “probable” that they had 
links to bin-Laden, he could not say so with certainty.  “The very scale of these acts and 
the challenge they pose are such that they should evoke a worldwide fight against 
terrorism” the way Europe had fought maritime piracy, Barak stated.  “This effort must 
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 not be aimed solely at the infrastructures of those we all know: bin-Laden, Hizbullah, 
HAMAS [Islamic Resistance Movement], the Islamic Jihad and even some of those 
around Arafat. It must also include the states and leaders that shelter and sponsor them: 
Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, to a certain degree North Korea and Libya, Sudan and a few other 
regimes that play a secondary role. All the world will have to make up its mind, not just 
in words but also in actions.” Barak said the struggle would create “a new and clear 
demarcation line,” which “must not be seen as a Judeo-Christian fight against Islam, 
because there are many moderate and reasonable leaders in the Arab-Muslim world. But 
each one will have to consider and choose his camp.”409    
 Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned that the New York 
and Washington attacks could be a harbinger of worse tragedies that could kill millions of 
people once Iran or Iraq acquired nuclear weapons. Claiming to have warned of such 
attacks soon after the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, and in his book Fighting 
Terrorism, Netanyahu called for a coalition against the militant Islamic regimes of 
“terrorist states like Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and the Palestinian entity” that want to 
“devour the West.”410 
 In the same vein, a histrionic opinion piece in Maariv trumpeted that the world 
needed “a historic leader,” with “superhuman” qualities, who “should bang on tables in 
Moscow and stop the sale of nuclear know-how and equipment to Iran” and halt the 
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 missile sales of North Korea.  “He should destroy the murderous empire of the Taliban 
and the Ayatollahs.” 411   The Globes daily business report called for a total cutoff of U.S. 
diplomatic and commercial ties with Russia, who was providing Iran with materials 
which were a danger to the entire world:   “Russia supplies Iran with nuclear materials 
that will enable Iran to manufacture nuclear weapons. This isn't a secret. Everybody 
knows it. So what? Nothing is being done about it. It's crystal clear that if Iran has 
nuclear weapons, so will Islamic terrorist organizations. Instead of crashing planes into 
buildings, terrorist organizations may fire missiles with nuclear warheads.”412  
 Globes published an interview with Dan Meridor, long been regarded by some as 
a rising star in Israel’s gerontocratic firmament.    His interviewer noted at the outset that 
Meridor foresaw an apocalyptic battle between good and evil,  with  a global  war 
ensuing “from Ramallah to Gaza, through the Al-Biqa Valley in Lebanon, the mountains 
of Iran and Afghanistan, all the way to Manhattan,” between the countries of free world 
against those “pulling the strings of terror,” whoever they might be. “Whoever thought 
the Palestinian conflict was the source of the scourge of fundamentalist terror realized 
this week that this was not so.” Meridor said.  “I think the world will now understand that 
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 the war is not over what the exact boundaries of the State of Israel should be or where the 
Palestinian state should be established.”413 
 Israel’s Shinui (“Change”) party leader Yosef (“Tommy”) Lapid called the attacks 
on the World Trade Center and Pentagon the “first course” on the menu of “fanatic 
Islam” and international terrorism, and noted that “most experts believe that Iran will 
manufacture nuclear weapons within three or, at most, five years.”414   Another article in 
the Jerusalem Post the same day (September 14) quoted an unnamed Western diplomatic 
source as asserting that, in contrast to the 1990 coalition put together by U.S. President 
George W. Bush’s father, which had left Israel out in order to avoid offending Arab 
sensibilities, the new anti-terror coalition would include Israel as a full partner, which 
“may allow it to participate in attacks against Iraq, as well as Iran and Afghanistan.”415 
    On September 11, Iranian President Khatami condemned the terrorist assault on 
the  United States on Iranian television, stating: 
In the name of the nation and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran I 
condemn the terrorist operations of hijacking and attacking public places in 
American cities which have resulted in the death of a large number of defenseless 
American people. I  would like to express my deep regret and condolences to the 
American nation especially those injured and the families of the  victims of these 
incidents. Terrorism is condemned and the world public should identify its roots 
and its dimensions and should take fundamental steps to eliminate it. The 
principled will of the Islamic Republic of Iran's government is categorically 
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 following this path and would not stop at any measure to realize this Islamic and 
humane belief.416 
 
Khatami’s condemnation of terrorism was not taken at face value by the international 
media.   The French Press Agency (AFP) interpreted “roots of terrorism” in Khatami’s 
address as referring to “Washington's unconditional support for Israel, which Tehran does 
not recognize.”417  The London Times reported “a marked divergence between the 
reformist President Khatami's call for international action to stem terrorist  attacks and 
the tone of the Tehran Times, which concluded that the Bush Administration was paying 
the price for its ‘blind  support’ of Israel.”418  The Jerusalem Post carried a Reuters report 
which interpreted Khatami’s words as “indicating that Iranian conservatives and 
reformists are united in calling for the destruction of Israel as the only solution to the 
Middle East conflict,” although “they differ in the strength of their opposition to it and its 
main backer, the U.S.”   The report went on to quote Iranian newspapers that emphasized 
the role of U.S. “blind support of the Zionist regime,” had played in the attacks, but also 
repeated the hardliner charge that Zionists had carried them out.   Nonetheless, the article 
concluded with the observation that “unlike elsewhere in the region, there have been no 
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 public displays of joy in Iran, where Khatami won a landslide reelection promising to 
improve relations with the outside world.”419 
 The day after the terrorist attacks, Iran’s majority Mosharekat (“Participation”) 
party issued a condemnation of them, saying they “displayed the furthest depth of the 
catastrophe that terrorism can inflict against humanity in any corner of the globe," and 
expressing “deepest regret and sympathy with the American nation and particularly the 
bereaved families of the incidents' victims.”   The Iranian nation, itself a major victim of 
terrorist attacks, acutely felt the pain inflicted against others, and believed it to be a joint 
task for all nations and world governments to cooperate in a campaign to uproot 
terrorism.  Nevertheless, the Mosharekat party criticized the U.S. government “for 
staunchly supporting the biggest state sponsor of terrorism in the world, Israel, and 
defending the unjustifiable terrorist moves of that terrorist entity openly.”420 
 A compendium of views expressed by Iranian politicians across the political 
appeared in the Teheran news daily Siyasat-e Ruz on September 13.  None condoned the 
attacks.  Reactions ranged from denouncing the “Black Tuesday” events in the U.S. as 
unjustifiable criminal acts that could only be unequivocally and universally condemned, 
to pointing to the unprecedented need for the “dialogue of civilizations” called for by 
President Khatami, to sympathizing with the American people while suggesting that they 
ask their political leaders why the U.S. had inspired so much hatred and the need to find 
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 the “root cause of such events.” As noted earlier, ex-parliamentarian Mohammad Javad 
Larijani, a former Deputy Foreign Minister who had lost his Majlis seat to reformists but 
retains considerable influence in foreign affairs, said his first guess was that perpetrators 
had to have been agents of the Zionists and the Israeli Mossad, since only they would 
have had access to the resources needed to carry out the attack and because the 
consequences of the attack favored Israeli interests.  “In circumstances in which that 
regime has been isolated in terms of world public opinion, this measure draws the 
attention of the world away from their crimes and to something else, and, in a way, 
creates the possibility of carrying out publicity against the wronged Palestinians.”421 
  The possibility that the “war against terrorism” might provide an opportunity for 
reconciliation between Iran and the U.S. began to be discussed in Iran within days of the 
September 11 events.  Political caution is evident in the way the Iranian News Agency 
(IRNA) disseminated the idea by reprinting a report published in the London Times that 
pointed out the positive reception that Iran’s response the events of September 11 had 
received from the U.S. State Department, which was “willing to explore the possibility of 
welcoming Iran into an international coalition to fight terrorism,” and “paradoxically, 
open the way for reconciliation between Washington and Tehran.”  While western 
military forces would not be permitted to use Iranian territory for any U.S.-led operation 
in Afghanistan, Iran could quietly provide valuable intelligence through third countries 
such as Russia, other Islamic states, or members of the Non-Aligned Movement. 
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   The IRNA article also noted the Times had reported that an obstacle to 
cooperation was the likely Israeli opposition in Washington, but also that the European 
Union, particularly Britain, might  be influential in convincing the U.S. towards a broader 
policy.  An unnamed European diplomat was quoted as stating that “The (U.S.) 82nd 
Airborne and Iran's Revolutionary Guards have similar views on the Taliban.”422  
 The possibility and desirability of reconciliation with the U.S. had been a 
contentious issue in Iran even before the events of September 11.  Less than a week 
before the attacks in the U.S.,  Mohammad Javad Larijani had said in an interview that 
“normalization” of relations between the U.S. and Iran was unlikely.  “When the 
Americans were showing a green light they wanted to discuss three issues.   One was 
Iran's support for terrorism, which is related to our support for the Palestinians, because 
they consider the Palestinians to be terrorists.   Second was the issue of human rights and 
the third issue was the production of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.” 
Interaction with the U.S. might be possible to discuss issues such as “the future of 
Afghanistan, the campaign against drugs, the problem of refugees, and the future of 
important international waterways from the environmental aspect,” if the two countries 
“can discuss issues at the same level.”  
  Larajani asserted Iran’s “absolute right” to have access to nuclear weapons if the 
U.S. and other nations do:  “If in disarmament talks the world can present a timetable for 
the elimination of atomic weapons we too are willing to sign and not pursue it.   But at 
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 present they are not willing and, in addition, their lackeys in the region such as Israel and 
others also possess these weapons.”423   On September 13, when asked whether  Iran 
would change its positions on Middle Eastern affairs to clear its name in American 
opinion, Larijani responded that its policy on Palestine “is the most honorable part of 
Iran's foreign policy... It is our right to support the Palestinians by any means.”424  
  On September 21, the London-based Arabic newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat 
reported that, according to an Iranian source, a meeting between a senior European 
diplomat and a senior official at the Iran's National Security Higher Council had taken 
place earlier in the week to discuss the measures that would be taken by the U.S. and its 
allies “against terrorism and the countries that harbor terrorism at various levels.” The 
European diplomat said Iran would have to be “frank and transparent in condemning 
terrorism and supporting the international movement to uproot terrorism wherever it 
might be.”  This source said that meetings had also taken place between Iranian 
government representatives and officials from Canada and Europe during the previous 
week, during which the Iranians asked whether the United States, Canada, and European 
states  harboring members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq  Organization would be prepared to 
put an end to MKO activities of  return for Iran's support of the anti-terrorism alliance.  A 
confidential letter to a National Security Higher Council official from one of his 
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 European counterparts hinted that the war on terrorism would “include all the 
organizations that rely on terrorist operations” and the MKO was among them. The 
article quoted an unidentified reformist deputy in the Iranian Majles as saying:  
“Despite attempts by the Zionist lobby and figures like Senator Lieberman and 
Henry Kissinger to include Iran among pro-terrorist countries, President George 
Bush's Government refused to point a finger  at Iran on account President 
Khatami’s immediate expression of sympathy and public condemnation of 
terrorism, and because Iranian officials, the Iranian press, and ‘the people on the 
street’ had made ‘a  good impression on the American people and government 
which helped change the atmosphere in Tehran as well.” 425 
 
The same source confirmed a report published in Al-Sharq al-Awsat  a few days 
earlier concerning “a decision by the Iranian revolution Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to 
give Khatami a free hand to run foreign policy, particularly in terms of the United States” 
and had “practically recognized Khatami's role in forming the general guidelines for 
Iran's foreign policy.”  The article noted Khamenei’s well known enmity towards the 
Taliban and its leader, Mullah Omar, who “had described those who belonged to the 
Shiite sect as rejects.  Omar had ordered the sectarian cleansing in Bamian and Mazar-e 
Sharif, which resulted in the death of thousands of Shiites...”426 
 Initially, Israelis had assumed they would be welcome partners in the war on 
terrorism.  “I believe that together we can defeat these forces of evil,” Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon had declared in a televised statement on September 11.”427  A week after 
the attacks, however,  Efraim Inbar, Director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Institute of 
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 Strategic Studies at Bar Ilan University, told a Jerusalem Post radio that the inclusion of 
Muslim states in the U.S. coalition against terrorism, among them Iran, might require 
some “compromises” on the part of the U.S., although he did not feel this would 
necessarily preclude Israel’s participation.”428  Nevertheless, a cable to the Foreign 
Ministry from an identified senior diplomat expressed concern that the U.S. media was 
beginning to link Israeli policies and Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the attacks in New 
York and Washington, and predicted that “this topic will gain currency on the U.S. 
agenda as the U.S. attempts to build an anti-terror coalition develop, and it becomes clear 
that Israeli and U.S. interests on the matter are not identical.”429  
  Subsequent reports in the Israeli media reflected increasing apprehension that the 
participation of Muslim countries would not only restrict Israel’s membership in the anti-
terrorist coalition, but might pressure the U.S. to demand Israeli concessions to the 
Palestinians.   Two weeks after the Sept. 11 attacks, Alon Pinkas, the Israeli Consul in 
New York, warned the Foreign Ministry that a “paradigm shift” was taking place in 
American thinking that might raise questions about the U.S. role in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, while editorials and news analysis critical of Sharon which were appearing in 
major American newspapers might be early warning signs of an anti-Israel backlash.  
While Foreign Ministry officials accused Pinkas of being an “alarmist,” it was noted that 
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 Israel did not appear on televised maps of the “coalition against terror”, and that none of 
the 27 terrorist-supporting organizations whose assets were being frozen by President 
Bush were linked to terror against Israel.430        
 British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s phone call to President Bush to inform him 
about a “remarkable conversation” he had had with Iranian President Khatami, and that 
British Foreign Minister Jack Straw’s would be visiting Teheran Sept. 25-27, provoked 
considerable consternation in Israel.  The Jerusalem Post reported that the U.S. “has no 
formal links with Teheran but regards Iran as a critical element in legitimizing the 
coalition and cloaking it in Islamic credibility.”431  That same day, another article 
highlighted that a senior IDF intelligence officer thought  Iran “could have had a hand” in 
plotting the attacks on the U.S.  “We don't have any information to support the possibility 
that Iraq is part of the plot,” the unidentified officer was quoted as saying. “But we can't 
say the same for the Iranians. They are very deeply involved in everything that carries the 
label of Islamic radical terrorism.” Iran, Osama bin Laden, Hizbullah, and Hamas were 
all from the same school of thought, he added, but  “Iran is the only country in the world 
that actually adopts this ideology and is working on its capabilities to get hold of 
weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles. Together with this ideology and 
these sort of threats, you can understand the kind of threat the free world and Israel is 
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 facing.”432  A non-scientific poll on the Jerusalem Post website that asked, “Do you think 
Iran was involved in any way in the WTC attack as Israel is suggesting?”  found that 81% 
of  the 12,858 respondents agreed.433   
 Former Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, in Washington to address the US House 
of Representatives Government Reform Committee on Sept. 24, linked growth of the 
terror network of those responsible for the attacks directly to developments in Iran: he 
said the Khomeini revolution and the establishment of a clerical Islamic state in Iran had 
“created a sovereign spiritual base for fomenting a strident Islamic militancy worldwide, 
a militancy that was often backed by terror.”434  Israeli President Katsav denounced the 
policies of several European states regarding global terrorism, saying they were 
dangerous because they legitimize the murder of innocent civilians.  Those who condemn 
Israel's actions to foil terrorism, he declared, encourage terrorist activities.435 
 Transport Minister Ephraim Sneh, a Labor Party member of Israel’s coalition 
government and retired general who had once served as deputy defense minister, 
complained on Israeli radio that Iran “will buy itself legitimacy at very little expense.”  
After the campaign against Bin Laden was over, Sneh said, “[Iran] will continue                
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 its support for terrorism, but with a kosher certificate from the United States.”436  Sneh 
called Straw’s visit a “stab in the back” to Israel.  Sneh denounced Straw’s statement as 
“an obscenity”, published in an article he had written for an Iranian newspaper just prior 
to his arrival, that “One of the factors that helps breed terror is the anger that many people 
in the region feel at events over the years in the Palestinian territories”437 and Straw’s 
scheduled meetings with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and President Moshe Katsav were 
cancelled over his remarks. After a 15 minute phone conversation between Blair and  
Sharon,  his meeting with Straw was reinstated.438 
  Sneh’s displeasure served to reinforce the position of Iranians favoring 
rapprochement.  A reformist editorial columnist suggested that, if Straw’s visit were a 
stab in the back for Israel, then it should be welcomed as a measure that would strengthen 
Iran. “(I)f the visit has threatened Israeli interests in the region and has expelled that 
country from the center of European diplomacy in the region, then would not the other 
side of this fact be fresh opportunities being available for Iran to exploit and for it to 
make use of opportunities for furthering Iran's foreign policy?” Rather than the right-
wing press viewing Straw’s visit from the perspective of strengthening the reformist 
position, “(t)hey should, rather, think in terms of its effective and positive consequences 
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 for maintaining the dignity and authority of Iran in the region and in the international 
arena.”439 
 The motives for Straw’s visit were a topic of considerable speculation in the 
Iranian media, the first by a British foreign minister since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.  
“According to the British there are no eternal friends or foes in politics,” explained 
Iranian journalist and international relations commentator Sa'id Leylaz  in an interview  
the day before Straw’s meeting with President Khatami and Foreign Minister Kharrazi.   
“There are no eternal interests and if necessary two sides can become friends, foes, or 
terrorists.”  Leylaz noted that  the idea of improving relations with the West had many 
enemies in Iran.  “From the extremists’ point of view, as long as there are full-fledged 
Zionists in the US lobbies we will never want to establish relations; and we will witness 
many obstructions when it comes to establishing such relations.” Nevertheless, he viewed 
relations between Iran and the U. S., on the whole, as being “more positive and 
increasing.”  Relative social and political calm after the Iranian elections and 
improvements in the economic situation had led to “the path of strategy” and “a more 
moderate stance that moves in the direction of improved relations with the West and the 
United States.”   Leylaz spoke approvingly of the official Iranian position  that both 
condemned terrorist acts and insisted that the campaign against terror be carried out 
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 under the auspices of the UN, and opined that Iran should rush into a reconciliation with 
the U.S.440  
  The first evening of Straw’s visit, Iranian television reported that he had 
expressed his approval of President Khatami’s call for a dialogue of civilizations, 
describing   meetings of intellectuals and religious leaders as “effective and productive” 
in stopping a confrontation between Islam and the West.   Khatami, while expressing 
understanding for the American situation in the face of the recent incidents, in spite of 
U.S. indifference to, even possible assistance to, terrorist attacks in Iran, declared that 
“any move in the region which ignores the role of Iran in the stability of the region will 
add to the problems.”  The Iranian president also referred to “the Zionist regime's moves 
aimed at creating a confrontation between the world of Islam and the West.” 441  
  But Straw aroused Iranian ire when, in response to remarks by Iranian Foreign 
Minister Kharrazi in which he referred to the Israeli regime as “racist,” Straw declared 
that “Britain does not accept the terms racist or Zionist being used to refer to Israel and 
fully believes that Israel has the right to live,” adding, “The Israelis have also suffered 
from terrorism and Britain believes that we should do something along with Arafat to 
implement the peace process.”442  Kharrazi countered that “The Zionist regime must not 
tarnish the image of Muslims...rather, the recent incidents must be turned into an 
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 opportunity to launch a 'relentless assault' on terrorism.” Expressing Iran’s willingness to 
expand its ties with the UK, Kharrazi added, “Once Washington's hostile policies towards 
Tehran are changed, and Washington takes the initiative to establish relations based on 
mutual respect and equality, then Teheran will be ready to review its  (now-frozen) ties 
with the U.S.” 443 
 In a sermon at Friday prayers at Tehran University on Sept. 28, Expediency 
Council Chairman Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Iran’s former president, announced that 
“Despite all our differences [with the USA], if America decides not to impose its own 
will ...we are ready to join the anti-terrorism coalition under the umbrella of the United 
Nations...”444  By the end of September, the advantages (and disadvantages) of the 
improvement relations between Iran and the West (particularly the U.S.) to achieve 
Iranian foreign policy goals, were being discussed widely. Commenting on Iran's 
diplomacy in light of recent events, Mohammad Ali Kuzegar observed, “What we have 
witnessed in the recent days indicates the importance of Iran's special position in 
international equations and relations... he said: A nation does not often encounter such 
historic opportunities.”445  Vice President Mohammad Reza Tajik declared, “The 
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 situation presents opportunities and in the context of these events we could resolve the 
problem of Iranian terrorism, implement a policy of detente towards the West, pursue a 
policy of dialogue, present a more acceptable face of Iranian society to the world, 
promote the role to the United Nation and have a greater say in international affairs.”446    
 Straw’s visit to Israel on Sept. 26 did not elicit nearly as positive an assessment 
from Israeli government officials.  In spite of Straw’s protestation, “I stand very firmly 
against the terrorism which the Israeli people have suffered. I've never, ever dreamed of 
calling the Israeli people terrorists. I stand fully behind them,” President Katsav refused 
to meet with Straw. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres cancelled a dinner that was to have 
been held in Straw’s honor but met with him briefly.  During their meeting, Peres 
emphasized to Straw that Iran funds and directs Hizbullah, publicly calls for the 
destruction of Israel, and is developing nuclear weapons.  In the hands of extremist 
Ayatollahs, Peres said, these weapons are “a danger to the entire world.” 447  No mention 
of Straw’s defense of Israel in Teheran was noted in the Israeli media.  Instead, the editor 
of the bi-weekly magazine Jerusalem Report David Horovitz, whose views generally 
reflect a thoughtful Israeli centrist postion,  accused Straw of “intimating...that terrorist 
attacks against Israel could somehow be legitimized.”  Characterizing Straw’s Iranian trip 
as the “craven, misguiding courting of the very perpetrators of the crime they are seeking 
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 to eliminate,” as well as “a virtual invitation to terrorists to carry out more crimes,” 
Horovitz said that was “no surprise that Iran has now rejected Straw’s advances...”448 
 Dozens of articles and editorials in the from various perspectives in the Iranian 
press during the first two weeks in October offered reasons Iran should not join the anti-
terror coalition unless it was under the auspices of the U.N.  The Iranian newspaper 
Siyasat-e Ruz prefaced a poll of the opinions of several Majlis members with both the 
pragmatic emphasis across the political and factional spectrum on “the necessity to 
maintain the independent stance of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the face of world 
developments and the imperialist steps which the US takes in order to secure its interests 
in the region” appeared alongside the recurrent charge of Zionist complicity in the 
attacks, which were being unfairly blamed on  Muslims:  “While the accusing fingers of 
the Western and Zionist media are pointed at Usamah Bin-Laden and a number of Islamic 
groups as the agents for the terrorist attacks on the cities of New York and Washington, 
each day more undeniable evidence is being disclosed with regard to the possibility of the 
interference and responsibility of the Zionist circles and intelligence agencies in the 
incidents in America.”  The reasons given by the Majlis members identified by name in 
the article included, in various formulations, suspicion of American and British motives 
and Iran’s insistence that the “war on terror” be led by the U.N.449 
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  During the United Nations debate on “measures to eliminate international 
terrorism” which took place Oct. 1-5, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, M. Javad Zarif, 
asserted that “The Islamic Republic of Iran is fully prepared to contribute actively to a 
UN-led global campaign against terrorism.” Zarif noted that  President Khatami had 
proposed in a letter to the Secretary-General on  September 16  that negotiations should  
begin on “practical and serious global policies and strategies to eradicate the menace of 
terrorism, and that a ‘Global Summit’ be convened at earliest possible date to show the 
international political will to uproot terrorism.  Iran’s position was that the General 
Assembly should consider a multi-faceted approach to terrorism which would include a 
guidelines for “a rational and rule-based approach across the board,” so that no terrorist 
could find refuge or support in any member of the international community,  and 
articulate objective single-standard criteria to identify and combat terrorism in the 
international community regardless of its victims or culprits.  “(T)he credibility of the 
campaign against terrorism is seriously undermined when policies and practices designed 
to instill terror and fear among the entire Palestinian people receive acquiescing silence, 
while resistance to foreign occupation and state terrorism is conveniently demonized.” 450 
 Yehuda Lancry, Israel’s permanent representative to the UN, defined terrorism in 
his statement as “the indiscriminate murder of innocent civilians to advance political or 
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 religious objectives,” no matter how its apologists otherwise attempt to label it.  “There 
has never been a terrorist group that did not believe that the ends justify the means,” 
Lancry declared. “These ends are typically articulated in terms of rights—but rights 
without any corresponding responsibilities, so-called rights which permit indiscriminate 
murder with impunity, so-called rights which clearly defy unequivocal legal obligations 
and historical commitments.”   In a veiled reference to Iran, Lancry stated, “Certain 
regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere have granted terrorists safe harbor, supplied 
them with weapons and training grounds, and provided the financial backing for the 
perpetration of thousands of attacks on innocent civilians. Through their support, both 
active and tacit, these regimes have declared themselves the allies of terrorism, and bear 
no less responsibility than the terrorists themselves.”451  
 The passage of a weak resolution that did not define terrorism, along with the 
decision of the U.S. to launch a military offensive against Afghanistan under its own 
leadership immediately upon conclusion of the U.N. debate, were denounced in the 
Iranian press across the political spectrum, in tones of pragmatic reflection:   U.S. actions 
against the people of Afghanistan were contrary to international law, and while there 
were good reasons for Iran to favor an Afghan regime other than the Taliban, blatant U.S. 
military intervention to replace it brought up Iranian memories of the American 
overthrow of Mohammed Mossadeq’s government in June, 1953.  The imminent prospect 
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 of U.S. air strikes against neighboring Afghanistan was unappealing but inevitable.  
Iranian political leaders spoke cautiously, and newspaper articles and editorials clearly 
indicated that no one wanted to give the U.S. any pretext for striking at Iran.   One of 
many astute commentators put Iran’s dilemma particularly succinctly: 
The American expedition to the region, in the name of the "war against 
terrorism," will be a long-term action, and afterward, we will unfortunately 
witness America's more pronounced and serious participation in the determination 
of regional policies.  The unpleasant effects of this presence on our political or 
economic national interests are obvious as well...Given the geopolitics of the 
critical nature of the region our country is a part of, it is expected that our 
neighbors  will become either bases for America, or targets of its deadly attacks.  
And it seems the outcome of this situation is to put Iran under political, military, 
and economic siege by the most powerful country in the world.452 
 
 Meanwhile, Israeli President Ariel Sharon, under the escalating pressure of almost 
daily suicide bombings in Israelis, and the mysterious explosion of an Siberian aircraft 
whose passengers were almost exclusively Russian emigrants to Israel, unleashed a harsh 
diatribe against the U.S. and European efforts to forge an anti-terror coalition which 
included Israel’s enemies but not Israel:  “Do not repeat the dreadful mistake of 1938, 
when enlightened European democracies decided to sacrifice Czechoslovakia for a 
convenient temporary solution. Do not try to appease the Arabs at our expense. This is 
unacceptable to us. Israel will not be Czechoslovakia.  Israel will fight terrorism.”  All 
attempts to reach a cease-fire with the Palestinians having failed, Sharon announced he 
was sending Israeli security forces into action against Palestinian terrorism.  Receiving no 
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 support from the international community for its anti-terrorism stance, Sharon asserted, 
“We can rely only on ourselves. And from today forward, we will only rely on 
ourselves.” 453  
  One Israeli commentator observed that Sharon had  not only withdrawn from the 
cease-fire with the Palestinians but “he also declared political war on the United States.   
Not just war, but a world war!”  Accusing  the Americans of deliberately stabbing Israel 
in the back, and of selling out Israel in order to appease the Arabs after insisting Israel 
was under no US pressure, “suddenly we are back in 1938 on the eve of the Holocaust 
with Arafat and not only Bin Ladin but also the accursed Hitler and Bush—as one is 
given to understand—in the form of Neville Chamberlain...” While this rhetoric 
“according to which the satanic Munich Agreement is absolute evil,” and which 
represented “the ultimate propaganda tool against all villains, be they domestic or 
foreign,” might reinstate Sharon in the graces of Israel’s right wing and among  American 
Jewry, giving free rein to the IDF to expand the fighting against the Palestinians would be 
viewed by the Americans “as deliberate sabotage of their efforts to establish a coalition 
with the Arab world.”454  
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   In a similar vein, an editorial in Kayhan International noted with satisfaction that 
Sharon’s invective was an indication of “the growing chasm between the United States 
and its illegitimate protégé in the Middle East, the Zionist regime.”  This chasm, although 
it might be small at the moment, was sure to grow as the American people realize the 
heavy price that their country was paying for its support of Israel.  There was no 
comparison between the mighty Nazi empire and the Arab Muslims Israel faces, nor 
could “the Zionist entity which has amassed huge stockpiles of nuclear warheads, 
biological weapons and weapons of mass destruction” be compared to Czechoslovakia.    
“Despite the propaganda of the Zionists in the United States... the American people will 
begin to see through the propaganda that they are being fed everyday by Jewish-
controlled mass media.”455  Two days later, an Iranian news report said that although the 
Bush administration only mildly criticized Sharon’s outburst, and  White House 
spokesman, Ari Fleisher had said that Sharon's statement was unacceptable because Israel 
has no stronger ally in the world than the U.S., there were signs that “Mr. Bush and his 
government have realized that extremism doesn't just originate within the Arab world.”  
The editorial alluded to British Foreign Minister, Straw’s “now famous statement upon 
his arrival in Tehran that the West understands and fully comprehends the position and 
sensitivity of the Muslim world toward the Palestinian issue,” and U.S. Defense Secretary 
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 Donald Rumsfeld’s skipping a stop-over in Tel Aviv, a few days earlier while  visiting 
five other nations in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.456  
 The Oct. 17 assassination of ultra-nationalist Tourism Minister Rehavam Ze’evi, a 
retired general and head of the far right National Union-Yisrael Beiteinu (“Israel our 
home”), by Palestinian gunmen took place just a few hours before his resignation as 
cabinet minister, in protest of the withdrawal of Israeli defense forces (IDF) from two 
Hebron neighborhoods,457 and added to Sharon’s outrage as well as his political 
headaches.  A meeting of the Israeli cabinet debated what “message” ought to be 
disseminated abroad concerning Israel’s attitude towards Arafat and the Palestinian 
Authority, in light of the Ze’evi assassination:  Was Arafat a criminal and a terrorist, or 
was he still a potential  peace partner?    Foreign Minister Shimon Peres proposed that 
Israel affirm its agreement with U.S. aims in the “war on terror,” and Prime Minister 
Sharon added that if the PA does not extradite the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine, who claimed credit for carrying out the assassination, or dismantle Palestinian 
terror organizations, “Israel will view the PA as an entity that supports and harbors terror, 
and will deal with it according to the international norms being employed  today against 
states harboring terror.”  According to Housing Minister Natan Sharansky,  many of the 
                                                 
 
 
456. Editorial: "Sharon in trouble." Iran News (Internet Version-WWW), Oct. 8, 2001, 
WNC Doc. FBIS-NES-2001-1008.  
 
457. Etgar Lefkovits, “Rehavam Ze'evi Assassinated.”  Jerusalem Post, October 18, 2001. 
http://www.jpost.com/Editions/2001/10/18/News/News.36446.html.(accessed Oct. 19, 2001.) 
 
 206
 cabinet ministers at the meeting agreed that “the PA should be presented in the US as 
‘Israel's Taliban,’ which gives aid and succor to terrorists.”458    
 But Sharon’s domestic priorities—containing the wrath of Israel’s far right who 
considered him too soft on the Palestinian as well as the center of Israel’s political 
spectrum, stunned at the first death of an Israeli cabinet minister at the hands of Arabs—
were on a collision course with growing American concern about how Israeli actions 
might affect the dynamics of the U.S. war against terror.  Israeli incursions into Ramallah 
and Jenin were “not helpful” and “complicated the situation,” according to State Dept. 
spokesman Phil Reeker, who also called on the PA to permanently halt terrorist attacks 
against Israelis and to bring Ze’evi’s assassins to justice.459  
  An opinion piece by Hebrew University History Professor Robert Wistrich 
appeared alongside the coverage of Ze’evi funeral orations and the cabinet debate over 
how to best frame Israel’s position vis-à-vis the PA and Arafat in light of the Ze’evi 
assassination in the Jerusalem Post.  Invoking the now ubiquitous “clash of civilizations” 
argument, Wistrich, author of the newly published Hitler and the Holocaust, said it was 
no accident that New York, “the financial center of  the Western world, but also the 
largest Jewish city on the  planet” was the target of the Sept. 11 attacks, nor was it by 
chance that “Osama bin Laden and the myriad groups that support him see their struggle 
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 as one against the ‘Crusaders’ (meaning the capitalist, Christian West) and the ‘Zionists’ 
(meaning international Jewry).”  Not Zionism, not colonialism, nor even the “Palestinian 
question” was the problem Muslims faced, but “the totally anachronistic concept of ‘Holy 
War’ and their refusal to come to terms with modernity: 
What a theater of the absurd it is when the godfathers of terrorism are courted by 
the West to join the great coalition against terror! When Iran, Syria, Pakistan, the 
PLO and others have to be on board and part of the banquet, but Israel (the prime 
victim of this brutal campaign for so many decades) is treated as a pariah state to 
be kept in hiding and periodically scolded for "excessive use of force" when it 
seeks to defend its own citizens from murder.460  
 
Back in Iran, an editorial in the  Khomeinist-conservative Jomhuri-ye Eslami still argued 
that the Sept. 11 attacks were “complex plots that the Zionists have come up with in a bid 
to ensure the survival of the cancerous cell of the Israeli regime.” Also denounced were 
the Taliban and Bin-Laden, for considering themselves to be the true voice of Islam and 
believing anyone who is not with them belongs to the camp of the infidels.  “Created and 
nurtured by the Americans themselves... their sell-by date has now expired, [and] 
America is now prepared to sacrifice them, in a bid to find someone to blame for the 
internal crisis it has been encountering since the events in New York and Washington on 
11 September and to resolve the dire straits both Israel and the U.S. find themselves in as 
a result of the Intifadah.”  They now were giving the Western media the opportunity to 
equate Islam with terrorism and to suggest that “the war  in Afghanistan is in effect a war 
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 between the opponents and supporters of  terrorism. However, we all know that the 
reality is something else.”461 
 Joining a meeting between Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and National 
Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, President Bush reportedly complained that, since the 
Ze’evi assassination, Israel “appears to have gone overboard.” According to Peres, the 
impression Israel was launching a full-scale war on the  Palestinians might impede its 
ability to carry out the U.S.-led war on terrorism. Middle East violence “was making it 
more difficult to keep the US-led anti-terrorism coalition together.”462  Bush called for 
Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian areas, but gave no specific timetable for Israeli 
withdrawal. Peres responded with five requests of the U.S.:  “Continue to press Arafat to 
live up to his commitments; use its influence to prevent anti-Israeli motions in the UN  
Security Council; add certain anti-Israel terrorist groups to those being targeted; do not 
surprise Israel; and warn Syria to keep the northern border quiet.”463 
 An unidentified diplomatic official in Jerusalem told the Jerusalem Post that “We 
misread the expected American reaction.  Rather than publicly coming down hard on the 
Palestinians, the U.S. came down hard on us, saying that first we should leave the 
territories, and then they will deal  with the Palestinians. We expected them first to come 
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 down on the Palestinians, and then to pressure us to  withdraw.”  On a more positive note, 
an official  present at the meeting reported that at his meeting with Peres, Bush had kind 
words for Israel’s Ambassador to the U.S., David Ivry, saying, “Your ambassador is a 
very fine man. He's one of Israel's best. He gave us all an example of preemptive action."  
(The preemptive action to which Bush referred was Ivry's command of the 1981 bombing 
of the Iraqi nuclear facility at Osirak.) “The president was quite warm about it,” the 
official added.464  
Sharon’s visit to Washington and London, scheduled for Nov. 7-13, was 
postponed due to Israel’s volatile security situation and the impending deployment from 
the Palestinian Area A, which Sharon wanted to be on hand to personally supervise.  
Privately, administration officials suggested that Sharon did not want to withdraw, nor 
did he want to  face a reprimand from Bush.465 
 During talks with Condoleezza Rice in Washington DC in early November, 
Transport Minister Ephraim Sneh complained to reporters that the U.S. seemed to be 
ignoring Iran’s terrorism record in the coalition-building process, and that Iran should be 
disqualified from any role in the U.S. alliance against terror.466 "Iran stands in first place 
as a sponsor of terrorism,” Sneh said. “If someone forgets that, we are willing to remind 
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 them.”  Iran was providing arms via Syria to Hizbullah, which was branded a terrorist 
organization by the State Dept. and had attacked Israel from southern Lebanon. Iran had 
deployed “thousands of missiles” in southern Lebanon, with a range of 40 to 45 miles, 
across Israel’s northern border.  Sneh expressed his certainty that Russia was damaging 
Israel’s security by supporting Iran’s nuclear weapons program.  “We believe they cannot 
be considered as countries that fight terrorism.” Sneh declared. Putin denied that Russia 
was providing dangerous weapons technology to Iran in a taped interview on ABC’s 
news program 20/20.467 
    The capture of the Karine A made January 3, 2002 “one of the prime minister's 
happiest days since winning the elections on 17 February,” according to one Israeli news 
commentator, since it “availed him military credit and justification for his diplomatic 
tactics, along with an important political bonus,”  saving his government  from a coalition   
crisis.   Having exposed the violent face of the Palestinian Authority, “Sharon can now 
claim that the cease-fire with Yasir Arafat is worthless and that even the lull in the 
violence in the territories could turn out to be a ruse to assist the huge arms smuggling 
operation.” 468 
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  When the 4,000 ton cargo ship docked in Eilat the following day, its inventory  
included Katyusha rockets with various ranges, mortar shells, anti-tank missiles and 
mines, rifles and ammunition, as well as rubber boats and diving equipment, valued by 
Israeli intelligence sources at $15 million  The ship itself was estimated to be worth 
$400,000. Expenses of this amount, these sources said, would most certainly have had to 
be personally approved by Yasser Arafat, as would contacts with Iran, which were a 
“sensitive” matter for the U.S. 469   The intercepted arms included both tactical weapons 
for infantry use and strategic weapons for terrorist attacks, and were made in Russia, 
China, and North Korea.470  Israeli Defense Forces Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz pointed 
out that many of arms on board the ship not only would have enhanced the threat to 
Israeli citizens, but were forbidden to the PA according to its agreements with Israel.  The 
Foreign Ministry announced that the arms shipment proved that Arafat and the PA were 
not acting to prevent terror, and that Prime Minister Sharon had been justified in insisting 
on the dismantling of the terrorist infrastructure.471 
   PA Information Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo called the arms smuggling attempt 
a fabrication:  “Of course the Israeli authorities chose the moment of [U.S. envoy 
Anthony] Zinni’s visit to Palestinian territory to announce the ship’s discovery, just as at 
this time, the Israeli occupation forces are continuing their escalation and their closure on 
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 the territories.”  When asked about the Karine A by Zinni, Yasser Arafat said he had no 
information about  it but would cooperate with  an international inquiry.472   
 A chronology published in Haaretz  reported that  Israeli naval intelligence had 
discovered the ships’ purchase by the Palestinian Authority a few months earlier and 
began monitoring its activities.  When the ship, under a Tongan flag, reached the Iranian 
island of Kish, its weapons cargo was loaded, and it sailed for Yemen.  Crew members 
claimed that the ship was to have loaded additional arms there, but did not.  The ship 
sailed for the Red Sea, where it was to have continued through the Suez Canal, left its 
cargo off the coast of Gaza, and sailed to Bulgaria for repairs. 473   
 Three weeks prior to its interception, Prime Minister Sharon had met with top 
military officers at his home, and approved “Operation Noah’s Ark.”  The site of the 
interception—between Saudi Aabia and Sudan—was supposed to have avoided both 
political and military complications which would have occurred had it taken place off the 
Egyptian coast.  Spy planes, fighter planes, and combat helicopters took off from Israel a 
few hours before the interception, which was personally supervised by IDF Chief of Staff 
Mofaz and the Commanders-in-Chief of the Israeli Navy and Air Force.  The boarding 
party met no resistance from the ship’s crew, only three of whom were awake at the time 
of the interception.474   
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  In the earliest reports about the Karine A interception, Iranian involvement 
appeared circumstantial and somewhat beside the point, other than reinforcing the 
perception of ties between terrorists of the PA and those sponsored by Iran.  Army 
sources originally gave as evidence of Iranian involvement the loading of the ship on the 
Iranian island of Kish, and the loading of the ship, according to the Karine A crew, by 
Iranian speakers. Some of the weaponry and containers appeared to have Persian writing 
on them.475 An anonymous senior U.S. Bush administration official told the New York 
Times that the U.S. had no information that would confirm that the weapons were 
destined for the Palestinian Authority, nor any proof that it had originated in Iran, and 
suggested that they were intended for Hizbullah in Lebanon, not the Palestinians.  But a 
statement issued by the U.S. State Dept. the same day criticized the smuggling of 
weapons into the region and accused Iran of providing arms, financing, training and 
refuge to Hizbullah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad.476   
 A discussion of the strategic implications of the capture of the Karine A by 
military affairs correspondent Ze’ev Schiff in Haaretz listed as first among the strategic 
implications of the Karine A that “Israel will emphasize the incident in its contacts with 
U.S. officials, using it as an example of Iran’s involvement in the export of arms to the 
PA.  Despite Iranian attempts to conceal its activities in this regard, the capture of the 
ship is the latest in a series of proof of Iran’s arms exports.”  Next on the list was the 
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 indication that the PA planned to escalate violent attacks on Israel’s civilian population, 
and finally, with regard to future negotiations with the PA, “It is now clear that a demand 
for a total cease-fire will not be enough for Israel.”477  
 The Iranian connection received little attention from Palestinian skeptics, who 
accepted the official PA explanation that the Karin A was an Israeli propaganda trick 
designed to subvert Zinni’s visit.478  A few Israeli journalists expressed skepticism as 
well.  Zvi Bar’el considered the most perplexing question about Iranian role in the Karine 
A affair to be why, if the arms shipment originated in Iran and official Iranian elements 
were behind the transfer, the ship would not have loaded its cargo and sailed directly 
from the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas to its destination, whether to the PA or Hizbullah.  
Bar’el suggested that the parties behind the transfer effort might have been “members of 
the Iranian military or intelligence services who had operated without the full backing of 
authorities in Iran,” and pointed out that corrupt elements in the security services might 
have profited from turning a blind eye to a clandestine shipment of weapons if they took 
place outside normal  ports.  Bar’el also raised numerous other questions regarding the 
official version of the Karine A chronology.  With respect to Iranian motives for arming 
the Palestinians, he noted that “Tehran is shying away from establishing formal links with 
Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian leadership.  In the wake of September 11, Iran is also 
keen to stress its efforts in the war against terror and has undertaken a ‘positive 
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 neutrality’ in Afghanistan, allowing U.S. humanitarian aid flights to pass through its air 
space.”479  
 Despite such questions being raised, the strategic significance of the Iranian role 
in the Karine A operation rapidly moved to the forefront of Israeli government 
discussions. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon told a political meeting that “Iran is entering 
our region, adding that this situation completely changes our strategic situation.”    
Sharon told a reporter of the major Hebrew daily Maariv that Iran is operating “three 
arms” against Israel—the Hizballah rockets in Lebanon; the PA, the intended recipients 
of the Karine A weapons; and Israeli Arabs, among whom Israel had discovered Iran 
making “inroads.”  Sharon refused to provide details about the Israeli Arab-Iranian 
connection, but declared that “Iran is manipulating these three arms as marionettes.”480  
In Washington the following week, IDF Chief of staff Mofaz met with Condoleezza Rice, 
Anthony Zinni,  Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, and Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Paul Wolfowitz.  Mofaz’s version of the tripartite Iranian threat consisted of the 
northern border threat from south Lebanon in cooperation with Hizbullah, Iran's “new 
‘strategic alliance’ with the Palestinians”; and “a long-range, existential threat posed by 
new missiles like the Shahab-3, which can reach Israel when launched from Iran.” Mofaz, 
who asked that Zinni not be sent back to Israel in light of Palestinians being “steeped in 
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 terror,” said upon his return that he believed “the  Americans were listening to Israel 
‘very carefully’.” 481 
 A sensationalistic feature story in Maariv on the Karine A investigation 
emphasized new details about Iranian involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.   
According to this account, said to be based upon information provided Karine A crew 
members “headed by Captain Umar Akkawi, who is familiar with all the details and is 
considered an information ‘goldmine’ in the investigation,” it was Hizballah, not the PA, 
who bought the ship for $400,000 cash, although high-level PA figures were involved in 
its selection.  One of them, Fu'ad al-Shubayki, head of procurement in the Palestinian  
national security services, then left for  Teheran, and with “senior officials in the Iranian 
security services, and with officials in the Ayatollah administration,” who told him the 
Iranians would give the 50 tons of weapons, as well as the ship, to the Palestinians for 
free, because they wanted to assist their struggle against the Zionists.   The Palestinians 
had only to pay the “insignificant cost” of the salary of the four crewmembers and the 
small salaries of nine foreigners and mostly Egyptian sailors.482    
 While the Palestinian interest in the weapons deal was clear, “the security 
establishment was professed to be appalled to learn the depth and the intimacy” of the 
Iranian connections, which, based upon the Karine A investigation was  “far more 
dangerous than it was made out to be.”   An unidentified senior official was quoted as 
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 stating that “Israel has firm evidence that this is not a deal between low-ranking clerks, 
but a deal involving all the leaders: Arafat on the Palestinian side, Ali Khamene'i on the 
Iranian side, and Hasan Nasrallah in Lebanon.  The mediator between the three was Imad 
Mughniyah, Hizballah's chief of terrorist attacks abroad.  
 During Defense Minister Ben-Eliezer’s trip to the United States, where he was 
scheduled to meet with “all the senior officials in the administration and security 
establishment,” he planned to address the issue of Iran’s accelerated efforts to procure 
long-range missiles and nuclear weapons.   These weapons not only were a threat to 
Israel, but to the entire world.  “Such strategic power in the hands of the extreme 
Ayatollah regime in Teheran will indirectly threaten the Gulf countries as well and will 
give them full control over the world's oil resources,” Ben-Eliezer said.  He added that  
Iran planned to develop missiles with a wider range than the Shihab-3 (1,300 kilometers), 
which could reach any target in Europe, and eventually the U.S.  The Defense Minister, 
who was certain that Iran would have its first nuclear bomb within three years, suggested 
that this was the time to act.   
    Even intelligence experts who disagreed with Ben Eliezer about the timeline 
were reportedly in agreement concerning the general acceleration of the trend toward 
Iranian nuclear capability and its implications.  An unnamed senior official claimed  that 
Iran had recently been directing its efforts into the nuclear field, with Russian assistance, 
as well as toward producing a steady production line of Shahab missiles into operational 
missiles with the aid of  North Korea and China (to whom the Israelis had been prepared 
to sell Phalcons until the U.S. intervened). The more the details that were exposed about 
Iranian involvement, the greater its scope was revealed.  Current Israeli effort “is aimed 
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 at convincing these countries both to renounce Iran and to return it to the category of the 
‘baddies.’  This is a not-so-simple diplomatic and security effort that to a large extent will 
determine not only the quality of life in the State of Israel, but also its mere existence.”483  
 An analysis in the Jerusalem Post by Miriam Shaviv noted that Ayatollah 
Khameini had denounced Arafat as a lackey of the U.S. back in November of 1998 when 
he signed the Wye memorandum, and that Arafat is regarded as a “Zionist” in Iran, where 
he is booed at anti-Zionist rallies and is generally regarded as a persona non grata.  
Israel’s claim that Iran and Arafat had formed a strategic alliance therefore “indicated a  
serious about-turn, and for Israel, a potentially dangerous development.” Shaviv quoted 
Sharon’s foreign policy adviser Zalman Shoval, a former Israel ambassador to the U.S., 
who declared that “By cooperating with the Palestinian Authority, the Iranians have 
become an immediate threat.”  Most of Israel's evidence, although revealed to the 
Americans during the past week, remained confidential.484   
 Nevertheless, Shaviv included denials of the allegations by both Iranian Defense 
Minister Ali Shamkhani and Palestinian Authority Information Minister Yasser Abed 
Rabbo, who challenged Israel to produce proof of its allegation, and quoting Rabbo that 
the accusations of military cooperation were “absurd, designed to frighten the United 
States, Europe, and even some Arab countries.”  Shaviv added that some highly respected 
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 Israeli analysts cautioned against rejecting these denials out of hand, and considered the 
evidence backing up the allegations to be “shaky.” 
   Gerald Steinberg, Director of the Program on Conflict Resolution and 
Negotiation at Bar-Ilan University, and an op-ed contributor to the Post, emphasized that 
such an alliance, if it existed, had to be viewed in the context of the ongoing power 
struggle between the Khatami-led reformists revolutionary Iranian die-hards; if the arms 
shipment did originate in Iran, might have been organized by one of Iran’s quasi-military 
organizations associated with hardline conservative elements, without the knowledge and 
consent of President Khatami.  Reverting to sources that supported the Israeli 
government’s official position,  Chief of Staff Mofaz was quoted as recently telling the 
press that as far back as the previous April, “direct  contacts began to be forged gradually 
between Yasser Arafat's close aides and the most senior levels in Teheran. A most 
dangerous axis began to be created, consisting of an attempt to infiltrate the region.” 
 Nevertheless, Steinberg was given the last word, warning that confrontation with 
Iran should be avoided.  “The fact that Iran has denied involvement in the Karine A arms 
shipment, instead of bragging about it, is a sign they are not looking for a confrontation.”  
He noted that “we share a lot of interests and dangers, like Iraq,” and recommended 
evaluating the changes taking place in Iran until a change in regime has taken place.485 
 On January 29, 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush, in his State of the Union 
address, declared Iran to be part of an “axis of evil,” along Iraq and North Korea.  “By 
seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.  
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 They could  provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred.  
They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States.  In any of these 
cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.” Bush specifically asserted that 
Iran “aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few 
repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom.”486 
 The response from Tehran was swift.  During a cabinet meeting on January 30, 
President Khatami condemned Bush's remarks as “intervening, warmongering...and 
worse than all, truly insulting towards the Iranian nation.” Khatami stated that “Iran is 
both a victim of terrorism and a victim of chemical weapons, which were generously 
donated to our enemies by those who were after uprooting the Islamic Revolution.”  It 
was unfortunate that after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S., when world 
public opinion was mobilized to counter international terrorism, “that great and important 
opportunity was misused,” thereby doing injustice to all mankind.487        
 The next day, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei said that the president’s 
words seemed to be coming from “a person thirsty for human blood” He declared that 
"The Islamic Republic of Iran is proud of having come under the rage and wrath of the 
greatest Satans.”  Khamenei took particular exception to Bush’s reference to the Iranian 
government be composed of  “unelected leaders.” “Contrary to the unlively elections held 
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 in the West, officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have been elected with majority vote 
and public affection.”   Khamenei decried American hypocrisy in supporting “the 
atrocious Zionist regime and the Israeli crimes against the innocent Palestinians,” and 
said that Bush’s “outrageous remarks” confirmed that  “Washington looks at international 
principles and conventions as a tool to meet its ends and interests.”488       
Summary 
During the period under examination, Israel and Iran both used the “War on 
Terror” to attempt to secure their own political interests.  How well they succeeded is 
beyond the scope of this study, which focuses on the dominant themes and metaphors 
related to “master commemorative narrative” in Israeli and Iranian political discourse and 
public diplomacy. Israel raised the Iranian nuclear issue each time U.S. pressure was 
brought to bear for withdrawal from the territories.  The Israeli metaphors about and 
analogies to the Holocaust--preventing a Holocaust that would result from Iranian nuclear 
acquisition, comparing the U.S. demand for Israeli territorial and policy compromises to 
the German invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1939, and implying that danger posed by Iran 
was an imminent threat to Israel’s existence.  
 Israel’s major concern after 9/11 was the incorporation of Iran into the anti-terror 
coalition might require the sacrifice U.S. friendship with Israel, undermining Israel’s 
exceptional status as the only ally upon which the U.S. and the West can depend.  
Loneliness and fear of betrayal—of being stabbed in the back”—as the U.S. sought allies 
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 in the Muslim world that might be a harbinger of 1938 Europe, were evident in Israel’s 
public diplomacy in the post 9/11 period, especially in its adamant refusal to concede to 
Iran any positive place in the anti-terror coalition.   
Iranians, for their part, made clear their fear of invasion and injustice, not just into 
Iran but into the region, and lobbied for action against Afghanistan under U.N. auspices.  
They focused on securing a definition terrorism that would allow for their support of the 
Palestinians and Hizbullah, and argued against the double standards with regard to the 
nuclear issue as well as in defining terrorism.  Iran attempted to deprive Israel of its 
historical comfort zone and its role as sacrificial victim, casting it as the aggressor, the 
plotter, and a deceiver that incarnates the root cause of the terrorism experienced by the 
U.S.  The accusation that Israelis had deceptively masterminded the 9/11 attacks, or “had 
a hand in them,” illustrates the suspicion of Iranians toward threats of foreign 
interference, and the propensity  toward conspiracy theories in situations of uncertainty 
and vulnerability.. 
The initial phase of US reaction to 9/11, and the Western world’s positive view of 
Iranian responses, particularly the possibility of it being a partner isolating the plague of 
terrorism from the rest of the Muslim world, opened a window for  possible alternative 
narratives in Iran.  The Karine A incident, whether or not it was authentic, served as the 
basis of the “Axis of Evil” speech, undermined potential alternative narratives, and 
reinforced Iran’s own self- image as  both a victim and the true champion of justice. 
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 CHAPTER V   
CONCLUSIONS: FROM  NARRATIVE  TO POLICY 
  
  Karen Armstrong explains that in the premodern world, there were two ways of 
thinking, speaking, and acquiring knowledge, mythos and logos, with primacy accorded 
to myth.  By looking back to the origins of life and the foundations of culture, myth gave 
meaning to the lives of the people within a society.  In the mythic view of history, people 
were far less concerned with what had actually happened than with the meaning of 
events. “Historical incidents were not seen as unique occurrences, set in a far-off time, 
but were thought to be external manifestations of constant, timeless realities.”  Mythic 
events were historicized through narratives that brought out their eternal dimension, and, 
being a reflection of eternal truths, history would repeat itself.489 
 Logos, “the rational, pragmatic, and scientific thought that enabled men and 
women to function well in the world” could give order and direction to daily life, but 
could not give it ultimate value, assuage pain and sorrow, or make sense of tragedy.   
Armstrong contends out that pre-moderns understood very well that mythos and logos 
had separate jobs to do.  Truths of myth were not intended to be empirically 
demonstrable.   Armstrong also credits successful pre-modern leaders with the realization 
that “You were not supposed to make mythos the basis of a pragmatic policy.  If you did 
so, the results could be disastrous...” 490 
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  In Israel and Iran, however, myth often does serve as the basis for policy, and 
even more frequently as a justification for policy.  This concluding chapter offers a 
summary of three themes where myth is incorporated into “master commemorative 
narrative” in some surprising ways, illustrating the flexibility and fungibility of myths in 
terms of various interpretations regarding these themes that they were able to absorb. 
They are: 1) the few against the many; 2) messianism and 3) the Palestinian issue.  
 1. “The few against the many.”   The Karbala paradigm represents resistance in 
Iran’s revolutionary rhetoric.   During the Islamic revolution, the Karbala paradigm was 
interpreted as a battle of the faithful—Khomeini in the role of Imam Husayn and his 
small party of followers—against the Shah, representing Yazid, and his mighty army.491   
In the Iraq war, the entire Iranian people was cast as Imam Husayn fighting for iman 
(faith) against kufr (unbelief). The people were assured by their leaders that God would 
be fighting on their side.  Iman not only served as a means of mass mobilization, but as a 
justification for a war for the true Islam, represented by the Iranian people. Numerically, 
Iran’s population far outnumbered that of Iraq.  By recasting “the few” as the true 
Muslims, and the many as those who did not  fight along with God in the spirit of 
Karbala, the “few against the many” was able to serve as a mobilizing force to keep the 
war going, after Iran had successfully repelled the Iraqi attack, and was in a superior 
position vis-à-vis the Iraqi forces. 492    
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  In Israel, the theme of the “few against the many” is a well-known theme from the 
Book of Maccabees, easily recognizable by Jews who were a small minority against “the 
nations” wherever they were.  The phrase was a dominant motif in Israeli self-perception 
during the 1920s and 1930s.  During Israel’s War of Independence, however, the phrase 
was “too dangerously close to reality” to serve as an effective mobilizing theme.    
Instead, the battle became for a new identity. The Zionist revolution was a revolt against 
the fate of the Jew in the gentile world.493  
 “All other revolts, both past and future, were uprisings against a system, against a 
political, social or economic structure,” Ben-Gurion declared.  “Our revolution is directed 
not only against a system, but against destiny, against the unique destiny of a unique 
people.”494   Israeli identity is conceived of as the antithesis of the diaspora Jewish 
identity: Israelis return to their land as conquerors.  Ironically, the old Jewish identity was 
then  projected  onto Arabs. Arab refugees, during and after the war, were even described 
disparagingly as “wandering Jews.”495 Perhaps not surprisingly, most of the options 
Israelis have envisioned for Arab have been based on those endured by the Jews in 
Europe—segregation in their own communities, autonomy and separation.   
 2. Messianism.  Iranian leaders deliberately discouraged messianism during the 
Iraq war, and played down expectations that the hardships of the Iran-Iraq war would 
bring about the long-awaited return of the mahdi.  The goals of the return of the mahdi 
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 were the same as those of the Islamic republic itself—the establishment of the ideal 
state— and Iran’s leaders did not want to arouse millenarian anticipation that could prove 
destabilizing during and after the war.496  
 The Six Day War, on the other hand, was viewed as replete with messianic 
implications.  “This war stopped the sun in its orbit,” wrote Aharon Meged.  “It seemed 
that all the powers above were taking part in it.  If war was being waged in the skies, then 
it was not the air force alone that was fighting; and if all the armies of the land, then it 
was not the  Israeli army alone...the entire space was filled with biblical verses, biblical 
prophesies, psalms, kabbalistic homilies, mystic symbols.”497 The messiah who came, 
however, was none other than the new Jew: “The messiah arrived in Jerusalem—tired, 
grey, and riding on the back of a tank.  He led a column of armoured vehicles forward as 
Arab mortars showered shells upon them…The messiah was wearing an army uniform 
this time.  An IDF soldier, a Jewish warrior…498  
 After the Six Day War, the implications of living in the messianic era began to 
manifest themselves.  Rabbis declared that with the recapture of the Temple Mount, the 
end of days was near.  The Gush Emunim movement galvanized to reclaim the territories 
captured during the war, and to create “facts on the ground” to prevent its return.  
Political leaders were helpless against the  onslaught of messianic fervor, either out of 
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 sympathy with it or uncertainty as to how to cope with the first great surge of populism of 
a “normal” nation. 
3. The Palestinians.  Ayatollah Khomeini’s earliest fulminations against Israel on 
the issue of Palestine, dating back to the early 1960s, focus on reclaiming the territory of 
Palestine and the plight of Arab refugees.  He castigated the heads of the Arab states, who 
banded together in to contest an Israeli attempt to divert the course of the Jordan River, 
for choosing to fight over a river instead of all of Palestine.  In the meantime, “The 
defenseless Arabs were expelled and now about a million or more of them are hungry and 
miserable in the desert.” 499    
The association of Iran with Palestinian cause is generally perceived in the West 
in terms of Iran supporting and directing the activities  of terrorist movements in order to 
control them. It was the PLO, however, that trained some of the revolutionaries who 
brought about the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran.   Khomeini was brought to power and 
supported by a number of Palestinian-trained Iranian revolutionaries, and in return, the 
PLO demanded political and material support, including arms, funding and human 
resources.500  In the early 1970s, young Iranians were admitted to Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) camps Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Libya.  Arafat’s Fatah  backed 
Khomeini as well as the Iranian Marxist Mujahidin al-Khalk,  while the Marxist-atheistic 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), led by  George Habash supported 
the Marxist-Leninist Fedayi’in Khalk movement, the Democratic Front for the 
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 Liberation of Palestinian (DFLP) allied itself with Iranian leftists who were loyal to 
Moscow.  Yet another group, the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) directed its energies 
toward the ethnic Arabs of Khuzistan who were later encouraged by the PLF and Iraq to 
rebel against Khomeini. 501   
Immediately after the revolution, Arafat invited himself to Teheran to personally 
congratulate Khomeini on his victory, declaring he needed no invitation.  Iran’s new and 
none-too-secure regime was not pleased by the reports of the PLO and PFLP provoking 
Khuzistan’s Arab minority, nor by Palestinian support for groups hostile to the Islamic 
regime.  Much to Arafat’s annoyance, Khomeni insisted that Iran, in light of its own 
pressing needs, was unable to help the Palestinians very much in a material way.    In the 
escalating conflict between Iran and Iraq, the Palestinians were seen as backing Iraq.  By 
the end of 1980, “the real honeymoon” between Khomeini and Arafat was over. 502  
Nevertheless, while Khomeini proclaimed August 17 as Quds (Jerusalem) Day, 
and called for worldwide demonstrations by Muslims demanding Palestinian rights, he 
had little use for Palestinian leaders.  The colder his relationship with actual Palestians 
leaders, the more fervent and strident the Quds Day speeches  became, targeting U.S. 
imperialism and calling for Israel’s elimination.  Ironically, during the Iran-Iraq war, 
Israel sold arms and spare parts to Iran’s Islamic regime in seeming defiance of stated 
U.S. policy, as well as of Israel’s own “master commemorative narrative,” while arguing 
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 that it was working to facilitate regime change in Iran. Regime change in Iran remained 
Israel’s defense of its role in the Iran-Contra affair.   
The biblical command to dwell in the Land and extirpate its prior inhabitants 
legitimates and reinforces the agreement among nearly all Israelis, from across the 
political spectrum that, in order for Israel to survive as both a state with preponderant 
Jewish population, and a democracy predicated on majority rule, Arabs must remain a 
minority, and the fewer of them within Israel’s borders, the better. The debate is: should 
this be achieved by carving out some of the territory conquered by Israel in the Six Day 
War and giving it to the Palestinian Arabs, so that there is no need for them to be either 
full or second-class citizens of Israel?    Many Israelis contend that there are many Arab 
states but only one Jewish state, and Palestinian Arabs should therefore be encouraged, 
persuaded, even forced, if necessary, to relocate outside the Land promised to the Jews.  
The peace process, even for liberal Israelis, is a matter of separation, not of co-existence.   
In each of these issue areas, myth works in surprising ways.  “Master 
commemorative narrative provides an entrée for assessing the use of myth in a broader 
context of meaning to a society.  On their own, individual images can be misleading, 
even deceptive, because of their ambiguity and their power to be used in so many various 
ways.   
In Jewish history, Cyrus credited by the Bible for  ending the exile of the Jews of 
 Babylon and allowing them to return to Judea. The majority of Jews, then and now, 
chose not to go.  Cyrus is a reminder that whenever Jews have been offered the 
opportunity to return to their historic homeland, most have chosen not to do so.  The 
figure of Cyrus challenges the Zionist “master commemorative  narrative” because it is 
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 an unwelcome memory  of a rupture in the continuity of Judean habitation of the Land of 
Israel more than six centuries prior to the two thousand year exile imposed upon the Jews 
by Rome in 70 CE. Furthermore, since the Second Temple period, more Jews have lived 
outside Palestine than in it.  Finally, Cyrus is a reminder that much of Judaism developed 
in a Persian cultural milieu, and Jews shared many rituals and values with their 
neighbors.     For these reasons, Cyrus, although a hero, is an ambivalent and ambiguous 
figure in Jewish history, for and about whom no commemorative rituals exist. 
For Iranians, Cyrus is a reminder that they were once a mighty empire, and that 
there is no reason that they cannot be one again.  For those looking for models of 
tolerance, Cyrus is invoked as a benevolent conqueror whose treatment of his conquests 
was respectful of their traditions.  Initially, the Islamic Revolutionary regime that gained 
power in 1979 associated Cyrus with the most negative aspects of the Shah’s rule, 
deriding him as an imperialist, a Zionist, and even a Jew.  Eventually he came to be seen, 
however, as part of a long history of Iranian courage and endurance that predated but also 
includes its Islamic heritage, and supportive of a  benevolently expansive foreign policy. 
The lesson of Cyrus is that, he is a shared historical meeting point of Israeli and 
Iranian.  At this time it appearsto be  in no one’s interest to bring him to life again.  In the 
future, however, if and when a myth of reconciliation is needed, he will be there, ready to 
be adapted into a new myth commemoration. 
In the meantime, the dramatic changes in mythos engendered by the election of 
Menachem Begin as Israel’s Prime Minister in 1977, and the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran in 1979, seem frozen in time.    The political discourses of both Israel 
and Iran metamorphosed from the dream of recapturing the ancient glory of two 
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 millennia ago through rapid modernization and westernization to the articulation of deep-
seated grievances toward most of the rest of the world, expressed in the “people that 
dwells alone” and “every day is Ashura” paradigms.  Religiously mandated 
exceptionalism shaped and drove this sense of victimization as well as providing the 
images and metaphors for its expression.  
 The European Holocaust, through the  association of Hitler with Amalek and 
Haman, has become an extension of the biblical narrative. Israel’s founding generation of 
Labor leaders considered the Holocaust and the triumph of Amalek to be an 
embarrassment for the Jewish people, and yet they willingly spoke of it abroad to arouse 
gentile guilt.  Begin’s  foreign policy rhetoric transformed the Jewish state from a haven 
where the oppressed and victimized Jews of the world could be empowered and 
“normalized” to the quintessential symbol of the Jewish people as a victim of “the 
nations.” The right wing slogan “Never Again!” justified the use of pre-emptive violence 
as a religious obligation, in order to prevent another Holocaust, as in the case of the 
Israeli attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor at Osirak.  Israelis frequently speak of doing 
attacking nuclear targets in Iran, based upon the biblical right to act preemptively to kill a 
would-be murderer, on the basis of the Bible and commentaries.  in order save the lives 
of Jews, hoping it would force regime change.  With a Karbala paradigm at the heart of 
its national self-perception, it is hardly surprising that threats have exactly the opposite 
effect than intended in changing state behavior.  
The objective of this research has been to explain the religious and cultural 
dimensions of the foreign policies of Israel and Iran.  Israel and Iran share an underlying 
sense of victimization and isolation that animates their domestic and foreign policy 
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 discourse, but also a vision of recapturing past glory in the present and gaining 
redemption  in the future.   The past is invoked and interpreted as a relevant model for the 
present through invocations of the paradigmatic images of Auschwitz and Ashura.  
  These contradictory narratives contextualize Israeli and Iranian foreign policy 
discourse. They are very much a part of the tensions between Israel and Iran.  The Bible 
gives  Israel  a “comparative advantage” in marketing itself in the realm of public opinion 
in the U.S., presently the most powerful nation in the world.503   Former U.S. President  
Jimmy Carter  recounts,  “For me there is no way to approach or enter Israel without 
thinking first about the Bible and the history of the land and its people.  The names and 
images have long been an integral part of my life as a Christian…It is rare indeed to find 
the distant past so intertwined with the immediate present, not just for historians and 
theologians in their classrooms and studies, but for statesmen in the halls of government 
and military commanders in the field of battle.504  
Since the end of the Six Day War, Christian dispensationalists, not unlike those of 
Lord Shaftesbury’s era, have become increasingly vocal and politically active in the 
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 Israeli-Iranian dynamic.  They have used their influence to make common cause with 
pro-Israel groups such as AIPAC, and have even created their own Christians United for 
Israel (CUFI) that shows its support for Israel by unequivocal opposition to any peace 
process, no less vehement than Iranian opposition to the same process in the name of the 
Palestinians.  Dispensationalists have become, in Timothy Weber’s words, Israel’s “new 
best friends” as well as “its most fierce and unwavering supporters, at the same time that 
they have tried to converts as many Jews as possible to the Christian faith.  One should 
not expect this pattern of behavior to change any time soon.”505 
  The myths that make up the Hebrew world view are perhaps unexceptional by 
the standards of small ethnic communities and religious sects,” Raymond Cohen 
observes.   
What is extraordinary about them is not only that they compose a secularized 
version of Judaism's historical self-consciousness itself but also that, with some 
variation and rationalization here and there, they have undergirded the ideology of 
a revolutionary political movement and molded the day-to-day discourse of a 
government in power in the midst of the twentieth century.506 
 
This discourse, however, has strong mythic components that offer dangers as well as 
opportunities.  In this respect they also share much with Iran.   
What is also extraordinary is the Zionist movement’s remarkable success in 
gaining acceptance of the modern State of Israel’s identity with an idealized ancient 
polity depicted in the Bible, not only within Israel’s domestic political discourse but in its 
foreign relations with primarily Christian countries, particularly the U.S. Within 
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 academia the axiomatic acceptance of the identification of biblical and modern Israel is 
generally regarded as mainstream and normative.    
In this study, I have argued that Iran and Israel have much in common in their 
“master commemorative narratives.” These commonalities, rather than being shared, 
have been the focus of competition, as the national and religious myths of two peoples 
who base their identity not only on a vision of a glorious historical past but the possibility 
of a redemptive, utopian vision future.   Ritual reenactments and “invented traditions” 
have served to sustain both visions.  
 The study of “master commemorative narratives” has the potential of opening up 
new ways of examining global conflict.    The need for analysts to be aware of and 
understand a country’s “master commemorative narrative” seem essential to effective 
diplomacy and devising feasible policy.  Threatening Iran with attack for non-compliance 
with its IAEA, for example, would be recognized as counterproductive for anyone 
familiar with the Karbala paradigm. Challenging the historicity of the Holocaust is not 
simply a matter of re-investigating “facts,” as Iran’s president declared, but is an attack 
on Israel’s theology of suffering and redemption, not unlike the Karbala paradigm.  
Equally dangerous is the “routinization of catastrophe” in some Israeli discourse that 
insists that any demand for territorial compromise is tantamount to the roundup of Jews 
in 1939 for slaughter in European death camps.  
It would follow that a crucial requirement for foreign service officers, diplomats, 
intelligence analysts and operatives, journalists, and academics dealing with a particular 
country would be to learn at least as much about its “master commemorative narrative” 
and the variant narratives it subsumes, as about its economy, demography, 
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 communication and transportation infrastructures and other considered useful by the 
CIA’s World Factbook,  Library of Congress Country Studies, and similar sources.Yet 
such information is rarely mentioned in discussions of foreign policy. Beyond narrow 
elite interests and manipulation of religious language to mobilize the masses, myths and 
“master commemorative narratives” can open up new insight into the motivations 
underlying political discourse and state behavior and understanding political discourse.   
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